Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
60 lines (51 loc) · 5.65 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

60 lines (51 loc) · 5.65 KB

Threat Model Analysis for jwagenleitner/groovy-wslite

Threat: Code Injection / Dynamic Code Execution - Groovy Code Injection via Unsanitized Input

  • Description: An attacker provides malicious input that is directly incorporated into Groovy code executed by groovy-wslite. This could occur through parameters in REST calls, SOAP message construction, or within response processing closures. The attacker crafts the input so that when it's evaluated as Groovy, it executes arbitrary commands on the server.
    • Impact: Complete system compromise. The attacker gains full control over the application and potentially the underlying server, enabling data theft, modification, or destruction.
    • Affected Component: groovy-wslite components that utilize Groovy closures for request/response handling:
      • client.post(body: { ... }) where the closure contains unsanitized input.
      • response.data.collect { ... } where the closure processes untrusted data.
      • Any custom methods that dynamically build Groovy code based on external input.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Input Validation & Sanitization: Rigorously validate and sanitize all user-supplied or externally-sourced data before using it in any Groovy code, especially within closures. Use whitelisting whenever possible.
      • Parameterization: Use parameterized requests or builders provided by the library (if available) to avoid direct string concatenation with user input.
      • Avoid Dynamic Closures: Minimize or eliminate the dynamic construction of Groovy closures based on external input.
      • Groovy Sandbox (If Possible): Consider a Groovy sandbox to restrict code capabilities, but understand its limitations.
      • Code Reviews: Conduct thorough code reviews, focusing on how groovy-wslite interacts with external data and Groovy code.

Threat: Code Injection / Dynamic Code Execution - Deserialization of Untrusted Data

  • Description: An attacker sends a crafted response (e.g., XML or JSON) to the application. groovy-wslite is configured (implicitly or explicitly) to automatically deserialize this response into Groovy objects. The attacker includes malicious code within the serialized data, which is executed during the deserialization process.
    • Impact: Arbitrary code execution on the server, leading to potential system compromise.
    • Affected Component:
      • response.data (when automatically deserialized)
      • Any custom deserialization logic used in conjunction with groovy-wslite.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Avoid Automatic Deserialization: Prefer manual parsing of responses using secure parsing libraries (e.g., a well-vetted JSON parser).
      • Safe Deserialization Libraries: If automatic deserialization is unavoidable, use libraries known to be secure against deserialization attacks and keep them updated.
      • Content-Type Validation: Strictly validate the Content-Type header before attempting any parsing.

Threat: XML-Related Vulnerabilities - XML External Entity (XXE) Injection

  • Description: An attacker sends a malicious XML payload containing external entity references. The underlying XML parser used by groovy-wslite is not configured to prevent external entity resolution. The attacker can then: * Read local files on the server. * Perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). * Cause a Denial of Service (DoS).
    • Impact: Data exfiltration, internal network access, service disruption.
    • Affected Component:
      • SOAPClient (when processing SOAP responses)
      • RESTClient (when processing XML responses)
      • Any component that uses groovy-wslite to handle XML data.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Disable External Entities: Configure the XML parser used by groovy-wslite (likely the default Groovy parser or a custom one) to disable the processing of external entities and DTDs. This is the primary defense.
      • Secure XML Parser: Ensure a secure and up-to-date XML parser is in use.

Threat: HTTP Request Manipulation - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Description: An attacker manipulates the URL used by groovy-wslite to access internal services or resources that should not be publicly accessible. The attacker crafts a URL that points to an internal IP address or a sensitive external system.
    • Impact: Access to internal systems, data exfiltration, potential for further attacks.
    • Affected Component:
      • RESTClient (the uri parameter or any method that accepts a URL)
      • SOAPClient (the endpoint URL)
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • URL Whitelisting: Strictly enforce a whitelist of allowed URLs or URL patterns that groovy-wslite can connect to.
      • Input Validation: If user input is used to construct URLs, rigorously validate and sanitize it to prevent injection of malicious schemes, hosts, or paths.
      • Network Segmentation: Implement network segmentation to limit the application server's access to internal resources.