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Attack Tree Analysis for gradleup/shadow

Objective: Compromise Application Using Shadow Jar

Attack Tree Visualization

**[CRITICAL NODE]**Compromise Application Using Shadow Jar [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[OR]─ [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Build Process Vulnerabilities (Shadow Jar Integration) [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[AND]─ [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Build Environment [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └───[OR]─ [HIGH RISK PATH] Compromise CI/CD Pipeline [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├─── [HIGH RISK PATH] Inject malicious build steps into CI/CD configuration │ │ │ - Likelihood: Medium │ │ │ - Impact: High │ │ │ - Effort: Medium │ │ │ - Skill Level: Medium │ │ │ - Detection Difficulty: Medium │ │ └───[OR]─ [HIGH RISK PATH] Compromise Developer Machine │ │ ├─── [HIGH RISK PATH] Phishing/Social Engineering developer credentials │ │ │ - Likelihood: Medium │ │ │ - Impact: Medium │ │ │ - Effort: Low │ │ │ - Skill Level: Low │ │ │ - Detection Difficulty: Low │ │ └─── [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit vulnerabilities on developer's workstation │ │ │ - Likelihood: Medium │ │ │ - Impact: Medium │ │ │ - Effort: Medium │ │ │ - Skill Level: Medium │ │ │ - Detection Difficulty: Medium │ └───[AND]─ [HIGH RISK PATH] Malicious Dependency Injection during Build [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├─── [HIGH RISK PATH] Dependency Confusion Attack │ │ └─── Introduce a malicious dependency with the same name as a legitimate internal/private dependency, which Shadow Jar bundles. │ │ │ - Likelihood: Medium │ │ │ - Impact: High │ │ │ - Effort: Medium │ │ │ - Skill Level: Medium │ │ │ - Detection Difficulty: Medium ├───[OR]─ [HIGH RISK PATH] Bundling Vulnerable Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ - Likelihood: High │ │ │ - Impact: High │ │ │ - Effort: Low │ │ │ - Skill Level: Low to Medium │ │ │ - Detection Difficulty: Low ├───[OR]─ [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Misconfiguration of Shadow Jar by Developers [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[AND]─ [HIGH RISK PATH] Insecure Relocation Rules │ │ │ - Likelihood: Medium │ │ │ - Impact: Medium to High │ │ │ - Effort: Low │ │ │ - Skill Level: Low │ │ │ - Detection Difficulty: Medium │ ├───[AND]─ [HIGH RISK PATH] Accidental Exclusion of Security Libraries │ │ │ - Likelihood: Low to Medium │ │ │ - Impact: High │ │ │ - Effort: Low │ │ │ - Skill Level: Low │ │ │ - Detection Difficulty: Medium │ ├───[AND]─ [HIGH RISK PATH] Using Outdated Shadow Jar Version │ │ │ - Likelihood: Medium │ │ │ - Impact: Medium │ │ │ - Effort: Low │ │ │ - Skill Level: Low to Medium │ │ │ - Detection Difficulty: Low

  • Description: This is the ultimate goal of the attacker. Success means gaining unauthorized access, control, or causing damage to the application.
  • Criticality: Highest, as it represents complete failure of application security.
  • Mitigation: All security measures aim to prevent reaching this goal. Focus on securing all attack paths leading to this node.
  • Description: Attackers target weaknesses in the software build process, specifically where Shadow Jar is integrated. Compromising the build process allows for injecting malicious code before deployment.
  • Criticality: High, as it can lead to widespread and persistent compromise.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Compromise Build Environment (Critical Node)
    • Malicious Dependency Injection during Build (Critical Node)
  • Description: The build environment (CI/CD pipelines, developer machines) is a critical infrastructure. Compromise grants attackers control over the software supply chain.
  • Criticality: High, as it enables multiple attack vectors and long-term persistence.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Compromise CI/CD Pipeline (High Risk Path)
    • Compromise Developer Machine (High Risk Path)
  • Description: Attackers target the CI/CD system to inject malicious code or manipulate the build process.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Attack Vectors:
    • [HIGH RISK PATH] Inject malicious build steps into CI/CD configuration:
      • Description: Directly modify the CI/CD configuration files to include malicious commands or scripts that are executed during the build process. This can involve adding steps to download and include malicious dependencies, modify source code, or inject backdoors into the final Shadow JAR.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Medium
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Description: Attackers target developer workstations to gain access to code, credentials, or the build environment.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Medium (can escalate to High if build environment access is gained)
  • Attack Vectors:
    • [HIGH RISK PATH] Phishing/Social Engineering developer credentials:
      • Description: Tricking developers into revealing their credentials (usernames, passwords, API keys) through phishing emails, fake login pages, or social engineering tactics. Compromised credentials can be used to access developer resources and potentially the build environment.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Medium
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Low
      • Detection Difficulty: Low
    • [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit vulnerabilities on developer's workstation:
      • Description: Exploiting software vulnerabilities (operating system, applications, browser plugins) on developer machines to gain unauthorized access. This can be achieved through drive-by downloads, malicious attachments, or exploiting known vulnerabilities in unpatched software.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Medium
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Medium
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Description: Attackers inject malicious dependencies into the project's dependency tree during the build process, which Shadow Jar then bundles into the final artifact.
  • Criticality: High, as it directly injects malicious code into the application.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • [HIGH RISK PATH] Dependency Confusion Attack:
      • Description: Exploiting the dependency resolution mechanism to trick the build system into downloading a malicious dependency from a public repository instead of a legitimate internal/private dependency. This is especially effective when internal dependency names are guessable or leaked. Shadow Jar will bundle this malicious dependency.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Medium
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Description: Shadow Jar bundles all dependencies, including potentially vulnerable ones. If vulnerable dependencies are included, the application becomes vulnerable.
  • Criticality: High, as it directly introduces known vulnerabilities into the deployed application.
  • Likelihood: High
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low to Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Low
  • Description: Developers misconfigure Shadow Jar, leading to security weaknesses in the packaged application.
  • Criticality: Medium to High, depending on the misconfiguration.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • [HIGH RISK PATH] Insecure Relocation Rules:
      • Description: Poorly designed relocation rules can bypass security checks that rely on package names or introduce logic errors leading to vulnerabilities.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Medium to High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Low
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • [HIGH RISK PATH] Accidental Exclusion of Security Libraries:
      • Description: Developers might accidentally configure Shadow Jar to exclude essential security libraries during packaging, weakening the application's security posture.
      • Likelihood: Low to Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Low
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • [HIGH RISK PATH] Using Outdated Shadow Jar Version:
      • Description: Using an outdated version of the Shadow Jar plugin that contains known vulnerabilities.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Medium
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Low to Medium
      • Detection Difficulty: Low