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Attack Tree Analysis for zeromicro/go-zero

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Data/Functionality via go-zero Exploits

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Gain Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Data/Functionality via go-zero Exploits
├── 1.  Exploit Authentication/Authorization Mechanisms [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├── 1.1  JWT Manipulation (go-zero uses JWTs extensively) [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├── 1.1.1  Algorithm Confusion (e.g., switching to "none") [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └──  *Action:*  Craft JWT with "alg": "none" and valid signature (empty).
│   │   ├── 1.1.2  Weak Secret Key [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └──  *Action:*  Attempt to brute-force or guess the JWT secret key.
│   ├── 1.2  Bypass Authorization Checks
│   │   ├── 1.2.1  Incorrect Middleware Order [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └──  *Action:*  Analyze the middleware chain.
│   │   ├── 1.2.2  Missing Authorization Checks [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └──  *Action:*  Identify API endpoints that *should* require authorization but don't.
├── 2.  Exploit RPC (Remote Procedure Call) Vulnerabilities (go-zero's `zrpc` component)
│   ├── 2.1  Unauthenticated RPC Calls [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └──  *Action:*  Attempt to directly call RPC endpoints without authentication.
│   ├── 2.2  Input Validation Flaws in RPC Handlers [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └──  *Action:*  Send malformed or unexpected data to RPC endpoints.
├── 3.  Exploit API Gateway Vulnerabilities (go-zero's `gateway` component)
│   ├── 3.1  Routing Misconfigurations [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └──  *Action:*  Analyze the gateway's routing rules.
│   ├── 3.2  Bypass Gateway Authentication/Authorization [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └──  *Action:*  Attempt to access backend services directly.
├── 4.  Exploit Dependency Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
│    └── 4.1 Vulnerabilities in go-zero's dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│        └── *Action:* Use a software composition analysis (SCA) tool.
└── 5. Exploit Misconfiguration of go-zero Features
    └── 5.4. Insecure default configurations [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        └── *Action:* Review all configuration files.

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Authentication/Authorization Mechanisms [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: This is the most critical area, as it governs access to the entire application.
  • Sub-Vectors:
    • 1.1 JWT Manipulation [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • 1.1.1 Algorithm Confusion [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Action: The attacker crafts a JWT, setting the "alg" field to "none" and providing an empty signature.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: High (Complete authentication bypass)
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Intermediate
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
        • Mitigation: go-zero's JWT validation must strictly enforce the expected algorithm and reject tokens with "alg": "none" or invalid signatures.
      • 1.1.2 Weak Secret Key [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Action: The attacker attempts to guess or brute-force the JWT secret key.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: High (Complete authentication bypass)
        • Effort: Medium to High
        • Skill Level: Intermediate
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
        • Mitigation: Use a strong, randomly generated secret key (at least 32 bytes for HS256, 2048 bits for RS256) and store it securely. Implement key rotation.
    • 1.2 Bypass Authorization Checks:
      • 1.2.1 Incorrect Middleware Order [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Action: The attacker exploits a misconfiguration where authentication/authorization middleware is placed after middleware that accesses sensitive data.
        • Likelihood: Low
        • Impact: High
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Intermediate
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
        • Mitigation: Carefully review the middleware chain and ensure authentication/authorization middleware is executed before any sensitive operations.
      • 1.2.2 Missing Authorization Checks [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Action: The attacker identifies and accesses API endpoints that lack proper authorization checks.
        • Likelihood: Low to Medium
        • Impact: High
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Intermediate
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
        • Mitigation: Ensure all API endpoints that require authorization have the appropriate middleware applied. Use a consistent authorization policy across the application.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit RPC Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Focuses on vulnerabilities within go-zero's zrpc component.
  • Sub-Vectors:
    • 2.1 Unauthenticated RPC Calls [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Action: The attacker directly calls RPC endpoints without providing authentication credentials.
      • Likelihood: Low
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy
      • Mitigation: Enforce authentication on all RPC endpoints, even those considered "internal."
    • 2.2 Input Validation Flaws in RPC Handlers [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Action: The attacker sends malformed or unexpected data to RPC endpoints to trigger vulnerabilities.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Medium to High
      • Effort: Low to Medium
      • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation: Implement strict input validation on all RPC handlers. Use a schema validation library if possible.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit API Gateway Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Focuses on vulnerabilities within go-zero's gateway component.
  • Sub-Vectors:
    • 3.1 Routing Misconfigurations [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Action: The attacker exploits misconfigured routing rules to access internal services or endpoints.
      • Likelihood: Low to Medium
      • Impact: Medium to High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation: Configure the gateway with least privilege routing. Regularly review and audit routing rules.
    • 3.2 Bypass Gateway Authentication/Authorization [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Action: The attacker attempts to access backend services directly, bypassing the gateway.
      • Likelihood: Low
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation: Do not rely solely on the gateway for security. Backend services must have their own independent authentication and authorization mechanisms.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit Dependency Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: Focuses on vulnerabilities within go-zero's dependencies.
  • Sub-Vectors:
    • 4.1 Vulnerabilities in go-zero's dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Action: The attacker exploits a known vulnerability in one of go-zero's dependencies.
      • Likelihood: Medium to High
      • Impact: Varies (depending on the vulnerability)
      • Effort: Low (if a public exploit is available)
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy (with SCA tools)
      • Mitigation: Use a Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tool to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in dependencies. Keep dependencies updated.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Exploit Misconfiguration of go-zero Features

*   **5.4. Insecure default configurations [HIGH-RISK PATH]**
    *   **Action:** Review all configuration files.
    *   **Likelihood:** Medium
    *   **Impact:** Varies
    *   **Effort:** Low
    *   **Skill Level:** Beginner
    *   **Detection Difficulty:** Easy
    *   **Mitigation:** Never rely on default configurations for security-sensitive settings. Explicitly configure all security-related parameters. Review configuration files thoroughly.