Objective: Compromise an Android application that uses the fat-aar-android Gradle plugin by exploiting vulnerabilities introduced or amplified by the plugin itself.
Attack Goal: Compromise Application Using fat-aar-android [CRITICAL NODE]
└─── 1. Exploit Vulnerabilities Introduced by fat-aar-android Plugin [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] └─── 1.1. Malicious AAR Injection during Fat-AAR Creation [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├─── 1.1.1. Dependency Poisoning [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └─── 1.1.1.1.3. Local Dependency Cache Poisoning [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├─── 1.1.2. Supply Chain Attack via Compromised AAR Dependency [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └─── 1.1.2.1. AAR Dependency Already Contains Malware [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├─── 1.1.2.1.1. Legitimate but Compromised Library [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └─── 1.1.2.1.2. Intentionally Malicious Library Masquerading as Legitimate [HIGH-RISK PATH] └─── 1.1.3. Malicious Local AAR Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├─── 1.1.3.1. Developer Machine Compromise [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] └─── 1.1.3.2. Build System Compromise (CI/CD Pipeline) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] └─── 1.2.1. Classpath Conflicts and Overwriting └─── 1.2.1.1. Malicious Class Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├─── 1.2.1.1.1. Overwrite Legitimate Class with Malicious One [HIGH-RISK PATH] └─── 1.2.1.1.2. Introduce Conflicting Class with Exploit Logic [HIGH-RISK PATH] └─── 1.2.3. Manifest Merging Issues ├─── 1.2.3.2. Intent Filter Hijacking [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └─── 1.2.3.2.1. Introduce AAR with Conflicting Intent Filters to Intercept Intents [HIGH-RISK PATH] └─── 1.2.3.3. Service/Receiver/Provider Overriding [HIGH-RISK PATH] └─── 1.2.3.3.1. Replace Legitimate Components with Malicious Ones via Manifest Merging [HIGH-RISK PATH]
This is the ultimate objective of the attacker. Success means gaining unauthorized control, access, or causing harm to the application and potentially the user's device, specifically by exploiting aspects related to the fat-aar-android plugin.
Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Vulnerabilities Introduced by fat-aar-android Plugin [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
This is the top-level attack vector. The attacker aims to leverage the specific functionalities and processes of the fat-aar-android plugin to introduce vulnerabilities or amplify existing ones in the application. This path is high-risk because it directly targets the plugin's integration into the build process.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Malicious AAR Injection during Fat-AAR Creation [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
This path focuses on injecting malicious Android Archive (AAR) files into the application's build process, specifically during the creation of the "fat-AAR" by the plugin. This is critical because malicious code within an AAR can be directly incorporated into the final application.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1. Dependency Poisoning [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Attack Vector: The attacker attempts to replace a legitimate AAR dependency with a malicious one during the dependency resolution phase of the Gradle build. This can be achieved by compromising the dependency source or the resolution process itself.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.1.3. Local Dependency Cache Poisoning [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Attack Vector: If the attacker gains access to the developer's machine or build server, they can directly modify the local Gradle dependency cache. By replacing a legitimate AAR in the cache with a malicious one, subsequent builds will use the compromised dependency.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2. Supply Chain Attack via Compromised AAR Dependency [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Attack Vector: This path exploits the supply chain by using AAR dependencies that are already compromised. The application unknowingly includes a malicious library as a dependency. This is critical because it leverages existing vulnerabilities in the broader software ecosystem.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2.1. AAR Dependency Already Contains Malware [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Attack Vector: An AAR dependency, obtained from a repository, already contains malicious code. This could be due to:
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2.1.1. Legitimate but Compromised Library [HIGH-RISK PATH]
A previously legitimate library is compromised by an attacker (e.g., through account takeover or backdoor insertion).
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2.1.2. Intentionally Malicious Library Masquerading as Legitimate [HIGH-RISK PATH]
An attacker creates a fake library, designed to appear legitimate, but containing malicious functionality.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3. Malicious Local AAR Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Attack Vector: The attacker directly injects a malicious AAR file into the project's dependency structure, especially if the fat-aar-android plugin is configured to include local AAR files.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3.1. Developer Machine Compromise [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Attack Vector: If the developer's machine is compromised, the attacker can modify the project's build configuration files (like build.gradle) or directly place malicious AAR files in locations where the fat-aar-android plugin will pick them up during the build process. This is critical as it directly manipulates the development environment.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3.2. Build System Compromise (CI/CD Pipeline) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Attack Vector: Compromising the CI/CD pipeline allows the attacker to inject malicious AARs during the automated build process. This is critical because it affects all builds produced by the compromised pipeline, potentially distributing malicious applications to a wide user base.
Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1. Classpath Conflicts and Overwriting -> 1.2.1.1. Malicious Class Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Attack Vector: This path exploits potential vulnerabilities in how fat-aar-android handles class name conflicts during the merging of multiple AARs. If not handled correctly, a malicious AAR could introduce classes that overwrite or conflict with legitimate classes, leading to malicious code execution.
Attack Vector: A malicious AAR contains a class with the same fully qualified name as a legitimate class in another AAR or the main application. Due to flaws in the merging process or classloading order, the malicious class overwrites and replaces the legitimate one.
Attack Vector: A malicious AAR introduces a new class with a name that conflicts with a class in another dependency, but with malicious logic. If classloading is not carefully managed, the malicious class might be loaded and executed instead of the intended legitimate class.
Attack Tree Path: 1.2.3. Manifest Merging Issues -> 1.2.3.2. Intent Filter Hijacking [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Attack Vector: This path exploits vulnerabilities in the Android manifest merging process performed by fat-aar-android. A malicious AAR is crafted to include intent filters that conflict with or are broader than the application's legitimate intent filters.
Attack Tree Path: 1.2.3.2.1. Introduce AAR with Conflicting Intent Filters to Intercept Intents [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Attack Vector: A malicious AAR includes intent filters that are designed to intercept intents intended for legitimate components of the application. This allows the malicious AAR's components to handle these intents instead, potentially leading to data theft, malicious actions triggered by intents, or denial of service.
Attack Tree Path: 1.2.3. Manifest Merging Issues -> 1.2.3.3. Service/Receiver/Provider Overriding [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Attack Vector: Similar to intent filter hijacking, this path exploits manifest merging to override or replace declarations of key Android components (Services, BroadcastReceivers, ContentProviders) defined in other AARs or the main application.
Attack Tree Path: 1.2.3.3.1. Replace Legitimate Components with Malicious Ones via Manifest Merging [HIGH-RISK PATH]
Attack Vector: Through manifest merging rules or vulnerabilities, a malicious AAR can replace the declaration of a legitimate Service, BroadcastReceiver, or ContentProvider with its own malicious component. When the application attempts to use the legitimate component, the malicious replacement is executed instead, allowing for arbitrary malicious actions within the application's context.