attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for marcelbirkner/docker-ci-tool-stack

Attack Surface: Unprotected Docker Daemon Socket Exposure

• Description: docker-ci-tool-stack environments, if not carefully configured, can inadvertently encourage or facilitate the exposure of the Docker daemon socket (e.g., /var/run/docker.sock) to containers or the network. This allows unauthorized control over the Docker daemon and the host system.
• docker-ci-tool-stack Contribution: If docker-ci-tool-stack examples, documentation, or default configurations suggest or allow mounting the Docker socket into CI/CD containers for ease of Docker operations within the pipeline, it directly contributes to this critical attack surface.
• Example: A docker-ci-tool-stack setup provides a sample Docker Compose configuration that mounts /var/run/docker.sock into a build container to enable docker build commands within the container. If this container is compromised, the attacker gains host-level Docker control.
• Impact: Critical. Full compromise of the host system, data breaches, service disruption, and lateral movement within the network.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Discourage and explicitly warn against mounting /var/run/docker.sock in default configurations and documentation of docker-ci-tool-stack.
  • Provide guidance and examples for secure alternatives to Docker socket mounting within CI/CD pipelines, such as using Docker-in-Docker (dind) with security considerations or remote Docker API access with TLS and authentication.
  • Emphasize the principle of least privilege and recommend avoiding Docker socket access within containers unless absolutely necessary and with strong justification.

Attack Surface: Network Exposure of Docker API without TLS and Authentication

• Description: docker-ci-tool-stack configurations or usage patterns might inadvertently lead to exposing the Docker API over the network (e.g., port 2376) without TLS encryption and strong authentication. This allows attackers to remotely control the Docker daemon.
• docker-ci-tool-stack Contribution: If docker-ci-tool-stack documentation or examples suggest or allow configuring remote Docker API access for CI/CD integration without clearly emphasizing the necessity of TLS and authentication, it increases the risk of insecure API exposure.
• Example: docker-ci-tool-stack documentation provides instructions for setting up remote Docker API access for CI/CD agents but lacks prominent warnings and guidance on enabling TLS and authentication, leading users to configure insecure remote access.
• Impact: Critical. Full compromise of the host system, data breaches, service disruption, and lateral movement within the network.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Clearly document and strongly recommend the use of TLS encryption and strong authentication for any remote Docker API access within docker-ci-tool-stack documentation and examples.
  • Provide step-by-step guides and configuration examples for setting up secure remote Docker API access with TLS and client certificate authentication.
  • Warn against exposing the Docker API directly to the public internet and emphasize the importance of network segmentation and access control.

Attack Surface: Vulnerable Base Images in Dockerfiles within docker-ci-tool-stack Projects

• Description: docker-ci-tool-stack projects rely on Dockerfiles. If example Dockerfiles or user-created Dockerfiles within the context of docker-ci-tool-stack utilize outdated or vulnerable base images, they introduce known vulnerabilities into the built CI/CD containers and application images.
• docker-ci-tool-stack Contribution: If docker-ci-tool-stack provides example Dockerfiles or templates that use outdated base images, or if it lacks guidance on selecting and maintaining secure base images, it contributes to the risk of using vulnerable base images in projects built with the tool stack.
• Example: A starter project provided by docker-ci-tool-stack includes a Dockerfile that uses an old version of a Linux distribution as a base image, which contains known security vulnerabilities. Images built using this Dockerfile will inherit these vulnerabilities.
• Impact: High. Container compromise, potential host compromise depending on the vulnerability and container configuration, data breaches, and service disruption.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Ensure all example Dockerfiles and templates provided by docker-ci-tool-stack use up-to-date and minimal base images.
  • Include documentation and best practices within docker-ci-tool-stack on selecting secure base images and regularly updating them.
  • Recommend and potentially integrate automated vulnerability scanning of Docker images as part of the docker-ci-tool-stack workflow or CI/CD pipeline examples.

Attack Surface: Software Vulnerabilities in Docker Images Built by docker-ci-tool-stack

• Description: docker-ci-tool-stack is designed to build Docker images. If the build processes facilitated by docker-ci-tool-stack result in images containing vulnerable software dependencies or packages, it creates an attack surface in deployed applications.
• docker-ci-tool-stack Contribution: If docker-ci-tool-stack lacks guidance or tools for dependency management and vulnerability scanning during the image build process, it indirectly contributes to the risk of creating vulnerable images.
• Example: A CI/CD pipeline configured using docker-ci-tool-stack builds a web application image. The build process, as configured by the user following docker-ci-tool-stack guidance, does not include dependency scanning, and a vulnerable version of a web framework dependency is included in the final image.
• Impact: High. Container compromise, application compromise, data breaches, and service disruption.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Provide guidance and examples within docker-ci-tool-stack documentation on incorporating dependency scanning and vulnerability checks into the image build process.
  • Recommend and potentially integrate tools for dependency scanning (e.g., npm audit, pip check, mvn dependency:check) and image vulnerability scanning (e.g., Trivy, Clair) into docker-ci-tool-stack workflows or CI/CD pipeline examples.
  • Emphasize the importance of using dependency management tools and keeping dependencies updated within docker-ci-tool-stack documentation and best practices.

Attack Surface: Secret Exposure in CI/CD Pipeline Configurations within docker-ci-tool-stack

• Description: docker-ci-tool-stack involves defining and managing CI/CD pipelines. If the tool stack or its examples inadvertently encourage or allow storing secrets directly within pipeline configurations or scripts, it leads to a high risk of secret exposure.
• docker-ci-tool-stack Contribution: If docker-ci-tool-stack examples or documentation demonstrate or allow hardcoding secrets in pipeline files or scripts for simplicity, without clearly warning against this practice and providing secure alternatives, it directly contributes to this attack surface.
• Example: A docker-ci-tool-stack example pipeline configuration shows how to deploy to a cloud provider by directly embedding API keys within the pipeline definition file for demonstration purposes, without highlighting the security risks and secure secret management practices.
• Impact: High. Data breaches, unauthorized access to cloud resources, compromised infrastructure, and potential financial loss.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Strongly discourage and explicitly warn against hardcoding secrets in pipeline configurations, scripts, or any files managed by docker-ci-tool-stack in documentation and examples.
  • Provide clear guidance and examples on integrating secure secret management tools (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, cloud provider secret managers) with docker-ci-tool-stack pipelines.
  • Emphasize the importance of using environment variables or mounted volumes from secret management systems to inject secrets into pipelines and containers at runtime within docker-ci-tool-stack documentation and best practices.

Attack Surface: Privileged Containers Usage Encouraged by docker-ci-tool-stack Configurations

• Description: docker-ci-tool-stack might utilize Docker Compose or similar orchestration tools. If default or example configurations within docker-ci-tool-stack unnecessarily use or suggest the use of privileged containers, it introduces a critical security vulnerability.
• docker-ci-tool-stack Contribution: If docker-ci-tool-stack examples or documentation provide Docker Compose configurations that include privileged: true without strong justification and clear warnings about the security implications, it contributes to the risk of users deploying privileged containers unnecessarily.
• Example: A docker-ci-tool-stack example Docker Compose file for a development environment includes a service defined with privileged: true for perceived convenience or to overcome permission issues, without explaining the security risks and alternative solutions.
• Impact: Critical. Full compromise of the host system, data breaches, service disruption, and lateral movement within the network if a privileged container is compromised.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Avoid using privileged: true in any default or example Docker Compose configurations provided by docker-ci-tool-stack.
  • Clearly document and strongly discourage the use of privileged containers in docker-ci-tool-stack documentation, emphasizing the significant security risks.
  • Provide guidance and examples on alternative approaches to achieve necessary functionalities without relying on privileged mode, such as using specific capabilities, volume mounts with appropriate permissions, or user namespace remapping.
  • Recommend regular audits of Docker Compose configurations to identify and eliminate any unnecessary use of privileged containers in projects using docker-ci-tool-stack.