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Threat Model Analysis for wailsapp/wails

Threat: Frontend Input Manipulation to Exploit Backend Go Functions

  • Threat: Frontend Input Manipulation to Exploit Backend Go Functions

    • Description: An attacker crafts malicious input in the frontend (JavaScript) that is passed to an exposed Go function through the Wails binding mechanism. The attacker leverages a lack of input validation or sanitization in the Go function to execute arbitrary code, access sensitive data, or cause a denial-of-service. The Wails bridge is the direct conduit for this attack. For example, an attacker might send a specially crafted string that, when processed by a vulnerable Go function, triggers a buffer overflow or SQL injection (if the Go function interacts with a database).
    • Impact:
      • Complete application compromise.
      • Data breach (sensitive data exposure).
      • System compromise (if the Go function has access to system resources).
      • Application crash (denial of service).
    • Wails Component Affected:
      • runtime.EventsOn/Emit (if event-based communication is used without proper validation, this is a Wails-specific API).
      • Exposed Go functions (specifically, the function parameters and the code within the function that handles the input). The vulnerability is in how the Go function handles input received via Wails.
      • Wails binding mechanism (the bridge itself is the essential conduit; without Wails, this attack vector wouldn't exist in this form).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Backend Input Validation: Implement strict input validation in every exposed Go function that is accessible through Wails. Use type checking, length restrictions, whitelisting (preferred over blacklisting), and regular expressions. Validate all data received from the frontend, regardless of any frontend-side validation. This is crucial because the data is coming through Wails.
      • Use of Structs: Define Go structs to represent the expected data format for each exposed function called via Wails. This enforces type safety and makes validation easier. Unmarshal JSON data from the frontend directly into these structs. This is a best practice specifically for the Wails communication pattern.
      • Parameterized Queries: If the Go function (exposed through Wails) interacts with a database, always use parameterized queries or prepared statements to prevent SQL injection.
      • Error Handling: Implement robust error handling in Go. Do not return detailed error messages to the frontend via Wails. Log errors securely on the backend.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Expose only the absolute minimum necessary Go functionality to the frontend through the Wails binding.

Threat: Frontend Code Modification to Bypass Security Controls and Attack via Wails

  • Threat: Frontend Code Modification to Bypass Security Controls and Attack via Wails

    • Description: An attacker gains access to the application's files and modifies the frontend JavaScript code to directly interact with the Wails binding mechanism. They bypass frontend-side validation, directly call exposed Go functions (via Wails) with malicious parameters, or inject code that interacts with the backend in unintended ways using the Wails bridge. The attack relies on the ability to call Go functions through Wails.
    • Impact:
      • Application compromise.
      • Data breach.
      • System compromise (potentially, if Go functions exposed through Wails have system access).
    • Wails Component Affected:
      • Frontend JavaScript code (specifically, the parts that interact with the Wails runtime).
      • Wails binding mechanism (this is the essential component being abused).
      • Exposed Go functions (the ultimate target, accessed via Wails).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Code Integrity Checks: Implement runtime checks to verify the integrity of the frontend code that interacts with Wails. Calculate a hash (e.g., SHA-256) of the relevant frontend files and compare it to a known good hash stored securely (e.g., in the Go backend, signed). This is to protect the code that uses the Wails bridge.
      • Digital Signatures: Digitally sign the frontend code (and the entire application bundle) to ensure authenticity and prevent tampering. This helps prevent modification of the code that calls Wails functions.
      • Minimize Frontend Security Logic: Do not rely solely on frontend validation. All critical security checks must be performed in the Go backend, especially for functions exposed through Wails.
      • Obfuscation (Limited): Obfuscate the frontend JavaScript code, particularly the parts that interact with the Wails runtime, to make it more difficult to understand and modify.

Threat: Unauthorized Local Resource Access via Exposed Go Functions (through Wails)

  • Threat: Unauthorized Local Resource Access via Exposed Go Functions (through Wails)

    • Description: An attacker exploits a Go function exposed through the Wails binding mechanism that interacts with local system resources (files, network, hardware) without proper authorization or validation. The Wails bridge is the attack vector. For example, a function intended to read a specific configuration file might be tricked into reading arbitrary files on the system (path traversal) because it's exposed and callable via Wails.
    • Impact:
      • Data leakage (reading sensitive files).
      • Data modification/deletion (writing to arbitrary files).
      • System compromise (executing commands, accessing hardware).
      • Network compromise (connecting to malicious servers).
    • Wails Component Affected:
      • Exposed Go functions that interact with the os, net, io/ioutil (or io), and other system-level packages, specifically those functions made available through the Wails binding.
      • Wails binding mechanism (the essential pathway for the attack).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Path Validation: If dealing with file paths in functions exposed through Wails, always validate them rigorously. Use absolute paths, avoid relative paths, and check for path traversal attempts. Use functions like filepath.Clean and filepath.Abs in Go.
      • Principle of Least Privilege (Filesystem): Run the application with the minimum necessary file system permissions. Avoid running as an administrator or root user. This limits the damage even if a Wails-exposed function is compromised.
      • Network Restrictions: If the application needs to make network connections via functions exposed through Wails, restrict the allowed destinations (e.g., using a whitelist).
      • User Confirmation: For sensitive operations triggered through Wails (e.g., accessing hardware, deleting files), require explicit user confirmation through a native dialog box (using Wails' dialog API).
      • Sandboxing (OS-Specific): Explore OS-specific sandboxing to limit the application's access to system resources, especially for functionality exposed through Wails.

Threat: Exploitation of Vulnerabilities in the Wails Framework Itself

  • Threat: Exploitation of Vulnerabilities in the Wails Framework Itself

    • Description: An attacker discovers and exploits a vulnerability in the Wails framework code, specifically targeting the binding mechanism, the runtime, or other core components that facilitate the Go-JavaScript communication. This is a direct attack on Wails.
    • Impact:
      • Potentially severe, as it could affect all Wails applications and bypass application-level security.
      • Could lead to arbitrary code execution, data breaches, or denial of service.
    • Wails Component Affected:
      • The Wails framework itself (various modules and functions, especially the binding and runtime).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Keep Wails Updated: Update to the latest stable version of Wails as soon as possible after releases, especially if security fixes are included. This is the primary defense against Wails framework vulnerabilities.
      • Monitor Wails Releases: Subscribe to Wails release announcements and security advisories.
      • Contribute to Security: If possible, contribute to Wails security audits or testing.
      • Defense in Depth: Implement the other mitigations listed above (input validation, etc.). Even if a Wails vulnerability exists, strong application-level security can limit the impact.