Objective: Compromise Application via Jenkins Pipeline Model Definition Plugin (Focus on High-Risk Paths)
Compromise Application (CRITICAL NODE - Root Goal)
├── Exploit Pipeline Definition Vulnerabilities (CRITICAL NODE - Major Attack Vector)
│ └── Groovy Script Injection (CRITICAL NODE - High Impact) **HIGH RISK PATH**
│ ├── Gain ability to modify pipeline definition (CRITICAL NODE - Prerequisite) **HIGH RISK PATH**
│ │ ├── Compromise Jenkins User Account with Pipeline Edit Permissions **HIGH RISK PATH**
│ │ └── Inject malicious code within declarative pipeline stages (e.g., `script` block, `steps`) **HIGH RISK PATH**
│ └── Pipeline executes malicious Groovy code on Jenkins Master or Agent (CRITICAL NODE - Code Execution) **HIGH RISK PATH**
│ ├── Impact: Data Breach (access application secrets, source code, build artifacts) (CRITICAL NODE - High Impact) **HIGH RISK PATH**
│ └── Impact: Supply Chain Attack (inject malware into application build) (CRITICAL NODE - High Impact) **HIGH RISK PATH**
├── Insecure Pipeline Configuration **HIGH RISK PATH**
│ ├── Misconfigure pipeline settings within declarative syntax **HIGH RISK PATH**
│ │ └── Example: Expose sensitive information in pipeline logs or build artifacts due to misconfiguration **HIGH RISK PATH**
│ └── Misconfiguration leads to unintended security weaknesses **HIGH RISK PATH**
│ └── Achieve: Information Disclosure (secrets in logs, artifacts) (CRITICAL NODE - Information Disclosure) **HIGH RISK PATH**
└── Abuse Plugin Features for Malicious Purposes **HIGH RISK PATH**
├── Resource Exhaustion via Pipeline Definition **HIGH RISK PATH**
│ ├── Craft pipeline definition that consumes excessive resources (CPU, memory, disk I/O) **HIGH RISK PATH**
│ │ └── Example: Looping constructs, large data processing within pipeline **HIGH RISK PATH**
│ └── Pipeline execution overwhelms Jenkins Master or Agent **HIGH RISK PATH**
│ └── Achieve: Denial of Service (Jenkins instance becomes unresponsive) (CRITICAL NODE - Denial of Service) **HIGH RISK PATH**
└── Information Leakage via Pipeline Output **HIGH RISK PATH**
├── Design pipeline to intentionally expose sensitive information in build logs or artifacts **HIGH RISK PATH**
│ └── Example: Print environment variables, secrets, configuration files to logs **HIGH RISK PATH**
└── Attacker gains access to pipeline output (logs, artifacts) **HIGH RISK PATH**
└── Achieve: Information Disclosure (secrets, configuration details) (CRITICAL NODE - Information Disclosure) **HIGH RISK PATH**
Attack Tree Path: 1. Groovy Script Injection (Critical Node & High-Risk Path):
- Attack Vector:
- Attacker gains the ability to modify pipeline definitions. This can be achieved by:
- Compromising a Jenkins User Account: Using techniques like password attacks, phishing, or social engineering to gain access to an account with pipeline edit permissions.
- Exploiting Jenkins Authentication/Authorization Bypass (Less Likely): Finding and exploiting a vulnerability in Jenkins itself that allows bypassing authentication or authorization checks.
- Once access is gained, the attacker injects malicious Groovy code within declarative pipeline stages, such as
script
blocks or within steps that allow script execution. - When the pipeline executes, the injected Groovy code runs on the Jenkins Master or Agent with the privileges of the Jenkins process.
- Attacker gains the ability to modify pipeline definitions. This can be achieved by:
- Impact:
- Code Execution: Arbitrary code execution on Jenkins infrastructure.
- Data Breach: Access to application secrets, source code, build artifacts stored within Jenkins or accessible from the Jenkins environment.
- Supply Chain Attack: Injecting malware or backdoors into the application build process, potentially affecting a wide range of users.
- Service Disruption: Malicious builds, resource exhaustion, or intentional disruption of Jenkins services.
- Mitigation:
- Strong Access Control: Implement robust authentication and authorization mechanisms for Jenkins. Use strong passwords, Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). Regularly review and audit user permissions.
- Minimize Script Usage: Limit the use of
script
blocks in declarative pipelines. If scripting is necessary, carefully review and sanitize any inputs used in scripts. - Input Validation and Sanitization: Thoroughly validate and sanitize all inputs used in pipeline definitions, especially if they come from external sources or user input.
- Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement CSP headers in Jenkins to mitigate certain types of script injection attacks (though might be less directly applicable to pipeline execution context).
- Runtime Monitoring: Monitor Jenkins Master and Agent processes for unusual activity or code execution patterns.
Attack Tree Path: 2. Insecure Pipeline Configuration (High-Risk Path):
- Attack Vector:
- Developers or administrators misconfigure pipeline settings within the declarative syntax. Common misconfigurations include:
- Exposing Sensitive Information in Logs or Artifacts: Accidentally or intentionally printing environment variables, secrets, credentials, or configuration files to pipeline logs or build artifacts.
- Weakening Security Checks (Less Likely in Declarative): While less common in declarative pipelines, there might be misconfiguration options that inadvertently weaken security measures.
- Attackers gain access to pipeline output (logs, artifacts) through Jenkins UI, API, or compromised accounts.
- Developers or administrators misconfigure pipeline settings within the declarative syntax. Common misconfigurations include:
- Impact:
- Information Disclosure: Exposure of sensitive secrets, credentials, API keys, and configuration details. This can lead to further compromise of applications and systems.
- Weakened Security Posture: Misconfigurations can create vulnerabilities that are easier to exploit by other attack vectors.
- Mitigation:
- Secure Secrets Management: Utilize Jenkins' built-in credential management system or external secret stores to securely manage sensitive information. Avoid hardcoding secrets in pipeline definitions.
- Regular Configuration Reviews: Conduct regular reviews of pipeline configurations to identify and rectify any misconfigurations or security weaknesses.
- Secret Scanning Tools: Implement automated secret scanning tools to detect accidental exposure of secrets in pipeline definitions, logs, and artifacts.
- Principle of Least Privilege: Grant only necessary permissions to pipelines and users. Avoid overly permissive configurations.
- Secure Logging Practices: Avoid logging sensitive information. Sanitize logs to remove any accidental exposure of secrets.
Attack Tree Path: 3. Resource Exhaustion via Pipeline Definition (High-Risk Path):
- Attack Vector:
- Attackers craft a malicious pipeline definition that is designed to consume excessive system resources (CPU, memory, disk I/O) on the Jenkins Master or Agent.
- Examples include:
- Infinite Loops or Deeply Nested Loops: Creating pipeline stages with looping constructs that run indefinitely or for an extremely long time.
- Large Data Processing: Including steps that process very large datasets or perform computationally intensive operations without proper resource management.
- When the pipeline is executed, it overwhelms the Jenkins infrastructure, leading to resource exhaustion.
- Impact:
- Denial of Service (DoS): Jenkins instance becomes unresponsive or crashes, disrupting build and deployment processes.
- Performance Degradation: Jenkins performance significantly degrades, impacting all users and pipelines.
- Mitigation:
- Resource Limits and Quotas: Implement resource limits and quotas for pipeline executions. Jenkins provides mechanisms to control resource consumption by builds and agents.
- Pipeline Code Review: Review pipeline definitions for resource-intensive operations or potential infinite loops before deployment.
- Monitoring and Alerting: Monitor Jenkins Master and Agent resource usage (CPU, memory, disk I/O). Set up alerts for unusual resource consumption patterns.
- Rate Limiting and Throttling: Implement rate limiting or throttling mechanisms for pipeline executions if necessary to prevent abuse.
- Input Validation and Sanitization (for pipeline parameters): If pipeline parameters can influence resource consumption, validate and sanitize them to prevent malicious input that could trigger resource exhaustion.
Attack Tree Path: 4. Information Leakage via Pipeline Output (High-Risk Path):
- Attack Vector:
- Attackers intentionally design a pipeline to expose sensitive information in build logs or artifacts.
- Examples include:
- Printing Environment Variables: Explicitly printing environment variables to logs, which might contain secrets or credentials.
- Logging Configuration Files: Logging the contents of configuration files that contain sensitive information.
- Including Secrets in Artifacts: Accidentally or intentionally including secrets or credentials in build artifacts that are stored and accessible through Jenkins.
- Attackers gain access to pipeline output (logs, artifacts) through Jenkins UI, API, or compromised accounts.
- Impact:
- Information Disclosure: Exposure of sensitive secrets, credentials, API keys, and configuration details.
- Mitigation:
- Secure Logging Practices: Strictly avoid logging sensitive information in pipelines. Sanitize logs to remove any accidental exposure.
- Artifact Security: Ensure that build artifacts are stored securely and access is controlled. Avoid including secrets or credentials in artifacts.
- Output Sanitization: Implement mechanisms to sanitize pipeline output before it is displayed or stored, removing any sensitive information.
- Access Control for Logs and Artifacts: Implement access control policies to restrict who can view pipeline logs and download artifacts.
- Regular Audits of Pipeline Output: Periodically audit pipeline logs and artifacts to identify and address any unintentional information leakage.