attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for fabric8io/fabric8-pipeline-library

Objective: Compromise Application via fabric8-pipeline-library

Attack Tree Visualization

• Compromise Application via fabric8-pipeline-library [CRITICAL NODE]
  • Exploit Vulnerabilities in fabric8-pipeline-library Code [CRITICAL NODE]
    • Code Injection Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Command Injection in Pipeline Steps [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Script Injection in Pipeline Steps [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Insecure handling of API responses leading to information disclosure [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Dependency Vulnerabilities
      • Exploiting known vulnerabilities in libraries used by fabric8-pipeline-library [HIGH RISK PATH]
  • Abuse Misconfiguration of fabric8-pipeline-library [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    • Insecure Credential Management [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Hardcoded credentials within pipeline configurations using library steps [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Storing credentials insecurely in Jenkins or Kubernetes Secrets accessed by library [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Overly permissive access to credentials used by library steps [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Overly Permissive RBAC/Permissions [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Library steps configured with excessive Kubernetes/OpenShift permissions [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Service accounts used by pipelines with overly broad roles [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Insecure Defaults or Configurations [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Using default configurations of library steps that are insecure [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Failing to properly configure security-related parameters in library usage [HIGH RISK PATH]
  • Exploit Pipeline Execution Context [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    • Script Injection in Pipelines Using Library [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Injecting malicious scripts into pipeline definitions that utilize library steps [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Manipulating pipeline parameters to execute arbitrary code via library steps [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Environment Variable Manipulation [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Injecting or modifying environment variables used by library steps to alter behavior [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Jenkins Plugin Vulnerabilities (Indirectly related to library usage) [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Exploiting vulnerabilities in other Jenkins plugins used in conjunction with fabric8-pipeline-library, impacting its security context. [HIGH RISK PATH]
  • Credential Theft and Abuse via Library Usage [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    • Credential Exposure through Library Logs/Output [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Library steps inadvertently logging sensitive credentials or tokens [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Library steps exposing credentials in pipeline build output or artifacts [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Credential Theft from Jenkins/Kubernetes Secrets (Leveraging library access) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Using library steps to gain access to and exfiltrate credentials stored in Jenkins or Kubernetes Secrets [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Re-use of Stolen Credentials [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Using credentials stolen via library exploitation to access other resources or systems [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Application via fabric8-pipeline-library [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: This is the overarching goal. Attackers aim to leverage weaknesses in the fabric8-pipeline-library or its usage to gain unauthorized access and control over the application and/or the underlying infrastructure.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Vulnerabilities in fabric8-pipeline-library Code [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Attackers directly target vulnerabilities within the fabric8-pipeline-library codebase itself. Successful exploitation here can have widespread impact on all applications using the vulnerable library version.

Attack Tree Path: Code Injection Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: The library code might contain flaws that allow attackers to inject and execute arbitrary code (commands or scripts). This is a high-impact vulnerability class.

  • 3.1. Command Injection in Pipeline Steps [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: If library steps take user-controlled input and use it to construct shell commands without proper sanitization, an attacker can inject malicious commands into the input. When the library executes the command, the injected part will also be executed, potentially granting the attacker control over the Jenkins agent or the Kubernetes/OpenShift environment.
  • 3.2. Script Injection in Pipeline Steps [HIGH RISK PATH]:
    • Attack Vector: Similar to command injection, but focuses on injecting scripts (e.g., Groovy, shell). If library steps dynamically execute scripts based on user-provided input without proper validation, attackers can inject malicious scripts that will be executed by the library, leading to code execution within the pipeline context.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure handling of API responses leading to information disclosure [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: The library interacts with Kubernetes/OpenShift APIs. If the library processes API responses and inadvertently exposes sensitive information (like secrets, configuration details, or internal data) in logs, error messages, or output, attackers can gain access to this information by observing these channels.

Attack Tree Path: Dependency Vulnerabilities - Exploiting known vulnerabilities in libraries used by fabric8-pipeline-library [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: The fabric8-pipeline-library relies on external libraries. If these dependencies have known vulnerabilities and are not updated, attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities. They can use public vulnerability databases to find vulnerable dependencies and then craft exploits targeting those specific weaknesses within the context of the fabric8-pipeline-library.

Attack Tree Path: Abuse Misconfiguration of fabric8-pipeline-library [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Even if the library code is secure, misconfigurations in how it's used in pipelines can introduce vulnerabilities. This is a common and easily exploitable attack vector.

  • 6.1. Insecure Credential Management [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

    • Attack Vector: Improper handling of credentials used by the library to interact with Kubernetes/OpenShift.

      • 6.1.1. Hardcoded credentials within pipeline configurations using library steps [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Developers might mistakenly embed sensitive credentials directly into pipeline scripts that use library steps. Attackers can find these hardcoded credentials by reviewing pipeline definitions in version control systems or Jenkins configurations.
      • 6.1.2. Storing credentials insecurely in Jenkins or Kubernetes Secrets accessed by library [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Credentials might be stored in Jenkins credential stores or Kubernetes Secrets, but with weak access controls or without proper encryption. Attackers can exploit misconfigurations in these systems to gain unauthorized access to the stored credentials that the library uses.
      • 6.1.3. Overly permissive access to credentials used by library steps [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: The service accounts or credentials used by pipelines and library steps might be granted excessive permissions. If an attacker compromises the pipeline execution environment, they can abuse these overly permissive credentials to access resources beyond what is necessary for the pipeline's intended function.

  • 6.2. Overly Permissive RBAC/Permissions [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Granting excessive Kubernetes/OpenShift Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) permissions to pipelines and library steps.

      • 6.2.1. Library steps configured with excessive Kubernetes/OpenShift permissions [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: When configuring library steps, developers might grant them broader Kubernetes/OpenShift permissions than required for their specific tasks. This expands the attack surface, as a compromised library step could then perform actions beyond its intended scope.
      • 6.2.2. Service accounts used by pipelines with overly broad roles [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: The Kubernetes/OpenShift service accounts associated with Jenkins pipelines might be assigned overly broad roles. If an attacker gains control of the pipeline execution, they inherit the permissions of the service account, potentially leading to cluster-wide compromise if the service account has excessive privileges.

  • 6.3. Insecure Defaults or Configurations [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Relying on insecure default settings or failing to configure security-related parameters when using the library.

      • 6.3.1. Using default configurations of library steps that are insecure [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Some library steps might have default configurations that are not secure by design. If users rely on these defaults without hardening them, they might introduce vulnerabilities.
      • 6.3.2. Failing to properly configure security-related parameters in library usage [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: The library might offer security-related configuration options that users are unaware of or fail to configure correctly. Neglecting these security parameters can leave vulnerabilities open.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Pipeline Execution Context [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities within the Jenkins pipeline execution environment where the fabric8-pipeline-library is used.

  • 7.1. Script Injection in Pipelines Using Library [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious scripts into the pipeline definition itself, which then interact with or abuse the library.

      • 7.1.1. Injecting malicious scripts into pipeline definitions that utilize library steps [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Attackers might gain unauthorized access to modify pipeline definitions (e.g., through compromised Jenkins accounts or insecure access controls). They can then inject malicious Groovy or shell scripts directly into the pipeline code. These injected scripts can then leverage the fabric8-pipeline-library or the pipeline's execution context for malicious purposes.
      • 7.1.2. Manipulating pipeline parameters to execute arbitrary code via library steps [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: If pipeline parameters are not properly validated and are used in scripts or passed to library steps in an unsafe manner, attackers can manipulate these parameters. By crafting malicious parameter values, they can potentially inject code that gets executed by the pipeline or the library steps.

  • 7.2. Environment Variable Manipulation [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Manipulating environment variables within the pipeline execution environment to alter the behavior of library steps.

      • 7.2.1. Injecting or modifying environment variables used by library steps to alter behavior [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Attackers might find ways to inject or modify environment variables that are used by the fabric8-pipeline-library steps. By controlling these environment variables, they can influence the library's behavior, potentially causing it to perform unintended actions or bypass security checks.

  • 7.3. Jenkins Plugin Vulnerabilities (Indirectly related to library usage) [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in other Jenkins plugins that are used in the same Jenkins environment as the fabric8-pipeline-library.

      • 7.3.1. Exploiting vulnerabilities in other Jenkins plugins used in conjunction with fabric8-pipeline-library, impacting its security context. [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Jenkins environments often use a variety of plugins. If other plugins installed in the same Jenkins instance have vulnerabilities, attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities to gain access to the Jenkins server or the pipeline execution environment. Once inside, they can then potentially leverage the fabric8-pipeline-library for further attacks, as they are now operating within the same security context.

Attack Tree Path: Credential Theft and Abuse via Library Usage [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Using the fabric8-pipeline-library as a means to steal credentials and then abuse those stolen credentials for further malicious activities.

  • 8.1. Credential Exposure through Library Logs/Output [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

    • Attack Vector: Accidental exposure of sensitive credentials through logging or pipeline output generated by library steps.

      • 8.1.1. Library steps inadvertently logging sensitive credentials or tokens [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Poorly designed library steps might unintentionally log sensitive information like API tokens, passwords, or other secrets during their execution. Attackers can then access these logs (if they have access to Jenkins logs or build logs) to retrieve the exposed credentials.
      • 8.1.2. Library steps exposing credentials in pipeline build output or artifacts [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Library steps might unintentionally include credentials in the pipeline build output, artifacts, or reports they generate. If attackers can access these build outputs or artifacts, they can potentially extract the embedded credentials.

  • 8.2. Credential Theft from Jenkins/Kubernetes Secrets (Leveraging library access) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

    • Attack Vector: Misusing the library's access to Kubernetes/OpenShift resources to steal credentials stored in Jenkins or Kubernetes Secrets.

      • 8.2.1. Using library steps to gain access to and exfiltrate credentials stored in Jenkins or Kubernetes Secrets [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: If library steps provide functionality to interact with Kubernetes Secrets or Jenkins credential stores, attackers might exploit these steps (or vulnerabilities within them) to gain unauthorized access to these secret stores. Once they have access, they can exfiltrate sensitive credentials stored within, such as API keys, database passwords, or other secrets.

  • 8.3. Re-use of Stolen Credentials [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

    • Attack Vector: Using credentials stolen through any of the above methods to gain unauthorized access to other systems and resources.

      • 8.3.1. Using credentials stolen via library exploitation to access other resources or systems [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Once attackers have successfully stolen credentials (e.g., Kubernetes API tokens, service account keys, database passwords) through exploiting the fabric8-pipeline-library or its misconfigurations, they will likely reuse these credentials to access other systems, applications, or cloud resources. This lateral movement can significantly expand the scope of the compromise and lead to further data breaches or system control.