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Attack Tree Analysis for kezong/fat-aar-android

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code OR Exfiltrate Data

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      +-------------------------------------------------+
                                      | Execute Arbitrary Code OR Exfiltrate Data (Goal) |
                                      +-------------------------------------------------+
                                                       |
          +------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
          |                                                                                                |
+-------------------------+                                                +-----------------------------+
|  Dependency Confusion   |                                                |  Malicious Code Injection   |
|       (Sub-Goal)        |                                                |        (Sub-Goal)           |
+-------------------------+                                                +-----------------------------+
          |                                                                                |
+---------------------+                                                     +-----------------------------+
| Publish Malicious   |                                                     |  Exploit Vulnerabilities   |
| Package to Public   |                                                     |  in Included Libraries    |
| Repository          |                                                     |  (Pre-existing or          |
+---------------------+                                                     |   Introduced via Tampering)| [CRITICAL]
          |                                                                                |
+---------------------+                                                     +-----------------------------+
| Name Package        |                                                     |  Craft Malicious Code      |
| Similar to Legitimate|                                                     |  to Bypass Security       |
| Dependency          | [CRITICAL]                                            |  Mechanisms  [CRITICAL]    |
+---------------------+                                                     +-----------------------------+
                                                                                                |
                                                                                    +-----------------------------+
                                                                                    |  Leverage Android          |
                                                                                    |  APIs for Code Execution  |
                                                                                    |  or Data Exfiltration     |
                                                                                    +-----------------------------+
          |
+-----------------------------+
|  Configuration Weakness     |
|        (Sub-Goal)           |
+-----------------------------+
          |
+-----------------------------+
|  Overly Permissive       |
|  Permissions Granted     |
|  Due to Merging          | [CRITICAL]
+-----------------------------+

Attack Tree Path: 1. High-Risk Path: Dependency Confusion

  • Overall Description: This attack path leverages the way fat-aar-android handles dependencies. If a developer isn't extremely careful, an attacker can trick the build system into using a malicious package instead of the intended one.

  • Step 1: Publish Malicious Package to Public Repository

    • Description: The attacker creates a malicious package and publishes it to a public repository like Maven Central or JCenter. This package will contain the attacker's malicious code.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High (Sets the stage for dependency confusion)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

  • Step 2: Name Package Similar to Legitimate Dependency [CRITICAL]

    • Description: The attacker gives the malicious package a name that is very similar to a legitimate dependency used within one of the AARs being embedded by fat-aar-android. This is the core of the deception, exploiting typos, similar-sounding names, or variations in naming conventions.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Success depends on developer oversight)
    • Impact: High (Critical for the success of dependency confusion)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Novice
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 2. Critical Node: Exploit Vulnerabilities in Included Libraries (Pre-existing or Introduced via Tampering)

  • Description: This represents the point where the attacker's code actually gains control. The attacker either exploits a known vulnerability in a library already included in an AAR, or they introduce a new vulnerability by modifying the library's code (if they have compromised the build process).
  • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on the presence of vulnerabilities)
  • Impact: High to Very High (Allows for arbitrary code execution)
  • Effort: Medium to High
  • Skill Level: Advanced to Expert
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard

Attack Tree Path: 3. Critical Node: Craft Malicious Code to Bypass Security Mechanisms

  • Description: The attacker designs their malicious code to evade any security measures in place on the Android device, such as sandboxing, permission checks, or security software. This is crucial for the code to execute successfully and achieve its goal.

  • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on the effectiveness of security mechanisms)

  • Impact: Very High (Enables the attacker to achieve their goal)

  • Effort: High

  • Skill Level: Expert

  • Detection Difficulty: Hard to Very Hard

  • Sub-Step: Leverage Android APIs for Code Execution or Data Exfiltration

    • Description: After bypassing security, the malicious code uses standard Android APIs to perform its intended actions, such as accessing files, network connections, sensitive data, or even installing additional malware.
    • Likelihood: High (Once malicious code is running, this is straightforward)
    • Impact: Very High (Achieves the attacker's goal)
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard

Attack Tree Path: 4. Critical Node: Overly Permissive Permissions Granted Due to Merging

  • Description: fat-aar-android merges the Android Manifest files from all included AARs. If an embedded AAR requests excessive permissions, or if the merging process isn't carefully managed, the final application might end up with more permissions than it needs. This creates a larger attack surface for an attacker.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Common oversight during development)
  • Impact: Medium to High (Increases the attack surface)
  • Effort: Very Low (Occurs automatically during the build process)
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Can be detected by reviewing the merged manifest)