Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
51 lines (42 loc) · 7.65 KB

attack-surface.md

File metadata and controls

51 lines (42 loc) · 7.65 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for fabric8io/fabric8-pipeline-library

Attack Surface: 1. Unvalidated Pipeline Step Parameters

  • Description: Pipeline steps provided by fabric8-pipeline-library accept parameters from Jenkinsfile definitions. Insufficient validation of these parameters can lead to injection vulnerabilities when these parameters are used in commands or API calls within the steps.
  • Fabric8-pipeline-library Contribution: The library provides numerous steps that take parameters for interacting with Kubernetes/OpenShift. If these steps lack robust input validation, they directly introduce the risk of command injection, path traversal, and other vulnerabilities through parameter manipulation.
  • Example: The oc or kubectl steps in the library might take a resourceName parameter. If this parameter is not validated and is directly used in a command like oc delete resource ${resourceType}/${resourceName}, a malicious user could inject commands by providing a crafted resourceName like ; rm -rf /.
  • Impact: Command Injection, Remote Code Execution (RCE), Data Deletion, Denial of Service (DoS).
  • Risk Severity: Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Sanitization within Steps: Developers of fabric8-pipeline-library steps must implement rigorous input sanitization for all parameters before using them in commands or API calls. Use parameterized queries or safe APIs instead of constructing commands from strings.
    • Parameter Validation within Steps: Library steps should include validation rules for parameters (e.g., allowed characters, length limits, format checks) to reject invalid or potentially malicious inputs.
    • User-Side Validation (Jenkinsfile): Pipeline authors using the library should also implement validation in their Jenkinsfiles before passing parameters to library steps, as a defense-in-depth measure.

Attack Surface: 2. Dependency Vulnerabilities

  • Description: The fabric8-pipeline-library relies on external libraries and components. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies can be exploited through the library, indirectly affecting pipelines using it.
  • Fabric8-pipeline-library Contribution: The library's dependency on potentially vulnerable libraries directly contributes to the attack surface. If the library uses outdated or vulnerable dependencies, pipelines using it inherit these vulnerabilities.
  • Example: A dependency used by fabric8-pipeline-library has a known critical vulnerability allowing for remote code execution. If a pipeline, through the use of a vulnerable library step, processes data in a way that triggers this dependency vulnerability, it becomes exploitable.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), Denial of Service (DoS), Information Disclosure, depending on the severity of the dependency vulnerability.
  • Risk Severity: Critical (if critical severity vulnerabilities exist in dependencies).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regular Dependency Scanning (Library Development): The fabric8-pipeline-library development team must regularly scan their dependencies for known vulnerabilities using security scanning tools and address them promptly.
    • Dependency Updates (Library Development & User): The library should be kept up-to-date with the latest versions of its dependencies, including security patches. Users should also ensure they are using the latest version of the fabric8-pipeline-library.
    • Vulnerability Monitoring (Library Development): The library development team should actively monitor security advisories and vulnerability databases for dependencies to proactively address new threats.

Attack Surface: 3. Insecure Secret Handling within Library Steps

  • Description: Steps within the fabric8-pipeline-library might handle secrets (credentials, API keys) in an insecure manner, leading to potential exposure.
  • Fabric8-pipeline-library Contribution: If library steps are designed or implemented in a way that leads to insecure secret handling, the library directly introduces this attack surface. This could include logging secrets, storing them insecurely in memory, or exposing them through environment variables unintentionally.
  • Example: A library step designed to deploy to Kubernetes might log the Kubernetes API token to the pipeline console for debugging purposes. This log could then be accessible to unauthorized users, exposing the cluster credentials.
  • Impact: Information Disclosure (secrets, credentials), Unauthorized Access to systems protected by the exposed secrets.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the sensitivity of the exposed secrets and ease of access to logs).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Secret Handling in Step Implementation (Library Development): Library developers must ensure steps never log secrets in plain text, avoid storing secrets in insecure locations, and follow best practices for secure secret management within their code.
    • Secret Masking in Logs (Library & User): Library steps should utilize Jenkins' secret masking features to prevent accidental logging of secrets. Users should also configure Jenkins appropriately for secret masking.
    • Documentation and Best Practices (Library Development): The library documentation should clearly guide users on secure secret management practices when using the library steps, emphasizing the use of secure secret storage solutions and avoidance of hardcoding secrets.

Attack Surface: 4. Pipeline Logic Vulnerabilities in Library Steps

  • Description: Bugs or flaws in the code logic of pipeline steps provided by the fabric8-pipeline-library can lead to unintended and potentially security-compromising behavior.
  • Fabric8-pipeline-library Contribution: As the library provides the implementation of these pipeline steps, any logic vulnerabilities within these steps are directly introduced by the library.
  • Example: A library step intended to apply Kubernetes resources might have a logic flaw that, under certain conditions, applies resources to the wrong namespace or with incorrect configurations, potentially leading to unauthorized access or resource manipulation.
  • Impact: Unauthorized Resource Modification, Data Corruption, Privilege Escalation, Denial of Service (DoS), depending on the nature of the logic vulnerability.
  • Risk Severity: High (depending on the severity and exploitability of the logic vulnerability).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Rigorous Code Review (Library Development): The fabric8-pipeline-library development team must conduct thorough code reviews of all pipeline steps, focusing on security implications and potential logic flaws.
    • Comprehensive Testing (Library Development): Implement comprehensive testing for all pipeline steps, including unit tests, integration tests, and security-focused tests, to identify logic errors and unexpected behavior.
    • Security Audits (Library Development): Regular security audits of the fabric8-pipeline-library codebase should be performed to proactively identify potential vulnerabilities and logic flaws.
    • Clear Documentation and Usage Examples (Library Development): Provide clear documentation and secure usage examples for all pipeline steps to guide users in using them correctly and securely, minimizing the risk of misconfiguration or misuse.