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Attack Tree Analysis for gradleup/shadow

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access/Execute Arbitrary Code via Shadow Plugin

Attack Tree Visualization

[Attacker's Goal: Gain Unauthorized Access/Execute Arbitrary Code via Shadow Plugin] | ------[2. Misconfiguration of Shadow Plugin] | ------------------------------------------------------ | ------[!!! 2.1. Overly Permissive Shadow Jar Filters !!!] | -------------------------- | | ------[!!! 2.1.1. Include !!!] ------[!!! 2.1.2. Expose !!!] ------[ Sensitive ] ------[ Internal ] ------[ Classes/ ] ------[ APIs/ ] ------[ Resources ] ------[ Secrets ] ------[ Unintention- ] ------[ ally ] | ------[!!! 2.1.3. Facilitate !!!] ------[ Code Injection] ------[ via Included ] ------[ Dependencies ]

Attack Tree Path: 2. Misconfiguration of Shadow Plugin

  • Description: This is the root of the high-risk path. It represents errors made by developers when configuring the shadow plugin, specifically within the shadowJar task. These errors stem from a lack of understanding of the plugin's features or a failure to apply secure configuration practices.
  • Why it's High-Risk: This is the most probable entry point for an attacker because developer error is common. It directly enables the subsequent critical vulnerabilities.
  • Mitigation:
    • Thorough developer training on the shadow plugin and its security implications.
    • Mandatory code reviews for all build.gradle files, focusing on the shadowJar configuration.
    • Use of linters or static analysis tools to detect common misconfigurations.

Attack Tree Path: !!! 2.1. Overly Permissive Shadow Jar Filters !!!

  • Description: This critical node represents the incorrect use of the include and exclude filters within the shadowJar task. Developers might use overly broad patterns (e.g., include '**/*.class') or forget to exclude sensitive files, leading to unintended inclusion of classes and resources in the final JAR.
  • Why it's Critical: This is the gateway to several severe vulnerabilities. It's the direct enabler for exposing sensitive data, internal APIs, and facilitating code injection.
  • Mitigation:
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Only include the absolute minimum necessary for the application to function.
    • Explicit include Directives: Use specific include patterns targeting individual classes or small, well-defined groups of classes. Avoid wildcard patterns whenever possible.
    • Explicit exclude Directives: Use exclude patterns to explicitly remove any sensitive directories or files (e.g., configuration files, test resources, internal packages).
    • Regular JAR Content Inspection: After building the shadowed JAR, always inspect its contents (e.g., using jar -tf) to verify that only the intended classes and resources are included.

Attack Tree Path: !!! 2.1.1. Include Sensitive Classes/Resources Unintentionally !!!

  • Description: This critical node represents the accidental inclusion of files containing sensitive information, such as API keys, database credentials, private keys, or other confidential data. This often happens when developers include entire directories without carefully considering their contents.
  • Why it's Critical: This leads to direct exposure of sensitive data, potentially allowing attackers to access protected resources or impersonate the application.
  • Mitigation:
    • Never Store Secrets in Code or Resources: Use environment variables, secrets management services (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager), or other secure mechanisms for storing sensitive data.
    • Strict Filtering: As described in 2.1, use very precise include and exclude filters.
    • Automated Scanning: Use tools that can scan the generated JAR for potentially sensitive information (e.g., regular expressions for common credential formats).

Attack Tree Path: !!! 2.1.2. Expose Internal APIs/Secrets !!!

  • Description: This critical node represents the inclusion of internal classes or resources that expose APIs or data not intended for public consumption. This can give attackers insights into the application's internal workings and potentially allow them to access functionality they shouldn't have.
  • Why it's Critical: Exposing internal APIs can create new attack vectors and increase the attack surface of the application.
  • Mitigation:
    • Clear Package Structure: Organize your code into well-defined packages, separating internal and public APIs.
    • Strict Filtering: Use include and exclude filters to ensure that only public-facing classes are included in the shadowed JAR.
    • Code Obfuscation (Limited Benefit): While not a primary defense, code obfuscation can make it slightly harder for attackers to understand the exposed internal APIs. However, it should not be relied upon as a primary security measure.

Attack Tree Path: !!! 2.1.3. Facilitate Code Injection via Included Dependencies !!!

  • Description: This critical node represents the scenario where an overly permissive filter includes a dependency that has a known code injection vulnerability. The shadowed JAR then inherits this vulnerability.
  • Why it's Critical: This leads to a remote code execution vulnerability, the most severe type of security flaw. An attacker could execute arbitrary code on the server running the application.
  • Mitigation:
    • Software Composition Analysis (SCA): Use SCA tools to identify and track vulnerabilities in all dependencies, including transitive dependencies.
    • Dependency Updates: Keep all dependencies up to date to benefit from security patches.
    • Strict Filtering: Even if a vulnerable dependency is present, strict filtering can prevent the vulnerable classes from being included in the shadowed JAR, mitigating the risk.
    • Vulnerability Scanning of the Shadowed JAR: Perform vulnerability scanning specifically on the final shadowed JAR to detect any inherited vulnerabilities.