Attack Surface: Unverified Plugin Installation
- Description: Wox allows users to install plugins from untrusted sources without built-in mechanisms to verify their integrity or safety. This lack of verification is a direct feature of Wox's plugin system.
- Wox Contribution: Wox's core design includes a plugin architecture that, by default, permits loading plugins from various locations without mandatory source verification or signature checks. This directly enables the risk.
- Example: A user installs a plugin from an unofficial online forum to add a new search provider to Wox. Unbeknownst to the user, this plugin contains malicious code that logs keystrokes and sends them to a remote server.
- Impact: Execution of arbitrary code within the Wox process, potentially leading to data theft, system compromise, and malware infection.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Developer: While developers using Wox might not directly control Wox's core plugin loading, they can:
- Educate users within their application's documentation about the risks of installing untrusted Wox plugins.
- Provide curated lists or recommendations of trusted plugins if applicable to their application's use case.
- User:
- Only install plugins from highly trusted and reputable sources. Prefer official plugin repositories or developers with established credibility.
- Exercise extreme caution when installing plugins from unofficial websites, forums, or unknown developers.
- Regularly review installed Wox plugins and uninstall any that are no longer needed or from questionable sources.
- If possible, research the plugin developer and community feedback before installation.
- Developer: While developers using Wox might not directly control Wox's core plugin loading, they can:
Attack Surface: Plugin Vulnerabilities
- Description: Even plugins developed for Wox by legitimate third parties can contain security vulnerabilities due to coding errors or insecure dependencies. Wox's plugin execution environment can then expose these vulnerabilities.
- Wox Contribution: Wox loads and executes plugin code within its own process space. Vulnerabilities within these plugins directly become attack vectors against the Wox application and potentially the user's system, as Wox itself doesn't provide plugin vulnerability scanning or sandboxing by default.
- Example: A popular Wox plugin for managing system settings has a vulnerability that allows an attacker to inject arbitrary commands through specially crafted input to the plugin's functions. Exploiting this vulnerability through Wox allows the attacker to execute commands with the privileges of the Wox process.
- Impact: Data breaches, unauthorized file system access, arbitrary code execution, denial of service, all stemming from vulnerabilities within Wox plugins.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Developer: Developers using Wox should:
- Advise users to keep their Wox plugins updated to the latest versions, as updates often include security patches for plugin vulnerabilities.
- If possible, provide guidance or recommendations on selecting plugins with a history of security awareness and active maintenance.
- User:
- Keep all installed Wox plugins updated to their latest versions. Plugin updates frequently address security vulnerabilities.
- Monitor plugin developer communities or security forums for reports of vulnerabilities in Wox plugins.
- If a vulnerability is reported in a plugin, disable or uninstall it until a patched version is available.
- Prefer plugins that are actively maintained and have a responsive developer team known for addressing security issues.
- Developer: Developers using Wox should:
Attack Surface: Command Injection via Custom Commands
- Description: Wox's custom command feature, if not used carefully, can be exploited for command injection. Improperly sanitized user input within custom commands can allow attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands through Wox.
- Wox Contribution: Wox's functionality to define and execute custom commands, including shell commands, is a direct feature. If users or applications using Wox define custom commands that don't properly handle user input, Wox becomes the conduit for command injection attacks.
- Example: A user defines a custom Wox command to search for files using a keyword like "find". An attacker crafts a malicious keyword like
find $(malicious_command)
, which, if the custom command directly executes this input in a shell without sanitization, will result inmalicious_command
being executed on the system when the "find" keyword is used in Wox. - Impact: Critical system compromise, arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the Wox process, data deletion, privilege escalation, denial of service.
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Developer: Developers using Wox should:
- Strongly advise users against defining custom commands that directly execute shell commands with unsanitized user input.
- If custom commands are necessary, provide clear guidelines and examples of secure command construction, emphasizing input sanitization and parameterized command execution.
- User:
- Exercise extreme caution when defining custom Wox commands, especially those involving shell execution.
- Never directly use user input in shell commands within custom commands without rigorous sanitization and validation.
- Understand the severe security risks associated with command injection and avoid creating custom commands that could be vulnerable.
- If possible, use safer alternatives to shell command execution within custom commands, or limit the functionality of custom commands to non-sensitive actions.
- Developer: Developers using Wox should:
Attack Surface: Path Traversal in Custom Commands
- Description: Wox's custom command feature, when used to handle file paths, can be vulnerable to path traversal attacks if input validation is insufficient. This allows attackers to access files or directories outside the intended scope through Wox.
- Wox Contribution: Wox's custom command functionality allows for file system interactions based on user-provided input. If custom commands are designed to handle file paths without proper validation, Wox directly facilitates path traversal vulnerabilities.
- Example: A custom Wox command is created to open files in a specific project directory. An attacker uses a keyword like
open ../../../sensitive_file.txt
. If the custom command doesn't properly validate and sanitize the path, Wox could be used to accesssensitive_file.txt
located outside the intended project directory, due to path traversal. - Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive files and directories, information disclosure, potential for further exploitation depending on the accessed data.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Developer: Developers using Wox should:
- Strongly advise users to implement robust path validation and sanitization in any custom Wox commands that handle file paths.
- Provide examples and guidelines for secure file path handling within custom commands, emphasizing the prevention of path traversal.
- User:
- Be extremely careful when defining custom Wox commands that handle file paths.
- Always validate and sanitize user input used in file path operations within custom commands to prevent path traversal.
- Avoid using relative paths or directly incorporating user input into file paths without thorough security checks.
- Restrict file access within custom commands to the necessary directories only and implement checks to ensure paths remain within the intended boundaries.
- Developer: Developers using Wox should: