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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for jenkinsci/job-dsl-plugin

Threat: Arbitrary Code Execution via Malicious DSL Scripts

  • Description: An attacker could inject or modify a Job DSL script to execute arbitrary Groovy code on the Jenkins master. This could be achieved by compromising a user account with permissions to manage DSL scripts, or by exploiting vulnerabilities in systems that feed data into DSL script creation.
  • Impact: Full compromise of the Jenkins master server, including access to sensitive data, modification of Jenkins configuration, and potential lateral movement to other systems accessible from the Jenkins master.
  • Affected Component: DSL Script Execution Engine (Groovy interpreter within Jenkins master)
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement strict Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to limit who can create, modify, and execute DSL scripts.
    • Enforce mandatory code review for all DSL scripts, especially those from external or untrusted sources.
    • Employ static analysis tools to scan DSL scripts for potentially malicious code patterns.
    • Principle of least privilege: Grant users only the necessary permissions to manage DSL scripts.
    • Regularly audit DSL script repositories and execution logs for suspicious activity.

Threat: Injection of Malicious Code through DSL Script Parameters or External Data

  • Description: An attacker could manipulate external data sources or parameters used in DSL scripts to inject malicious code into generated job configurations or executed DSL logic. This could happen if DSL scripts dynamically build job configurations based on user-controlled input or data from external systems without proper sanitization.
  • Impact: Execution of malicious code within Jenkins jobs, potentially leading to data exfiltration, denial of service, or further compromise of Jenkins or connected systems.
  • Affected Component: DSL Script Parameter Handling, Dynamic Job Configuration Generation
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement robust input validation and sanitization for all external data used within DSL scripts.
    • Avoid dynamic code construction based on untrusted external data.
    • Use parameterized DSL scripts cautiously, ensuring parameters are strictly validated against expected types and values.
    • Apply output encoding when generating job configurations to prevent injection vulnerabilities.

Threat: Unauthorized Job Creation or Modification via DSL Scripts

  • Description: An attacker, gaining unauthorized access to DSL script management (e.g., through compromised credentials or lack of access control), could create or modify Jenkins jobs to perform malicious actions, such as deploying backdoors, stealing data, or disrupting services.
  • Impact: Unauthorized modification of Jenkins infrastructure, potential disruption of CI/CD pipelines, data breaches, and introduction of vulnerabilities into deployed applications.
  • Affected Component: DSL Script Management Interface, Job Creation/Modification Logic
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement strong authentication and authorization for accessing and managing DSL scripts.
    • Utilize Jenkins' security realm and RBAC to restrict access to DSL script management based on the principle of least privilege.
    • Enable audit logging for all DSL script creation, modification, and execution events.
    • Regularly review user permissions and access controls related to DSL script management.