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Attack Tree Analysis for airbnb/okreplay

Objective: Manipulate application behavior or extract sensitive data via OkReplay

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Manipulate application behavior or extract sensitive data via OkReplay ├── 1. Tamper with Recorded Interactions ("Tapes") [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.1. Gain Access to Tape Storage [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 1.1.2. Compromise CI/CD Environment (Shared Storage) [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ ├── 1.1.2.1. Weak CI/CD Credentials [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1.1.3. Compromise Cloud Storage (if tapes are stored there, e.g., S3) [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.3.1. Leaked Cloud Credentials [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.2. Modify Tape Contents [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 1.2.1. Inject Malicious Responses [HIGH RISK] └── 2. Exploit OkReplay Configuration └── 2.3. Leverage "Record Mode" Misuse [HIGH RISK] └── 2.3.1. Record Sensitive Data Unintentionally [CRITICAL] └── 2.3.1.1. Accidental Recording of Production Credentials/Data [HIGH RISK]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Tamper with Recorded Interactions ("Tapes") [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: This is the most direct attack path, focusing on gaining access to and manipulating the recorded network interactions (tapes). Success here gives the attacker significant control over the application's behavior during testing.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Gain Access to Tape Storage [CRITICAL]

  • Overall Description: This is the prerequisite for any tape tampering. The attacker must gain access to where the tapes are stored.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2. Compromise CI/CD Environment (Shared Storage) [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: CI/CD systems often have broad access and are attractive targets.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2.1. Weak CI/CD Credentials [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The attacker uses weak, default, or easily guessable credentials to gain access to the CI/CD system.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3. Compromise Cloud Storage (if tapes are stored there, e.g., S3) [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: If tapes are stored in cloud services (like AWS S3, Google Cloud Storage, Azure Blob Storage), compromising the cloud storage is a direct path to the tapes.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3.1. Leaked Cloud Credentials [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The attacker obtains valid cloud credentials through phishing, credential stuffing, finding them in exposed code repositories, or other means.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1.2. Modify Tape Contents [CRITICAL]

  • Overall Description: After gaining access to the tapes, the attacker modifies their contents to inject malicious data or alter existing interactions.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1. Inject Malicious Responses [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker modifies the response data within a tape to inject malicious code (XSS, RCE), manipulate application logic (bypass authentication, change prices), or cause a denial of service.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High/Very High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate/Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard (if application doesn't log replayed responses)

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit OkReplay Configuration

  • Overall Description: This path focuses on misusing OkReplay's features, particularly the recording mode, to capture sensitive information.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3. Leverage "Record Mode" Misuse [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: Improper use of OkReplay's record mode can lead to unintentional recording of sensitive data.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3.1. Record Sensitive Data Unintentionally [CRITICAL]

  • Overall Description: This is the key risk associated with record mode – accidentally capturing sensitive information.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3.1.1. Accidental Recording of Production Credentials/Data [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: During recording, the developer accidentally interacts with production systems or uses production credentials, resulting in this sensitive data being stored in the tape.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High/Very High
  • Effort: Very Low
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (requires tape review)