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Attack Tree Analysis for jenkinsci/job-dsl-plugin

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Control over Jenkins Instance via Job DSL Plugin

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Gain Unauthorized Control over Jenkins Instance via Job DSL Plugin

└───[OR] Achieve Code Execution on Jenkins Master via Job DSL [HIGH RISK PATH] ├───[OR] Inject Malicious Code into DSL Scripts [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───[AND] Compromise Source of DSL Scripts (SCM, User Input, API) [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── Compromise SCM Repository containing DSL scripts [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └─── Lack of Input Validation in DSL script generation process [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Weak API Authentication/Authorization [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───[AND] DSL Script Executes Malicious Code [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├─── Groovy Script Execution Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── Unsafe Groovy Constructs used in DSL (e.g., Eval, execute) [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH] │ └─── Access to Sensitive Jenkins APIs/Objects from DSL [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├─── Access to Credentials API [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH] │ └─── Access to Plugin Management API [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH] └───[OR] Exploit DSL to Modify Jenkins Configuration [HIGH RISK PATH] ├───[AND] Modify Security Realm/Authorization Strategy via DSL [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH] │ └─── DSL script grants excessive permissions or disables security [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH] └───[AND] Install/Uninstall Malicious Plugins via DSL [HIGH RISK PATH] └─── DSL script installs backdoored or vulnerable plugins [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH] └───[OR] Exploit Vulnerabilities in Job DSL Plugin Itself [HIGH RISK PATH] ├───[AND] Exploit Known Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] └─── Outdated Job DSL Plugin version with known CVEs [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Achieve Code Execution on Jenkins Master via Job DSL [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: The attacker aims to execute arbitrary code directly on the Jenkins master server. This is the most impactful attack as it grants full control over the Jenkins instance and potentially the underlying infrastructure.
  • How it's achieved: By injecting and executing malicious code within DSL scripts processed by the Job DSL plugin.

Attack Tree Path: Inject Malicious Code into DSL Scripts [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: The attacker needs to insert malicious code into the DSL scripts that Jenkins will process. This is a prerequisite for achieving code execution.
  • How it's achieved:
    • Compromise Source of DSL Scripts (SCM, User Input, API) [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Compromise SCM Repository containing DSL scripts [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Gaining unauthorized access to the source code repository (e.g., Git) where DSL scripts are stored.
        • How it's achieved:
          • Exploiting weak SCM credentials: Brute-forcing, phishing, or obtaining leaked credentials for SCM accounts.
          • Exploiting SCM vulnerabilities: Leveraging known security vulnerabilities in the SCM system itself to gain access or modify files.
      • Lack of Input Validation in DSL script generation process [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: If DSL scripts are dynamically generated based on user-provided input, insufficient validation can allow attackers to inject malicious DSL code through manipulated input.
        • How it's achieved: Providing crafted input that, when incorporated into the DSL script, introduces malicious Groovy code or commands.
      • Weak API Authentication/Authorization [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Exploiting poorly secured APIs that are used to manage or upload DSL scripts.
        • How it's achieved:
          • Bypassing or circumventing weak authentication mechanisms (e.g., default credentials, easily guessable passwords).
          • Exploiting insufficient authorization controls to access and modify DSL scripts without proper permissions.

Attack Tree Path: DSL Script Executes Malicious Code [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Once malicious code is injected into a DSL script, it needs to be executed by Jenkins when the script is processed.
  • How it's achieved:
    • Groovy Script Execution Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Unsafe Groovy Constructs used in DSL (e.g., Eval, execute) [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: DSL scripts utilizing Groovy features that allow direct execution of arbitrary system commands or code.
        • How it's achieved: Using Groovy methods like Eval, execute, ProcessBuilder within DSL scripts to run attacker-controlled commands on the Jenkins master.
    • Access to Sensitive Jenkins APIs/Objects from DSL [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Access to Credentials API [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: DSL scripts gaining access to Jenkins' credential storage and retrieval APIs.
        • How it's achieved: Using DSL code to access and extract stored credentials (usernames, passwords, API keys) through Jenkins APIs, potentially for lateral movement or further attacks.
      • Access to Plugin Management API [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: DSL scripts using Jenkins' Plugin Management API to install or uninstall plugins.
        • How it's achieved: Using DSL code to install malicious plugins (backdoored or vulnerable) or uninstall security-related plugins, compromising Jenkins functionality and security.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit DSL to Modify Jenkins Configuration [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Abusing the Job DSL plugin's capabilities to alter Jenkins' configuration settings maliciously.
  • How it's achieved:
    • Modify Security Realm/Authorization Strategy via DSL [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • DSL script grants excessive permissions or disables security [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Using DSL scripts to change Jenkins' security settings, weakening or disabling authentication and authorization mechanisms.
        • How it's achieved: DSL code that programmatically modifies Jenkins' security realm or authorization strategy to grant excessive permissions to attacker-controlled accounts or completely disable security, allowing unrestricted access.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit DSL to Install/Uninstall Malicious Plugins [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Utilizing the Job DSL plugin to manage Jenkins plugins in a malicious way.
  • How it's achieved:
    • DSL script installs backdoored or vulnerable plugins [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • DSL script installs backdoored or vulnerable plugins [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Using DSL scripts to install plugins that are either backdoored (containing malware) or have known security vulnerabilities.
        • How it's achieved: DSL code that instructs Jenkins to download and install plugins from attacker-controlled repositories or specific versions known to be vulnerable, introducing malware or exploitable weaknesses into the Jenkins environment.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Vulnerabilities in Job DSL Plugin Itself [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Directly exploiting security vulnerabilities within the Job DSL plugin's code.
  • How it's achieved:
    • Exploit Known Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Outdated Job DSL Plugin version with known CVEs [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Running an outdated version of the Job DSL plugin that has publicly disclosed Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs).
        • How it's achieved: Exploiting known vulnerabilities in older versions of the Job DSL plugin for which exploits may be publicly available. This requires the Jenkins instance to be running a vulnerable version of the plugin.