Mitigation Strategy: Strict Configuration Schema Validation
- Description:
- Step 1: Define a formal schema (e.g., JSON Schema) that describes the expected structure and valid values for your
xray-coreconfiguration files. This schema should include data types, required fields, allowed values, and constraints for all configuration parameters, especially security-sensitive ones like protocols, ciphers, ports, and access control settings withinxray-core. - Step 2: Integrate a schema validation library or tool into your application's deployment pipeline or configuration management system. This tool will automatically check your
xray-coreconfiguration files against the defined schema before deployment or application startup. - Step 3: Implement error handling to reject invalid configurations. If the validation fails, the deployment or application startup should be aborted, and detailed error messages should be logged to indicate the specific configuration issues within
xray-coreconfiguration. - Step 4: Regularly review and update the schema to reflect changes in
xray-coreversions, security best practices, and your application's evolving requirements related toxray-coreconfiguration.
- Step 1: Define a formal schema (e.g., JSON Schema) that describes the expected structure and valid values for your
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Misconfiguration Vulnerabilities (High Severity): Incorrectly configured settings in
xray-corecan lead to open proxies, insecure protocols, unauthorized access throughxray-core, and denial-of-service vulnerabilities related toxray-corefunctionality. - Accidental Exposure of Internal Services (Medium Severity): Misconfigurations in routing or inbound/outbound settings within
xray-corecould unintentionally expose internal services or networks to the internet or unauthorized users viaxray-core.
- Misconfiguration Vulnerabilities (High Severity): Incorrectly configured settings in
- Impact:
- Misconfiguration Vulnerabilities: Significantly reduces the risk by preventing the deployment of
xray-coreconfigurations that deviate from security best practices and defined policies. - Accidental Exposure of Internal Services: Moderately reduces the risk by enforcing stricter configuration parameters within
xray-corerelated to network access and routing.
- Misconfiguration Vulnerabilities: Significantly reduces the risk by preventing the deployment of
- Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Developers might perform basic manual configuration reviews, but automated schema validation for
xray-coreconfiguration is likely missing. - Missing Implementation: Definition of a comprehensive JSON schema for
xray-coreconfiguration, integration of schema validation into the CI/CD pipeline, automated validation checks before deployment ofxray-coreconfigurations, and regular schema updates.
Mitigation Strategy: Principle of Least Privilege Configuration
- Description:
- Step 1: Identify the absolute minimum set of features and functionalities required from
xray-corefor your application to operate correctly. - Step 2: Disable or remove any unnecessary features, protocols, or modules in the
xray-coreconfiguration. This includes removing unused inbound/outbound protocols withinxray-core, disabling features like stats or API access provided byxray-coreif not needed, and restricting protocol options to only those required byxray-coreconfiguration. - Step 3: Configure access control lists (ACLs) and routing rules within
xray-coreto limit the scope of its operations. For example, restrict allowed destination IPs, ports, or domains if possible usingxray-core's features. - Step 4: Regularly review the
xray-coreconfiguration and remove any newly added features or protocols that are not actively used or required.
- Step 1: Identify the absolute minimum set of features and functionalities required from
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Reduced Attack Surface (Medium Severity): By disabling unnecessary features within
xray-core, the overall attack surface ofxray-coreis reduced, making it harder for attackers to exploit potential vulnerabilities in unused components ofxray-core. - Lateral Movement (Low to Medium Severity): Limiting the scope of
xray-core's operations through its configuration can restrict potential lateral movement if thexray-coreinstance is compromised.
- Reduced Attack Surface (Medium Severity): By disabling unnecessary features within
- Impact:
- Reduced Attack Surface: Moderately reduces the risk by minimizing the number of potential entry points for attackers within
xray-coreitself. - Lateral Movement: Minimally to Moderately reduces the risk depending on the level of restriction achievable in the
xray-coreconfiguration.
- Reduced Attack Surface: Moderately reduces the risk by minimizing the number of potential entry points for attackers within
- Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Developers might generally try to keep configurations simple, but a systematic approach to least privilege configuration within
xray-coreis likely missing. - Missing Implementation: Formal review of required
xray-corefeatures, explicit disabling of unused features inxray-coreconfiguration, implementation of granular ACLs and routing rules withinxray-core, and periodic configuration reviews to maintain least privilege inxray-core.
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Default Settings Review and Modification
- Description:
- Step 1: Thoroughly review the default configuration file and documentation provided by
xtls/xray-core. Identify any default settings that could pose a security risk in your specific environment. Pay close attention to default ports used byxray-core, exposed interfaces ofxray-core, enabled protocols inxray-core, and authentication settings forxray-coremanagement if applicable. - Step 2: Change all default passwords, API keys, or any other default credentials provided by
xray-coreif applicable. Ensure strong, unique credentials are used. - Step 3: Modify default ports used by
xray-coreto non-standard ports if appropriate for your environment (while considering network manageability). - Step 4: Disable or restrict access to any default management interfaces or APIs provided by
xray-coreif they are not required or should not be publicly accessible. - Step 5: Document all deviations from the default
xray-coreconfiguration and the security rationale behind these changes.
- Step 1: Thoroughly review the default configuration file and documentation provided by
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Exploitation of Default Credentials (High Severity if defaults are weak or unchanged): Default credentials in
xray-coreare a common target for attackers and can lead to immediate compromise ofxray-core. - Information Disclosure (Low to Medium Severity): Default configurations of
xray-coremight expose unnecessary information or services that could be used for reconnaissance or further attacks targetingxray-coreor systems behind it.
- Exploitation of Default Credentials (High Severity if defaults are weak or unchanged): Default credentials in
- Impact:
- Exploitation of Default Credentials: Significantly reduces the risk by eliminating the vulnerability of easily guessable or well-known default credentials in
xray-core. - Information Disclosure: Minimally to Moderately reduces the risk by limiting exposure of unnecessary information through
xray-coredefault settings.
- Exploitation of Default Credentials: Significantly reduces the risk by eliminating the vulnerability of easily guessable or well-known default credentials in
- Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Developers are likely to change default passwords if any are obviously present in
xray-core, but a comprehensive review of all default settings and their security implications withinxray-coremight be missing. - Missing Implementation: Formal documented review of
xray-coredefault settings, systematic modification of risky defaults, and ongoing process to review defaults with eachxray-coreupdate.
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Strong Authentication for Management Interfaces
- Description:
- Step 1: Identify all management interfaces exposed by
xray-core(e.g., APIs, control panels, or any interfaces used for administration or monitoring ofxray-core). - Step 2: Disable or remove any management interfaces of
xray-corethat are not absolutely necessary. - Step 3: For remaining management interfaces of
xray-core, enforce strong authentication mechanisms. Options include:- API Keys: Generate strong, unique API keys and require them for all API requests to
xray-coremanagement interfaces. Implement secure storage and rotation of API keys. - Certificate-Based Authentication: Use TLS client certificates for authentication to
xray-coremanagement interfaces, providing mutual authentication and stronger security than passwords. - Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): If applicable and supported by
xray-coremanagement interfaces, implement MFA to add an extra layer of security.
- API Keys: Generate strong, unique API keys and require them for all API requests to
- Step 4: Avoid using basic password authentication if possible for
xray-coremanagement, as it is less secure. If passwords are used, enforce strong password policies (complexity, length, rotation). - Step 5: Implement proper authorization controls within
xray-coremanagement to ensure authenticated users only have access to the management functions they are authorized to use.
- Step 1: Identify all management interfaces exposed by
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Unauthorized Access to Management Interfaces (High Severity): Weak or missing authentication on
xray-coremanagement interfaces can allow attackers to gain administrative control overxray-coreand potentially the underlying system throughxray-core. - Configuration Tampering (High Severity): Unauthorized access to
xray-coremanagement can lead to malicious configuration changes that compromise security or disrupt service provided byxray-core.
- Unauthorized Access to Management Interfaces (High Severity): Weak or missing authentication on
- Impact:
- Unauthorized Access to Management Interfaces: Significantly reduces the risk by making it much harder for unauthorized individuals to access and control
xray-coremanagement functions. - Configuration Tampering: Significantly reduces the risk by protecting the
xray-coreconfiguration from unauthorized modifications.
- Unauthorized Access to Management Interfaces: Significantly reduces the risk by making it much harder for unauthorized individuals to access and control
- Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. API keys might be used in some cases for
xray-coremanagement, but certificate-based authentication or MFA are less likely to be implemented forxray-coremanagement interfaces. - Missing Implementation: Formal identification of
xray-coremanagement interfaces, selection and implementation of strong authentication methods (beyond basic passwords) forxray-coremanagement, and robust authorization controls forxray-coremanagement functions.
Mitigation Strategy: Enforce TLS/HTTPS for all Proxied Traffic
- Description:
- Step 1: Configure
xray-coreto enforce TLS/HTTPS for all proxied traffic, especially for sensitive data. This is a configuration setting withinxray-core. - Step 2: Ensure that all inbound and outbound configurations within
xray-coreare set up to use TLS/HTTPS. - Step 3: Disable or remove support for insecure protocols like HTTP within
xray-coreconfiguration if they are not absolutely necessary. - Step 4: Configure
xray-coreto reject insecure connections or downgrade attempts. This is a configuration setting withinxray-core. - Step 5: Regularly verify that TLS/HTTPS is being used for all intended traffic proxied by
xray-coreand monitor for any insecure connections handled byxray-core.
- Step 1: Configure
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks (High Severity): TLS/HTTPS encryption configured in
xray-coreprotects data in transit from eavesdropping and manipulation by MITM attackers. - Data Eavesdropping (High Severity): Encryption enforced by
xray-coreprevents attackers from intercepting and reading sensitive data transmitted throughxray-core. - Data Tampering (High Severity): Encryption configured in
xray-coreensures data integrity and prevents attackers from modifying data in transit without detection.
- Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks (High Severity): TLS/HTTPS encryption configured in
- Impact:
- Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks: Significantly reduces the risk by providing strong encryption and authentication for communication channels managed by
xray-core. - Data Eavesdropping: Significantly reduces the risk by protecting the confidentiality of transmitted data proxied by
xray-core. - Data Tampering: Significantly reduces the risk by ensuring the integrity of transmitted data proxied by
xray-core.
- Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks: Significantly reduces the risk by providing strong encryption and authentication for communication channels managed by
- Currently Implemented: Likely partially implemented. TLS/HTTPS might be used for some traffic proxied by
xray-core, but enforcement across all proxied traffic and explicit disabling of insecure protocols inxray-coreconfiguration might be missing. - Missing Implementation: Configuration review to ensure TLS/HTTPS enforcement for all relevant traffic proxied by
xray-core, explicit disabling of insecure protocols inxray-coreconfiguration, and monitoring to verify TLS/HTTPS usage byxray-core.
Mitigation Strategy: Regular Updates and Vulnerability Management
- Description:
- Step 1: Establish a process for regularly checking for updates to
xtls/xray-core. Subscribe to security advisories, release notes, and the project's communication channels. This is about managing thexray-coresoftware itself. - Step 2: Test updates in a non-production environment before deploying them to production. Verify compatibility and functionality after
xray-coreupdates. - Step 3: Implement a schedule for applying
xray-coreupdates in a timely manner, prioritizing security updates. - Step 4: Conduct periodic vulnerability scans and security assessments of the environment running
xray-core. Use vulnerability scanning tools to identify known vulnerabilities inxray-coreand its dependencies. Specifically scanning thexray-coresoftware. - Step 5: Develop a plan for responding to identified vulnerabilities in
xray-core, including patching, mitigation, and remediation steps.
- Step 1: Establish a process for regularly checking for updates to
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities (High Severity): Outdated
xray-coresoftware is vulnerable to known exploits. Regular updates patch these vulnerabilities and reduce the risk of exploitation ofxray-core. - Zero-Day Vulnerabilities (Medium Severity): While updates cannot prevent zero-day exploits, staying up-to-date with
xray-coreensures that patches are applied quickly when vulnerabilities are discovered and released forxray-core.
- Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities (High Severity): Outdated
- Impact:
- Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities: Significantly reduces the risk by eliminating known vulnerabilities in
xray-corethat attackers could exploit. - Zero-Day Vulnerabilities: Moderately reduces the risk by enabling faster patching of
xray-corewhen new vulnerabilities are discovered.
- Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities: Significantly reduces the risk by eliminating known vulnerabilities in
- Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Developers might occasionally update
xray-core, but a formal update process, vulnerability scanning specifically forxray-core, and a vulnerability response plan are likely missing. - Missing Implementation: Formal
xray-coreupdate process, subscription to security advisories related toxray-core, testingxray-coreupdates before production deployment, scheduledxray-coreupdates, vulnerability scanning focused onxray-core, and a vulnerability response plan forxray-corevulnerabilities.
Mitigation Strategy: Resource Management and Rate Limiting
- Description:
- Step 1: Implement Rate Limiting within
xray-coreconfiguration. Configure rate limiting to prevent abuse, denial-of-service attacks, and resource exhaustion targetingxray-core. Limit the number of requests or connections from specific sources or within certain timeframes usingxray-core's rate limiting features. - Step 2: Resource Quotas and Limits within
xray-coreconfiguration: Set appropriate resource quotas and limits (CPU, memory, connections) for thexray-coreprocess to prevent resource exhaustion and ensure stability ofxray-core. - Step 3: Monitor Resource Usage of
xray-core: Continuously monitor the resource consumption ofxray-coreto detect anomalies and potential resource exhaustion attacks targetingxray-core.
- Step 1: Implement Rate Limiting within
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks (High Severity): Without resource management,
xray-corecan be overwhelmed by excessive requests, leading to service disruption. Rate limiting and resource quotas mitigate this risk. - Resource Exhaustion (Medium Severity): Uncontrolled resource consumption by
xray-corecan impact other applications or the entire system. Resource limits prevent resource exhaustion. - Abuse and Misuse (Medium Severity): Rate limiting can prevent abuse of
xray-core's functionalities, such as excessive proxying or unauthorized access attempts.
- Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks (High Severity): Without resource management,
- Impact:
- Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks: Significantly reduces the risk by limiting the impact of DoS attacks targeting
xray-core. - Resource Exhaustion: Moderately reduces the risk by preventing
xray-corefrom consuming excessive resources. - Abuse and Misuse: Moderately reduces the risk by controlling the usage of
xray-corefunctionalities.
- Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks: Significantly reduces the risk by limiting the impact of DoS attacks targeting
- Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Basic resource monitoring might be in place, but explicit rate limiting and resource quota configurations within
xray-coreare likely missing. - Missing Implementation: Configuration of rate limiting within
xray-core, setting resource quotas and limits forxray-core, and implementation of detailed resource usage monitoring specifically forxray-core.