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Attack Tree Analysis for jwagenleitner/groovy-wslite

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code on Server (or achieve significant compromise)

Attack Tree Visualization

                                  Execute Arbitrary Code on Server [CRITICAL]
                                              |
                              ------------------------------------
                              |                                  |
                  Exploit Vulnerabilities in           Abuse Features/Misconfigurations of
                      groovy-wslite                       groovy-wslite
                              |                                  |
              -----------------------------------      ---------------------------------------
              |                 |                 |              |                      |
  1.  Deserialization   2.  XML External    3.  Groovy   4. Dynamic   5. Unvalidated    6.  Dependency
      Vulnerability     Entity (XXE)      Injection    SOAP/REST    Input to       Confusion/Hijacking
    [CRITICAL]          Vulnerability                Client     SOAP/REST
                                           [CRITICAL]   Creation   Methods
              |                 |                 |      |              |                      |
    -----------------   -----------------   ----------   --------   --------------   --------------------------
    |               |   |      |        |   |        |            |            |                        |

1a. Crafted 2a. Inject 3a. Inject 4a. Craft 5a. Provide 6a. Leverage Payload External Groovy Malicious Malicious a known to Exploit Entities Code via SOAP Input to vulnerability Known to Read SOAP/REST Endpoint SOAP/REST in a transitive Vulnerable Files Parameters Methods dependency Class [HIGH RISK] [HIGH RISK] [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL] [CRITICAL] [CRITICAL] [CRITICAL] [CRITICAL] [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Deserialization Vulnerability

1a. Crafted Payload to Exploit Known Vulnerable Class

  • Description: The attacker crafts a malicious serialized object (a "payload") that, when deserialized by the application using groovy-wslite, triggers a vulnerability in a known vulnerable class within the application's classpath (including transitive dependencies). This often involves exploiting "gadget chains" – sequences of method calls that ultimately lead to arbitrary code execution.
  • Likelihood: Medium. Depends on the presence of vulnerable classes and the application's handling of deserialization. Groovy's dynamic nature can increase the attack surface.
  • Impact: Very High. Successful exploitation leads to arbitrary code execution on the server.
  • Effort: Medium. Requires research to find suitable gadget chains or create new ones.
  • Skill Level: Intermediate. Requires understanding of serialization, object graphs, and vulnerability research.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium. Can be difficult to detect without specialized security tools that analyze deserialization behavior. Standard logging might not catch it.
  • Mitigation:
    • Avoid deserializing untrusted data whenever possible.
    • Use a safe deserialization mechanism (e.g., whitelist-based deserialization, look-ahead deserialization).
    • If using XML, consider a format less prone to deserialization issues (e.g., JSON with a secure parser).
    • Keep all dependencies up-to-date.
    • Use a software composition analysis (SCA) tool to identify vulnerable dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: 2. XML External Entity (XXE) Vulnerability

2a. Inject External Entities to Read Files

  • Description: The attacker injects malicious XML external entities into a SOAP/REST request processed by groovy-wslite. If the XML parser is misconfigured or vulnerable, the server will process these entities, potentially allowing the attacker to read arbitrary files on the server's filesystem.
  • Likelihood: Medium. Depends on the XML parser configuration. Many modern parsers are secure by default, but misconfigurations are common. The use of groovy-wslite for web services increases the likelihood of XML processing.
  • Impact: High. Can expose sensitive data (configuration files, credentials, etc.), leading to further compromise.
  • Effort: Low. Basic XXE attacks are relatively easy to craft.
  • Skill Level: Intermediate. Requires understanding of XML and entities.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium. Might be detected by monitoring file access or network traffic. Blind XXE is harder to detect.
  • Mitigation:
    • Disable DTD processing completely if it's not absolutely necessary. This is the most effective defense.
    • If DTDs are required, disable external entity resolution.
    • Use a secure XML parser that is configured to prevent XXE by default.
    • Explicitly configure the XML parser used by groovy-wslite to be secure.
    • Validate and sanitize all user input before it's included in XML documents.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Groovy Injection

3a. Inject Groovy Code via SOAP/REST Parameters

  • Description: The attacker injects malicious Groovy code into parameters of SOAP/REST requests handled by groovy-wslite. If user input is directly concatenated into the request without proper sanitization or is otherwise evaluated as Groovy code, the injected code will be executed on the server.
  • Likelihood: Low (if proper input validation is in place), but Very High if input validation is weak or bypassed.
  • Impact: Very High. Successful Groovy injection leads to arbitrary code execution on the server.
  • Effort: Low. Crafting the injection payload is often straightforward if input validation is weak.
  • Skill Level: Intermediate. Requires understanding of how user input is handled and basic Groovy syntax.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium. Might be detected by input validation or security tools that look for code injection patterns.
  • Mitigation:
    • Implement strict input validation and sanitization. Use a whitelist approach whenever possible.
    • Avoid using user input to construct Groovy code that is then evaluated.
    • Use parameterized queries or prepared statements if interacting with databases via Groovy.
    • Encode output appropriately to prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) if user input is displayed.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Dynamic SOAP/REST Client Creation

4a. Craft Malicious Endpoint

  • Description: Attacker provides a URL to a malicious SOAP endpoint they control.
  • Mitigation: Validate URLs and WSDL locations.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Unvalidated Input to SOAP/REST Methods

5a. Provide Malicious Input

  • Description: Attacker provides crafted input that exploits vulnerabilities in the target web service.
  • Mitigation: Validate and sanitize all input, even if it's being sent to another service.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Dependency Confusion/Hijacking

6a. Leverage a known vulnerability in a transitive dependency

  • Description: Attacker exploits a known vulnerability in a dependency of groovy-wslite.
  • Mitigation: Keep dependencies up-to-date, use dependency scanning tools, and pin dependency versions.