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Attack Tree Analysis for betamaxteam/betamax

Objective: Compromise Application Using Betamax Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Betamax Exploitation **[CRITICAL NODE - Root Goal]**
├───(OR)─ 1. Exploit Cassette Manipulation **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   ├───(OR)─ 1.1. Direct Cassette File Modification **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├───(AND)─ 1.1.1. Gain Access to Cassette Storage Location **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   ├───(OR)─ 1.1.1.1. Exploit Application Vulnerability for File System Access **[HIGH RISK PATH if App Vuln exists]**
│   │   │   └───(OR)─ 1.1.1.2. Exploit Server/Infrastructure Vulnerability for File System Access **[HIGH RISK PATH if Infra Vuln exists]**
│   │   └───(AND)─ 1.1.2. Modify Cassette File Content **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │       ├───(OR)─ 1.1.2.1. Inject Malicious HTTP Responses **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │       └───(OR)─ 1.1.2.2. Modify Existing Responses to Inject Malicious Content **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   └───(OR)─ 1.2. Cassette Poisoning during Recording **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│       ├───(AND)─ 1.2.1. Intercept Recording Process **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│       │   ├───(OR)─ 1.2.1.1. Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack during Recording **[HIGH RISK PATH if recording over insecure network]**
│       └───(AND)─ 1.2.2. Inject Malicious Responses into Cassette **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│           ├───(OR)─ 1.2.2.1. Inject Malicious Payloads (e.g., XSS, SQLi in Responses) **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
├───(OR)─ 2. Exploit Replay Logic Vulnerabilities
│   ├───(OR)─ 2.1. Request Matching Bypass
│   │   └───(AND)─ 2.1.2. Craft Request to Bypass Intended Matching and Trigger Malicious Cassette Entry
│   │       ├───(OR)─ 2.1.2.1. Exploit Weak Matching Rules (e.g., overly broad matching) **[HIGH RISK PATH if Betamax misconfigured]**
│   └───(OR)─ 2.2. Cassette Data Deserialization Vulnerabilities (If Applicable)
│       └───(AND)─ 2.2.2. Exploit Deserialization Vulnerabilities in Cassette Parsing Library
│           ├───(OR)─ 2.2.2.1. Code Injection via Deserialization **[HIGH RISK PATH if vulnerable library used]**
├───(OR)─ 3. Exploit Information Disclosure via Cassettes
│   ├───(OR)─ 3.1. Sensitive Data in Cassettes **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH if sensitive data exists and storage is insecure]**
│   │   └───(AND)─ 3.1.2. Cassette Storage Location is Accessible to Unauthorized Users **[CRITICAL NODE]** **[HIGH RISK PATH if happens]**
│   │       ├───(OR)─ 3.1.2.1. Publicly Accessible Storage Location (Misconfiguration) **[HIGH RISK PATH if misconfigured]**
│   │       └───(OR)─ 3.1.2.2. Weak Access Controls on Storage Location **[HIGH RISK PATH if weak controls]**

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Cassette Manipulation [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vectors:

    • This is a broad category encompassing attacks that involve directly altering the content or integrity of Betamax cassette files.

    • Success in this path can lead to critical application compromise by injecting malicious content or causing malfunctions.

    • 1.1. Direct Cassette File Modification [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:

      • Attack Vectors:

        • Attacker gains unauthorized access to the file system where cassettes are stored and directly modifies the cassette files.
        • This can be achieved through:
          • 1.1.1.1. Exploit Application Vulnerability for File System Access [HIGH RISK PATH if App Vuln exists]:
            • Exploiting web application vulnerabilities like Local File Inclusion (LFI), Remote File Inclusion (RFI), or directory traversal to read and potentially write to cassette files.
          • 1.1.1.2. Exploit Server/Infrastructure Vulnerability for File System Access [HIGH RISK PATH if Infra Vuln exists]:
            • Exploiting vulnerabilities in the underlying server operating system, web server, or cloud infrastructure to gain file system access.

      • 1.1.2. Modify Cassette File Content [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:

        • Attack Vectors:
          • Once file system access is gained, attacker modifies the content of cassette files.
          • This can involve:
            • 1.1.2.1. Inject Malicious HTTP Responses [HIGH RISK PATH]:
              • Replacing legitimate HTTP responses in cassettes with malicious ones containing payloads like XSS, SQL injection, or command injection.
            • 1.1.2.2. Modify Existing Responses to Inject Malicious Content [HIGH RISK PATH]:
              • Subtly altering existing responses to inject malicious content, making detection more difficult.

    • 1.2. Cassette Poisoning during Recording [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:

      • Attack Vectors:
        • Attacker interferes with the process of recording cassettes, injecting malicious content directly during recording.
        • This can be achieved through:
          • 1.2.1. Intercept Recording Process [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:
            • 1.2.1.1. Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack during Recording [HIGH RISK PATH if recording over insecure network]:
              • Performing a MITM attack on the network during the recording process to intercept and modify HTTP traffic between the application and external services.
          • 1.2.2. Inject Malicious Responses into Cassette [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:
            • 1.2.2.1. Inject Malicious Payloads (e.g., XSS, SQLi in Responses) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
              • Injecting malicious payloads (XSS, SQL injection, etc.) into the HTTP responses that are being recorded into the cassette.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Replay Logic Vulnerabilities:

  • 2.1. Request Matching Bypass:

    • Attack Vectors:
      • 2.1.2.1. Exploit Weak Matching Rules (e.g., overly broad matching) [HIGH RISK PATH if Betamax misconfigured]:
        • If Betamax is configured with weak or overly broad request matching rules, an attacker can craft requests that bypass the intended matching logic and trigger the replay of malicious cassette entries. This relies on misconfiguration of Betamax.

  • 2.2. Cassette Data Deserialization Vulnerabilities (If Applicable):

    • Attack Vectors:
      • 2.2.2.1. Code Injection via Deserialization [HIGH RISK PATH if vulnerable library used]:
        • If the library used by Betamax to parse cassette files (e.g., YAML, JSON) has deserialization vulnerabilities, an attacker could craft a malicious cassette file that, when parsed, leads to code execution on the server. This depends on the presence of a vulnerability in the parsing library.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Information Disclosure via Cassettes:

  • 3.1. Sensitive Data in Cassettes [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH if sensitive data exists and storage is insecure]:
    • Attack Vectors:
      • 3.1.2. Cassette Storage Location is Accessible to Unauthorized Users [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH if happens]:
        • If cassettes inadvertently contain sensitive data (API keys, passwords, PII) and the storage location is not properly secured, attackers can gain access to this sensitive information.
        • This can occur due to:
          • 3.1.2.1. Publicly Accessible Storage Location (Misconfiguration) [HIGH RISK PATH if misconfigured]:
            • Cassette storage directory is accidentally made publicly accessible due to misconfiguration of the web server or cloud storage.
          • 3.1.2.2. Weak Access Controls on Storage Location [HIGH RISK PATH if weak controls]:
            • Access controls on the cassette storage location are weak, allowing unauthorized users (internal or external) to access the files.

This breakdown provides a focused view of the most critical threats associated with Betamax, allowing development and security teams to prioritize their mitigation efforts effectively.