attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for fabiomsr/drawable-optimizer

Objective: Compromise application using drawable-optimizer by exploiting vulnerabilities introduced by the tool or its integration.

Attack Tree Visualization

Root: Compromise Application via Drawable Optimizer [CRITICAL NODE] ├── 1. Compromise via Malicious Input to Drawable Optimizer [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 1.1. Inject Malicious Drawable File [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── 1.1.1. Exploit Image Processing Vulnerability in Underlying Tools [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.1. Crafted PNG to Exploit optipng/pngquant [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.2. Crafted SVG to Exploit svgo [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── 1.2. Manipulate Drawable Optimizer Configuration [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── 1.2.1. Modify Configuration File to Introduce Malicious Settings [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ ├── 1.2.1.1. Change Output Directory to Overwrite Sensitive Files [CRITICAL NODE] ├── 2. Compromise via Supply Chain Vulnerabilities in Drawable Optimizer Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 2.1. Exploit Vulnerable Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── 2.1.1. Outdated Dependencies with Known Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ ├── 2.1.1.1. Vulnerable version of optipng [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ ├── 2.1.1.2. Vulnerable version of pngquant [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ ├── 2.1.1.3. Vulnerable version of svgo [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ ├── 2.1.1.4. Vulnerable version of zopflipng [CRITICAL NODE] ├── 3. Compromise via Insecure Integration with Build Process [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 3.1. Insecure Permissions during Execution [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── 3.1.1. Drawable Optimizer Running with Elevated Privileges [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 3.2. Command Injection Vulnerability in Integration Script [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise via Malicious Input to Drawable Optimizer [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: An attacker introduces malicious input to the drawable-optimizer during the build process. This input is designed to exploit vulnerabilities within the tool or its dependencies.
• Why High-Risk: Controlling input to a processing tool is a fundamental attack vector. If successful, it can lead to severe consequences like Remote Code Execution (RCE).
• Actionable Insights:
  • Treat all drawable files as potentially untrusted input, especially if they originate from external or less-trusted sources.
  • Implement basic input validation checks (e.g., file type, size limits) before processing with drawable-optimizer.
  • Focus on mitigating vulnerabilities in the underlying image processing tools, as malicious input often targets these.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Inject Malicious Drawable File [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Specifically, the attacker injects a malicious drawable file (PNG, SVG, XML Drawable) into the input set processed by drawable-optimizer.
• Why High-Risk: Direct injection of malicious files is a common and effective way to exploit vulnerabilities in file processing tools.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Secure the source of drawable files. Ensure they come from trusted repositories or are thoroughly vetted.
  • Implement access controls to prevent unauthorized modification or addition of drawable files in the input directories.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1. Exploit Image Processing Vulnerability in Underlying Tools [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: The malicious drawable file is crafted to exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities in the image processing libraries used by drawable-optimizer (optipng, pngquant, svgo, zopflipng).
• Why High-Risk: Successful exploitation can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the build server, allowing the attacker to completely compromise the build environment and potentially inject malicious code into the application itself.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Regularly update all underlying image processing tools to the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities.
  • Implement vulnerability scanning on the build environment to detect outdated and vulnerable dependencies.
  • Consider fuzz testing the image processing tools with malformed and crafted drawable files to proactively identify potential vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.1. Crafted PNG to Exploit optipng/pngquant [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: A specifically crafted PNG file is designed to exploit vulnerabilities within optipng or pngquant during processing.
• Why High-Risk: PNG processing vulnerabilities can lead to RCE. optipng and pngquant are critical components in the image optimization pipeline.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Prioritize updating optipng and pngquant.
  • Monitor security advisories for these tools.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.2. Crafted SVG to Exploit svgo [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: A specifically crafted SVG file is designed to exploit vulnerabilities within svgo during processing.
• Why High-Risk: SVG parsing and optimization are complex, and svgo vulnerabilities can lead to RCE. SVGs can be particularly complex and prone to parsing issues.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Prioritize updating svgo.
  • Monitor security advisories for svgo.
  • Consider complexity analysis or sanitization of SVG files before processing.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2. Manipulate Drawable Optimizer Configuration [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: The attacker manipulates the configuration of drawable-optimizer to introduce malicious settings that compromise the build process or the application.
• Why High-Risk: Configuration manipulation can have wide-ranging consequences, including file overwriting, disabling security features (if any), or altering the tool's behavior in unexpected ways.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Secure configuration file storage and access permissions. Restrict write access to configuration files to only authorized users/processes.
  • Implement configuration validation. Ensure that configuration parameters are within expected ranges and do not introduce security risks.
  • Consider using a fixed and secure output directory for drawable-optimizer to prevent attackers from redirecting output to overwrite sensitive files.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1. Modify Configuration File to Introduce Malicious Settings [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Specifically, the attacker modifies the configuration file of drawable-optimizer to inject malicious settings.
• Why High-Risk: Direct modification of configuration files can lead to immediate and significant impact.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Implement file integrity monitoring for configuration files to detect unauthorized changes.
  • Use version control for configuration files to track changes and facilitate rollback if necessary.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.1. Change Output Directory to Overwrite Sensitive Files [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: The attacker modifies the configuration to change the output directory of drawable-optimizer to a sensitive location within the build environment, aiming to overwrite critical application files or build scripts with optimized (potentially corrupted or malicious) drawables.
• Why High-Risk: Successful file overwriting can lead to code injection, application malfunction, or complete system compromise.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Strictly control the output directory. Ideally, fix the output directory to a secure, isolated location that cannot be easily manipulated or used to overwrite critical files.
  • Validate and sanitize any user-provided or configurable output directory paths. If configuration of the output directory is necessary, rigorously validate and sanitize the provided path to prevent directory traversal or overwriting of restricted locations.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Compromise via Supply Chain Vulnerabilities in Drawable Optimizer Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: The attacker exploits vulnerabilities in the supply chain of drawable-optimizer, specifically targeting its dependencies (optipng, pngquant, svgo, zopflipng, and potentially others).
• Why High-Risk: Supply chain attacks are increasingly common and can have a wide impact. Vulnerabilities in dependencies are often overlooked and can provide a relatively easy entry point for attackers.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Implement a robust dependency management process.
  • Regularly audit and update all dependencies to their latest secure versions.
  • Use dependency scanning tools to automatically identify known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
  • Monitor security advisories for all dependencies used by drawable-optimizer.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1. Exploit Vulnerable Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Directly exploiting known vulnerabilities in outdated dependencies of drawable-optimizer.
• Why High-Risk: Outdated dependencies are a common source of vulnerabilities, and exploits for known vulnerabilities are often readily available.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Prioritize keeping dependencies up-to-date.
  • Automate dependency updates and vulnerability scanning as part of the build pipeline.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1. Outdated Dependencies with Known Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Specifically targeting known vulnerabilities in outdated versions of optipng, pngquant, svgo, zopflipng, or other dependencies.
• Why High-Risk: Exploiting known vulnerabilities is significantly easier than discovering new ones. Attackers can leverage existing exploits.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Immediately update optipng, pngquant, svgo, and zopflipng to their latest versions.
  • Establish a process for regularly checking and updating dependencies.
  • Use dependency management tools that provide vulnerability scanning and update recommendations.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1.1. Vulnerable version of optipng [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Having outdated versions of these specific tools that contain known vulnerabilities.
• Why High-Risk: These are core image processing tools used by drawable-optimizer, and vulnerabilities in them can directly compromise the tool's security.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Treat these dependencies as critical security components.
  • Prioritize updates for these tools above other dependencies.
  • Specifically monitor security advisories related to optipng, pngquant, svgo, and zopflipng.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1.2. Vulnerable version of pngquant [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Having outdated versions of these specific tools that contain known vulnerabilities.
• Why High-Risk: These are core image processing tools used by drawable-optimizer, and vulnerabilities in them can directly compromise the tool's security.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Treat these dependencies as critical security components.
  • Prioritize updates for these tools above other dependencies.
  • Specifically monitor security advisories related to optipng, pngquant, svgo, and zopflipng.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1.3. Vulnerable version of svgo [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Having outdated versions of these specific tools that contain known vulnerabilities.
• Why High-Risk: These are core image processing tools used by drawable-optimizer, and vulnerabilities in them can directly compromise the tool's security.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Treat these dependencies as critical security components.
  • Prioritize updates for these tools above other dependencies.
  • Specifically monitor security advisories related to optipng, pngquant, svgo, and zopflipng.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1.4. Vulnerable version of zopflipng [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Having outdated versions of these specific tools that contain known vulnerabilities.
• Why High-Risk: These are core image processing tools used by drawable-optimizer, and vulnerabilities in them can directly compromise the tool's security.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Treat these dependencies as critical security components.
  • Prioritize updates for these tools above other dependencies.
  • Specifically monitor security advisories related to optipng, pngquant, svgo, and zopflipng.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Compromise via Insecure Integration with Build Process [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: The attacker exploits weaknesses in how drawable-optimizer is integrated into the application's build process. This can include insecure permissions, running with elevated privileges, or vulnerabilities in integration scripts.
• Why High-Risk: Insecure integration can create vulnerabilities even if the tool itself is relatively secure. Build processes often have access to sensitive resources and credentials.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Apply the principle of least privilege when running drawable-optimizer and the build process.
  • Secure file system permissions for input, output, and temporary directories used by drawable-optimizer.
  • Thoroughly review and secure integration scripts to prevent command injection and other vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1. Insecure Permissions during Execution [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: drawable-optimizer or the build process is run with unnecessarily elevated privileges, increasing the potential impact of any vulnerability exploitation.
• Why High-Risk: Running with elevated privileges expands the attack surface and potential damage from successful exploits. If a vulnerability is exploited when running as root or administrator, the attacker can gain full system control.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Run drawable-optimizer and the build process with the least necessary privileges. Avoid running them as root or administrator unless absolutely required.
  • Implement proper user and group management for the build environment.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.1. Drawable Optimizer Running with Elevated Privileges [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Specifically, drawable-optimizer is configured or inadvertently run with elevated privileges (e.g., as root or administrator).
• Why High-Risk: This is a direct misconfiguration that significantly increases the risk of system compromise if any vulnerability in drawable-optimizer or its dependencies is exploited.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Explicitly configure the build process to run drawable-optimizer with minimal privileges.
  • Regularly audit the privileges under which build processes and tools are running.
  • Use containerization or virtualization to isolate the build environment and limit the impact of potential compromises.

Attack Tree Path: 3.2. Command Injection Vulnerability in Integration Script [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: The script that integrates drawable-optimizer into the build process is vulnerable to command injection. This could occur if the script constructs shell commands using unsanitized input, potentially from drawable file names or configuration parameters.
• Why High-Risk: Command injection vulnerabilities allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the build server, leading to RCE and full system compromise.
• Actionable Insights:
  • Thoroughly review and audit integration scripts for command injection vulnerabilities.
  • Sanitize all inputs used in integration scripts, especially if they are used to construct shell commands.
  • Avoid constructing shell commands dynamically from user-controlled data.
  • Use parameterized commands or secure APIs instead of shell commands whenever possible.
  • Implement input validation in integration scripts to ensure that inputs are within expected formats and do not contain malicious characters.