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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for wox-launcher/wox

Attack Surface: 1. Malicious Plugins (Wox's Handling)

  • Description: Wox's execution of code from potentially malicious third-party plugins. This focuses on Wox's role in enabling this, not the plugin itself.
  • Wox Contribution: Wox's plugin architecture provides the mechanism for loading and executing external code, making it a critical point of vulnerability. The lack of strong isolation is the core issue.
  • Example: A malicious plugin is installed, and Wox executes it without sufficient sandboxing, allowing the plugin to access the user's files.
  • Impact: Complete system compromise, data theft, installation of further malware, credential theft.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer:
      • Implement robust plugin sandboxing (e.g., separate processes with minimal privileges). This is the primary mitigation.
      • Implement a plugin signing system and enforce signature verification.
      • Implement a permission system, requiring plugins to declare and request specific permissions. Wox should enforce these permissions.
      • Provide a clear API for plugins that minimizes the risk of security vulnerabilities (e.g., safe functions for file access, network communication).

Attack Surface: 2. Command Injection via Queries (Wox's Processing)

  • Description: Wox's handling of user-entered queries, specifically the potential for injecting malicious commands if input is not properly sanitized before being passed to system functions or APIs.
  • Wox Contribution: Wox's core functionality involves processing user input (queries) and potentially interacting with the operating system or other applications based on that input. This is where the vulnerability lies.
  • Example: A user enters a query that, due to a flaw in Wox's parsing logic, is interpreted as a system command and executed. This could happen even without a malicious plugin if Wox itself has a vulnerability in how it handles certain characters or commands.
  • Impact: Arbitrary code execution, system compromise, data loss.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer:
      • Implement strict input validation and sanitization for all user input processed by Wox.
      • Use parameterized queries or APIs whenever interacting with the operating system or external applications. Never construct commands by concatenating strings with user input.
      • Employ a whitelist approach for allowed characters in queries, rejecting anything outside the whitelist.
      • Thoroughly test and fuzz the query parsing and handling logic.

Attack Surface: 3. Insecure Inter-Process Communication (IPC)

  • Description: Vulnerabilities in the communication mechanism between Wox's main process and any helper processes or plugins (if they run in separate processes).
  • Wox Contribution: Wox's architecture and choice of IPC mechanism directly determine the security of this communication.
  • Example: If Wox uses an insecure IPC method (e.g., named pipes without proper authentication), an attacker could potentially inject commands or data into Wox or a plugin.
  • Impact: Arbitrary code execution, privilege escalation, data manipulation.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer:
      • Use well-established, secure IPC mechanisms (e.g., named pipes with proper access control lists, secure sockets with TLS).
      • Implement strong authentication and authorization for all IPC communication.
      • Encrypt sensitive data transmitted via IPC.
      • Validate all data received via IPC, treating it as untrusted.
      • Avoid custom-built IPC protocols unless absolutely necessary and rigorously security-reviewed.

Attack Surface: 4. Insecure Update Mechanism

  • Description: Flaws in Wox's update process that could allow an attacker to deliver a malicious update.
  • Wox Contribution: Wox's update mechanism is entirely within its control and is a critical security component.
  • Example: An attacker compromises the update server or performs a man-in-the-middle attack, replacing a legitimate Wox update with a compromised version.
  • Impact: Complete system compromise, as the attacker can deliver arbitrary code through the update.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer:
      • Use HTTPS for all update downloads.
      • Must verify the digital signature of downloaded updates using a trusted certificate authority.
      • Implement a secure update mechanism that is resistant to tampering and rollback attacks.
      • Regularly audit the update process and infrastructure for security vulnerabilities.