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Threat Model Analysis for gradleup/shadow

  • Description: Shadow's class merging process incorrectly resolves a conflict between two dependencies containing classes with the same name. A vulnerable version of a class (e.g., one with a known deserialization flaw) is chosen over a patched version because of Shadow's merging logic. An attacker exploits this Shadow-introduced vulnerability.
    • Impact:
      • Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the application server.
      • Data breach (sensitive data exfiltration).
      • System compromise.
    • Affected Shadow Component: The core merging logic of Shadow, specifically how it resolves class conflicts (the mergeServiceFiles and related configurations, and the order in which dependencies are processed). This is a direct consequence of Shadow's operation.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Proactive Conflict Resolution (Relocation): Use Shadow's relocate feature to rename packages of conflicting dependencies. This is the primary and most effective mitigation, as it directly addresses the root cause within Shadow.
      • Dependency Pinning: Explicitly define exact versions of all dependencies to reduce the likelihood of conflicts, but this doesn't guarantee prevention if Shadow's merging logic still makes an incorrect choice.
      • Dependency Analysis (Pre-Shading): Use tools like gradle dependencies and OWASP Dependency-Check before shading to identify potential conflicts, allowing for proactive resolution.
      • Thorough Testing (Targeted): Implement comprehensive integration and security tests that specifically target areas where conflicts are likely, focusing on the behavior of potentially conflicting classes.
  • Description: Shadow, due to its default behavior of including all transitive dependencies (unless explicitly excluded), pulls in a compromised, rarely used transitive dependency. The attacker leverages this Shadow-included dependency to execute malicious code. The inclusion is the direct result of Shadow's operation.
    • Impact:
      • Remote Code Execution (RCE).
      • Backdoor installation.
      • Data exfiltration.
    • Affected Shadow Component: Shadow's default behavior of including all transitive dependencies. The dependencies block configuration in the build script, specifically the lack of precise filtering within the shadowJar task.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Dependency Filtering (Shadow-Specific): Use Shadow's include and exclude filters extensively within the shadowJar configuration. Only include the absolute minimum set of dependencies and classes required. Prioritize include rules for a more restrictive, whitelist-based approach. This directly controls Shadow's inclusion behavior.
      • Dependency Whitelisting: Maintain a whitelist of approved dependencies and versions. This is a general good practice, but it's Shadow's lack of filtering that makes it a direct threat.
      • Regular Dependency Audits: Perform frequent security audits of all dependencies (including transitive ones).
      • SBOM Generation: Create and maintain a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) to track all included components.
  • Description: Shadow, due to insufficiently restrictive include/exclude rules in the shadowJar configuration, includes sensitive configuration files, test resources, or development artifacts within the shaded JAR. An attacker extracts the shaded JAR and gains access to this sensitive information because Shadow included it.
    • Impact:
      • Disclosure of sensitive information (API keys, database credentials, internal network details).
      • Facilitation of further attacks (using exposed credentials).
    • Affected Shadow Component: Shadow's file inclusion mechanism, specifically the include and exclude patterns within the shadowJar configuration. The lack of precise filtering is the direct cause.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Precise File Filtering (Shadow-Specific): Use very specific include and exclude patterns in the shadowJar configuration. Avoid broad wildcard patterns. This is the direct mitigation for Shadow's file inclusion behavior.
      • Separate Build Configurations: Use separate Gradle build configurations for development, testing, and production. The production configuration's shadowJar task should be highly restrictive.
      • Resource Review (Post-Shading): Manually review the contents of the shaded JAR before deployment to ensure no sensitive information is present. This is a verification step after Shadow has run.
      • Externalize Configuration: Store sensitive configuration data outside the JAR (e.g., environment variables, secrets management service). This reduces the impact if Shadow accidentally includes something.
  • Description: A vulnerability is discovered in a dependency within a shaded JAR. The merged nature of the shaded JAR, a direct result of Shadow, makes it more difficult and time-consuming to identify the specific vulnerable component and its version, delaying the patching process.
    • Impact:
      • Increased window of vulnerability to known exploits.
      • Higher likelihood of successful attacks.
    • Affected Shadow Component: The entire shaded JAR; the difficulty stems directly from the merged, monolithic nature of the artifact created by Shadow.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • SBOM and Dependency Tracking (Essential for Shadow): Maintain a detailed and up-to-date SBOM that explicitly maps the contents of the shaded JAR back to the original dependencies and their versions. This is crucial because of Shadow's merging.
      • Automated Vulnerability Scanning (Shaded JAR Aware): Use automated vulnerability scanning tools that are specifically capable of analyzing shaded JARs and identifying their constituent components.
      • Streamlined Update Process (Shadow-Specific): Establish a clear and efficient process for updating dependencies, rebuilding the shaded JAR, and redeploying. This process must account for the Shadow-specific steps.
      • Monitoring for Vulnerability Announcements: Actively monitor security advisories.