attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for betamaxteam/betamax

Objective: Exfiltrate sensitive data (credentials, API keys, PII) or manipulate application behavior by tampering with recorded HTTP interactions (cassettes) used by Betamax.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     +-----------------------------------------------------+
                                     | Exfiltrate Sensitive Data or Manipulate Application |
                                     |         Behavior via Betamax Cassettes             |
                                     +-----------------------------------------------------+
                                                        |
          +---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
          |                                                                                 |
+-------------------------+                                             +-----------------------------------------+
|  1. Compromise Cassette  |                                             | 2.  Exploit Betamax Configuration/Usage |
|       Storage/Access      |                                             |             Vulnerabilities             |
+-------------------------+                                             +-----------------------------------------+
          |                                                                                 |
+---------------------+---------------------+                      +---------------------+---------------------+
| 1.a. Unauthorized   | 1.b.  Insecure      |                      | 2.a.  Insecure     | 2.b.  Lack of       |
|      File Access    |       Storage       |                      |      Matchers      |      Cassette       |
|                     |       Location      |                      |                     |      Sanitization   | [CRITICAL]
+---------------------+---------------------+                      +---------------------+---------------------+
          | >>                  | >>                                              |                     | >>
+---------+---------+   +---------+---------+                +---------+---------+   +---------+---------+
| 1.a.2.  |           |   | 1.b.1.  | 1.b.2.  |                | 2.a.2.  |           |   | 2.b.1.  | 2.b.2.  |
|  Code   |           |   |  Lack   |  Weak   |                |  Missing|           |   |  Record |  Missing|
|  Vuln   |           |   |  of     |  File   |                |  Request|           |   |  Sensitive|  Header/|
|  in App |           |   |  Encr.  |  Perms. |                |  Body   |           |   |  Data   |  Body   | [CRITICAL]
|  [HIGH] |           |   | [CRITICAL]| [CRITICAL]|                |  Matching|           |   | [CRITICAL]|  Filter | [CRITICAL]
+---------+---------+   +---------+---------+                +---------+---------+   +---------+---------+
                                                                                                | >>
                                                                                    +---------+---------+
                                                                                    | 2.b.3.  | 2.b.4  |
                                                                                    |  Missing|  Missing|
                                                                                    |  Query  |  Cookie |
                                                                                    |  Param  |  Filter | [CRITICAL]
                                                                                    |  Filter |         |
                                                                                    | [CRITICAL]|         |
                                                                                    +---------+---------+

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise Cassette Storage/Access

• 1.a. Unauthorized File Access (>> 1.a.2. Code Vulnerability in Application [HIGH]):

  • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the application's code (e.g., path traversal, arbitrary file read/write) to gain access to the Betamax cassette files.
  • Mitigation:
    • Thoroughly review and test the application code for any vulnerabilities that could lead to unauthorized file access.
    • Implement secure coding practices, including input validation and output encoding.
    • Perform regular security audits and penetration testing.
    • Use a web application firewall (WAF) to detect and block malicious requests.

• 1.b. Insecure Storage Location:

  • (>> 1.b.1. Lack of Encryption [CRITICAL]):

    • Description: Cassette files are stored without encryption, making them readable to anyone with access to the storage location.
    • Mitigation:
      • Encrypt cassette files at rest using filesystem-level encryption (e.g., LUKS, BitLocker) or a Python library like cryptography.
      • Implement a secure key management system to protect the encryption keys.
      • Regularly rotate encryption keys.

  • (>> 1.b.2. Weak File Permissions [CRITICAL]):

    • Description: Cassette files have overly permissive file permissions, allowing unauthorized users on the system to read or modify them.
    • Mitigation:
      • Set strict file permissions on the cassette directory and files. Only the user/process running the tests should have read/write access (e.g., chmod 600 or chmod 700).
      • Use the principle of least privilege.
      • Regularly audit file permissions.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Betamax Configuration/Usage Vulnerabilities

• 2.a Insecure Matchers: * (>> 2.a.2 Missing Request Body Matching):

  • Description: If the request body contains sensitive data and is not included in Betamax matchers, the response might be replayed to requests with different, potentially malicious, bodies.
  • Mitigation: * Always include the body matcher in your Betamax configuration when the request body contains sensitive data. * Consider using more granular matchers, such as matching specific fields within the request body.

• 2.b. Lack of Cassette Sanitization [CRITICAL] (and all sub-nodes):

  • (>> 2.b.1. Record Sensitive Data [CRITICAL]):

    • Description: Betamax records sensitive data (API keys, passwords, PII) without any filtering, storing this data in plain text within the cassette.
    • Mitigation:
      • Use Betamax's before_record and before_playback hooks (or the filter_request and filter_response methods) to register filters.
      • Create custom filter functions to remove or replace sensitive data before it's written to the cassette.
      • Use regular expressions to target specific patterns of sensitive data.

  • (>> 2.b.2. Missing Header/Body Filter [CRITICAL]):

    • Description: Sensitive data is present in HTTP headers (e.g., Authorization, Cookie) or the response body, and no filters are applied to remove or redact it.
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement filters to specifically target and remove sensitive headers.
      • Create filters to redact or replace sensitive portions of the response body. Use regular expressions or custom logic to identify and modify the data.

  • (>> 2.b.3. Missing Query Param Filter [CRITICAL]):

    • Description: Sensitive data is present in the URL query parameters, and no filters are applied.
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement filters to remove or redact sensitive query parameters.

  • (>> 2.b.4. Missing Cookie Filter [CRITICAL]):

    • Description: Sensitive data is present in cookies, and no filters are applied.
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement filters to remove or redact sensitive cookies.