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Attack Tree Analysis for jfrog/artifactory-user-plugins

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access/Control over Artifactory Resources/System via User Plugins

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Gain Unauthorized Access/Control over Artifactory Resources/System via User Plugins

├── 1. Exploit Plugin Code Vulnerabilities (AND) │ ├── 1.1. Injection Attacks (OR) │ │ ├── 1.1.1. Groovy Script Injection [CRITICAL] │ │ │ -> HIGH RISK -> ├── 2. Exploit Plugin Deployment/Configuration Issues (AND) │ ├── 2.1. Weak Security Manager Configuration (OR) [CRITICAL] │ │ -> HIGH RISK -> (Especially when combined with Groovy Script Injection) │ ├── 2.3. Lack of Plugin Verification (OR) -> HIGH RISK -> (If combined with social engineering or insecure plugin storage) ├── 3. Social Engineering / Phishing (Less Likely, but Possible) (AND) -> HIGH RISK -> (If combined with Lack of Plugin Verification)

Attack Tree Path: Groovy Script Injection [CRITICAL] -> HIGH RISK ->

  • Description: User plugins are written in Groovy. If user-supplied input is directly incorporated into Groovy code without proper sanitization or validation, an attacker can inject malicious Groovy code. This code executes within the Artifactory server's context, potentially with high privileges.
  • Example: A plugin takes a repository name as input and uses it directly in a repositories.get(...) call. An attacker could inject code like "; repositories.list().each { println it.key }; //" to list all repositories, or worse, "; org.apache.commons.io.FileUtils.deleteDirectory(new File('/')); //" (hypothetically, if permissions allowed) to delete files.
  • Mitigation:
    • Strict input validation and sanitization: Use whitelists for allowed characters and patterns.
    • Parameterized queries/APIs: Use Artifactory's API methods that handle escaping automatically.
    • Avoid dynamic code generation: Minimize or eliminate the use of user input to construct Groovy code.
    • Security Manager: Enforce strict permissions to limit what the Groovy code can do (even if compromised).
    • Code Reviews: Thoroughly review code for injection vulnerabilities.
  • Likelihood: High
  • Impact: Very High (Full system compromise, data exfiltration, data destruction)
  • Effort: Low to Medium (Depends on the complexity of input validation and the presence of vulnerable code patterns)
  • Skill Level: Medium (Requires understanding of Groovy, Artifactory API, and injection techniques)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to High (Requires static code analysis, dynamic analysis, and potentially runtime monitoring of plugin behavior)

Attack Tree Path: Weak Security Manager Configuration (OR) [CRITICAL] -> HIGH RISK -> (Especially when combined with Groovy Script Injection)

  • Description: Artifactory's Security Manager can restrict the permissions of user plugins (e.g., file system access, network access, execution of system commands). A weak or disabled Security Manager allows plugins to operate with excessive privileges, greatly increasing the impact of any other vulnerability.
  • Example: The Security Manager is disabled, or a plugin is granted java.security.AllPermission. A compromised plugin (e.g., via Groovy Script Injection) can then execute arbitrary system commands, read/write any file, and connect to any network resource.
  • Mitigation:
    • Enable Security Manager: Always enable the Security Manager.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant plugins only the minimum necessary permissions.
    • Granular Policies: Use separate security.policy files for each plugin, defining specific permissions.
    • Regular Review: Periodically review and update the Security Manager configuration.
    • Testing: Test the Security Manager configuration to ensure it effectively restricts plugin actions.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on administrator awareness and diligence)
  • Impact: Very High (Amplifies the impact of other vulnerabilities)
  • Effort: Very Low (Requires only configuration changes)
  • Skill Level: Very Low (Basic understanding of Artifactory configuration)
  • Detection Difficulty: Low (Can be detected by reviewing the security.policy files and Artifactory configuration)

Attack Tree Path: Lack of Plugin Verification -> HIGH RISK -> (If combined with social engineering or insecure plugin storage)

  • Description: Artifactory doesn't inherently verify the integrity or authenticity of user plugins before loading them. This makes it possible for an attacker to introduce a malicious plugin if they can bypass other security controls.
  • Example:
    • Social Engineering: An attacker sends a phishing email to an Artifactory administrator, convincing them to install a "critical security update" plugin that is actually malicious.
    • Insecure Plugin Storage: An attacker gains write access to the Artifactory plugins directory (e.g., through a separate vulnerability or misconfiguration) and replaces a legitimate plugin with a malicious one.
  • Mitigation:
    • Checksum Verification: Calculate and verify the checksum (e.g., SHA-256) of plugin files before deployment.
    • Digital Signatures: Use digitally signed plugins and verify the signatures before loading.
    • Trusted Source: Obtain plugins only from trusted sources (e.g., a controlled internal repository).
    • CI/CD Pipeline: Integrate plugin verification into a CI/CD pipeline, including automated testing and signing.
    • File System Permissions: Ensure the plugins directory is only writable by the Artifactory service account.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on the presence of other vulnerabilities or successful social engineering)
  • Impact: Very High (Allows execution of arbitrary malicious code)
  • Effort: Low (For the attacker, once a vector is found; for mitigation, it requires implementing a verification process)
  • Skill Level: Low (For the attacker; for mitigation, it depends on the chosen verification method)
  • Detection Difficulty: High (Without verification, it's difficult to detect a malicious plugin)

Attack Tree Path: Social Engineering / Phishing -> HIGH RISK -> (If combined with Lack of Plugin Verification)

  • Description: Attackers use deceptive techniques to trick Artifactory administrators into installing malicious plugins.
  • Example: A phishing email impersonates a legitimate source, offering a fake "security update" or "performance enhancement" plugin.
  • Mitigation:
    • User Education: Train administrators to recognize phishing attempts and verify the source of plugins.
    • Strict Procedures: Establish clear procedures for installing and updating plugins, including verification steps.
    • Multi-Factor Authentication: Use MFA for Artifactory administrator accounts to make unauthorized access more difficult.
    • Reporting Mechanism: Provide a way for users to report suspicious emails or plugins.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium