Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
118 lines (100 loc) · 12.9 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

118 lines (100 loc) · 12.9 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for zeromicro/go-zero

Objective: Compromise the Go-Zero application to gain unauthorized access, data breaches, service disruption, or other malicious outcomes by exploiting vulnerabilities within the Go-Zero framework or its common usage patterns.

Attack Tree Visualization

[CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Go-Zero Application ├───[AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit API Gateway Vulnerabilities │ ├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Input Validation Issues in API Gateway │ │ └───[AND] Bypass API Gateway Input Validation │ │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Weak Custom Validation Logic │ ├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Authentication/Authorization Bypass in API Gateway │ │ └───[AND] Circumvent API Gateway Auth Mechanisms │ │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Weak JWT Verification (if used) │ │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Authorization Logic Flaws in Gateway Middleware │ ├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Rate Limiting/DoS Vulnerabilities in API Gateway │ │ └───[AND] Overwhelm API Gateway Resources │ │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Resource Exhaustion via High Request Volume │ ├───[OR] API Gateway Configuration Vulnerabilities │ └───[OR] Code Generation Flaws in API Gateway (Less Likely, but possible) ├───[AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit RPC Service Vulnerabilities │ ├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Input Validation Issues in RPC Services │ │ └───[AND] Bypass RPC Service Input Validation │ │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Weak Validation in RPC Handlers │ ├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Authentication/Authorization Bypass in RPC Services │ │ └───[AND] Circumvent RPC Service Auth Mechanisms │ │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Lack of Mutual TLS (mTLS) for RPC (if sensitive data) │ │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Weak or Missing Authorization Checks in RPC Handlers │ ├───[OR] Service Discovery Exploitation │ │ └───[AND] Manipulate Service Discovery Mechanism │ │ └───[OR] [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise etcd/Consul (if used for discovery) │ ├───[OR] Load Balancing Exploitation │ └───[OR] Code Generation Flaws in RPC Services (Less Likely, but possible) ├───[AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Concurrency/Goroutine Related Issues (Go Specific) │ ├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Race Conditions in Go-Zero Components or Application Code │ │ └───[AND] Trigger Race Conditions │ │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Data Corruption due to Unsynchronized Access │ ├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Deadlocks/Resource Exhaustion due to Goroutine Mismanagement │ │ └───[AND] Cause Deadlocks or Goroutine Leaks │ │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Goroutine Leak leading to Memory Exhaustion and DoS │ └───[OR] Improper Error Handling in Concurrent Operations ├───[AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Insecure Cache Configuration │ └───[AND] Exploit Misconfigured Cache │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Storing Sensitive Data in Cache without Encryption ├───[AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Middleware/Interceptor Vulnerabilities (Custom or Default) │ ├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Vulnerable Custom Middleware/Interceptors │ │ └───[AND] Exploit Flaws in Custom Middleware Logic │ │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Input Validation Issues in Middleware │ │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Authentication/Authorization Bypass in Middleware │ ├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Bypass Vulnerabilities in Middleware Chain │ │ └───[AND] Circumvent Middleware Processing │ │ └───[OR] Misconfiguration of Middleware Order │ │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Logic Flaws Allowing Middleware Bypass │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Resource Exhaustion in Middleware │ └───[AND] Overload Middleware Processing │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] CPU/Memory Exhaustion via Complex Middleware Logic │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] DoS via Middleware Processing Bottleneck └───[AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Deployment/Operational Vulnerabilities (Go-Zero Context) ├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Misconfiguration of Go-Zero Services in Deployment │ └───[AND] Exploit Deployment Misconfigurations │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Insecure Network Policies allowing Unnecessary Access ├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Insecure Dependencies of Go-Zero Application │ └───[AND] Exploit Vulnerabilities in Dependencies │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Vulnerable Go Modules used by Application │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Outdated Go-Zero Version with Known Vulnerabilities └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Logging/Monitoring Vulnerabilities (Information Disclosure) └───[AND] Exploit Logging/Monitoring Data └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Sensitive Data Leakage in Logs

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path 1: Exploit API Gateway Vulnerabilities

  • Attack Vector 1: Input Validation Issues in API Gateway
    • Exploit Weak Custom Validation Logic: If developers implement custom input validation in the API Gateway that is flawed or incomplete, attackers can craft malicious requests to bypass validation and inject malicious data or commands.
  • Attack Vector 2: Authentication/Authorization Bypass in API Gateway
    • Exploit Weak JWT Verification (if used): If JWT is used for authentication, vulnerabilities in JWT verification logic (e.g., weak keys, algorithm confusion, signature bypass) can allow attackers to forge valid JWTs and gain unauthorized access.
    • Authorization Logic Flaws in Gateway Middleware: If custom middleware is used for authorization in the API Gateway, logic errors in this middleware can lead to authorization bypasses, allowing attackers to access resources they shouldn't.
  • Attack Vector 3: Rate Limiting/DoS Vulnerabilities in API Gateway
    • Resource Exhaustion via High Request Volume: Attackers can flood the API Gateway with a high volume of requests, overwhelming its resources (CPU, memory, network) and causing a denial of service for legitimate users.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path 2: Exploit RPC Service Vulnerabilities

  • Attack Vector 1: Input Validation Issues in RPC Services
    • Exploit Weak Validation in RPC Handlers: Similar to API Gateway, if RPC service handlers have weak or missing input validation, attackers can send malicious RPC requests to manipulate data, trigger errors, or potentially exploit further vulnerabilities within the service.
  • Attack Vector 2: Authentication/Authorization Bypass in RPC Services
    • Lack of Mutual TLS (mTLS) for RPC (if sensitive data): If sensitive data is exchanged via RPC without mTLS, attackers performing Man-in-the-Middle attacks within the network can eavesdrop on communication and potentially steal sensitive information.
    • Weak or Missing Authorization Checks in RPC Handlers: If RPC service handlers lack proper authorization checks, or if these checks are flawed, attackers who have bypassed API Gateway authentication (or are internal malicious actors) can access and manipulate RPC service functionalities without proper authorization.

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: Compromise etcd/Consul (if used for discovery)

  • Attack Vector 1: Compromise etcd/Consul directly: If the etcd or Consul cluster used for service discovery is compromised (e.g., due to weak access controls, vulnerabilities in etcd/Consul itself, or insider threats), attackers can manipulate service discovery information. This allows them to:
    • Redirect traffic to malicious services under their control.
    • Cause service disruption by removing or corrupting service registrations.
    • Gain insights into the application architecture and internal services.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path 3: Exploit Concurrency/Goroutine Related Issues (Go Specific)

  • Attack Vector 1: Data Corruption due to Unsynchronized Access: In Go applications, including Go-Zero services, race conditions can occur if shared data is accessed concurrently by multiple goroutines without proper synchronization mechanisms (like mutexes). Attackers can trigger specific request sequences to exploit these race conditions, leading to data corruption and unpredictable application behavior.
  • Attack Vector 2: Goroutine Leak leading to Memory Exhaustion and DoS: If goroutines are not properly managed and terminated in Go-Zero services (e.g., due to errors in goroutine lifecycle management), they can leak resources, particularly memory. Over time, this can lead to memory exhaustion and ultimately a denial of service.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path 4: Insecure Cache Configuration

  • Attack Vector 1: Storing Sensitive Data in Cache without Encryption: If sensitive data is cached by Go-Zero applications without encryption, and the cache storage is compromised (e.g., due to misconfiguration, vulnerabilities in the cache system, or unauthorized access), attackers can directly access and steal the sensitive data from the cache.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path 5: Exploit Middleware/Interceptor Vulnerabilities (Custom or Default)

  • Attack Vector 1: Input Validation Issues in Middleware: Custom middleware components in Go-Zero applications might have input validation vulnerabilities similar to API Gateways and RPC services. Attackers can exploit these to bypass middleware logic or inject malicious data.
  • Attack Vector 2: Authentication/Authorization Bypass in Middleware: Custom middleware designed for authentication or authorization might contain flaws that allow attackers to bypass these security checks and gain unauthorized access.
  • Attack Vector 3: Logic Flaws Allowing Middleware Bypass: Logic errors in middleware implementation or in the middleware chain configuration (order of middleware) can create bypass vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to circumvent security middleware and reach vulnerable parts of the application.
  • Attack Vector 4: CPU/Memory Exhaustion via Complex Middleware Logic: Inefficient or computationally expensive logic within custom middleware can be exploited by attackers. By sending requests that trigger this complex middleware processing, they can cause CPU or memory exhaustion, leading to a denial of service.
  • Attack Vector 5: DoS via Middleware Processing Bottleneck: If middleware processing becomes a bottleneck in the request handling pipeline (e.g., due to a single point of failure or inefficient middleware), attackers can overload this bottleneck with requests, causing a denial of service.

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path 6: Exploit Deployment/Operational Vulnerabilities (Go-Zero Context)

  • Attack Vector 1: Insecure Network Policies allowing Unnecessary Access: Overly permissive network policies in the deployment environment can allow attackers who have compromised one service or gained access to the internal network to move laterally and access other services or infrastructure components that should be restricted.
  • Attack Vector 2: Vulnerable Go Modules used by Application: Go-Zero applications rely on Go modules (dependencies). If the application uses vulnerable Go modules, attackers can exploit known vulnerabilities in these dependencies to compromise the application. This includes supply chain attacks where malicious modules are introduced.
  • Attack Vector 3: Outdated Go-Zero Version with Known Vulnerabilities: Using an outdated version of Go-Zero itself can expose the application to known vulnerabilities that have been patched in newer versions. Attackers can exploit these framework-level vulnerabilities.
  • Attack Vector 4: Sensitive Data Leakage in Logs: If Go-Zero applications log sensitive data (e.g., user credentials, PII, API keys) in plain text, and these logs are accessible to attackers (e.g., due to misconfigured logging systems or compromised servers), it can lead to information disclosure and further attacks.