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Threat Model Analysis for jenkinsci/job-dsl-plugin

  • Description: An attacker with permission to create or modify Job DSL scripts crafts a script containing malicious Groovy code that is not processed by the Script Security Plugin's CPS transformation. This allows direct access to the Jenkins master's JVM and operating system. The attacker might use java.lang.Runtime.exec() to run system commands, read/write files (including Jenkins configuration files and secrets), or establish network connections to external systems. The Job DSL Plugin is the direct enabler of this threat, as it's the component that executes the Groovy code.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of the Jenkins master and potentially any connected agents. The attacker gains full control, can steal data, disrupt operations, install malware, and pivot to other systems on the network.
    • Affected Component:
      • Core Job DSL Plugin engine (processing of Groovy scripts).
      • Interaction with the Script Security Plugin (specifically, bypassing or misconfiguring the CPS transformation).
      • Any Job DSL API methods that allow direct execution of unsandboxed Groovy.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Mandatory CPS Transformation: Enforce the use of the Script Security Plugin's CPS transformation for all Job DSL scripts. This is the primary defense. Configure the Script Security Plugin to disallow direct approval of unsandboxed scripts.
      • Strict Code Review: Implement a mandatory, rigorous code review process for all Job DSL scripts, focusing on identifying and removing any attempts to bypass sandboxing or execute dangerous operations. Reviews must be performed by security-aware personnel other than the script author.
      • Seed Job Control: Strictly limit which users can create or modify "seed jobs" (jobs that run Job DSL scripts). These are high-value targets.
      • Disable Unnecessary Features: Disable any Job DSL Plugin features that are not strictly required, especially those that might allow loading scripts from external sources or executing arbitrary code.
      • Monitoring and Alerting: Implement robust monitoring and alerting to detect suspicious activity, such as unexpected system commands being executed or unauthorized file access.
  • Description: An attacker crafts a Job DSL script that intentionally or unintentionally consumes excessive resources (CPU, memory, disk I/O, or network bandwidth) during the execution of the DSL script itself. This could involve infinite loops, allocating large amounts of memory, creating numerous large files, or making excessive network requests within the Groovy code. The Job DSL Plugin is directly involved because it's the engine executing this resource-consuming script.
    • Impact: The Jenkins master becomes unresponsive, preventing legitimate users from accessing or using the system. Builds may fail, deployments may be delayed, and overall productivity is severely impacted. The impact is primarily on the Jenkins master during DSL script processing.
    • Affected Component:
      • Core Job DSL Plugin engine (processing of Groovy scripts).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Timeouts: Set strict timeouts for Job DSL script execution specifically. This prevents infinite loops or excessively long-running operations within the DSL script from consuming resources indefinitely. This is distinct from general job timeouts.
      • Code Review: Review Job DSL scripts for potential resource exhaustion vulnerabilities, such as unbounded loops, excessive memory allocation, or uncontrolled file creation within the script's logic.
      • Monitoring: Monitor resource usage of the Jenkins master during Job DSL script execution to detect and respond to denial-of-service conditions. Implement alerts for high resource consumption during this phase.
      • Sandboxing (CPS - Limited Effectiveness): While CPS primarily addresses code execution, it can offer some protection against certain types of resource exhaustion by limiting access to some system APIs. However, it's not a complete solution for DoS.
  • Description: An attacker crafts a Job DSL script that accesses and exposes sensitive information during the execution of the DSL script. This could involve reading environment variables containing credentials, accessing files containing API keys, or printing sensitive data to the console log using Groovy code within the script. The Job DSL Plugin is directly involved as the execution engine for the script.
    • Impact: Leakage of confidential information, such as credentials, API keys, internal system details, or proprietary data. This can lead to further compromise of Jenkins or other systems.
    • Affected Component:
      • Core Job DSL Plugin engine (processing of Groovy scripts).
      • Groovy's file I/O and system access capabilities (as used within the DSL script).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Credential Management: Never hardcode credentials in Job DSL scripts. Use Jenkins' built-in credential management features (e.g., Credentials Plugin) to securely store and access credentials. Ensure that Job DSL scripts use the appropriate APIs to retrieve credentials from the Credentials Plugin.
      • Code Review: Carefully review Job DSL scripts to ensure they do not inadvertently expose sensitive information by printing it to the console log, writing it to files, or sending it over the network within the script's execution.
      • Sandboxing (CPS - Limited Effectiveness): CPS can limit access to certain system APIs that might be used to retrieve sensitive information, providing a partial mitigation.
  • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the Job DSL Plugin itself to gain elevated privileges. This could involve exploiting a bug in the Job DSL Plugin's code that allows bypassing security checks or injecting code into a higher-privileged context. This is distinct from exploiting vulnerabilities in other plugins.
    • Impact: An attacker with limited access to Jenkins could gain administrative privileges, leading to complete system compromise.
    • Affected Component:
      • Job DSL Plugin code (vulnerabilities in the plugin's own implementation).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regular Updates: Keep the Job DSL Plugin up to date with the latest security patches. Subscribe to security advisories specifically for the Job DSL Plugin.
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Regularly scan the Job DSL Plugin for known vulnerabilities using a vulnerability scanner that specifically targets Jenkins plugins.
  • Description: The Job DSL plugin itself uses a malicious or compromised library. The attacker publishes a malicious package with a similar name to a legitimate dependency of the Job DSL Plugin (typosquatting) or compromises a legitimate package repository that the Job DSL Plugin uses.
    • Impact: Varies depending on the compromised dependency, but could range from information disclosure to arbitrary code execution within the context of the Jenkins master. This is a direct threat to the plugin's integrity.
    • Affected Component:
      • Job DSL Plugin's own dependencies.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regular Updates: Keep the Job DSL Plugin up to date. Plugin updates often include updates to their dependencies.
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Use vulnerability scanning tools that can analyze the Job DSL Plugin and its dependencies.
      • Software Composition Analysis (SCA): Employ SCA tools on the Jenkins instance to identify and track dependencies of all plugins, including the Job DSL Plugin, and their associated vulnerabilities.