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Attack Tree Analysis for marcelbirkner/docker-ci-tool-stack

Objective: Compromise Application via docker-ci-tool-stack Weaknesses (Focus on High-Risk Paths)

Attack Tree Visualization

Root Goal: Compromise Application via docker-ci-tool-stack

    ├───[OR]─ **Compromise CI/CD Pipeline** **(CRITICAL NODE)**
    │   ├───[OR]─ **Compromise Jenkins Instance** **(CRITICAL NODE)**
    │   │   ├───[AND]─ **Exploit Unsecured Jenkins Access** **(CRITICAL NODE)**
    │   │   │   ├─── **Default Credentials (admin:admin)** **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
    │   │   │   ├─── **No Authentication Enabled** **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
    │   │   │   ├─── **Publicly Accessible Jenkins UI without Authentication** **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
    │   │   ├───[OR]─ **Exploit Insecure Pipeline Secrets Management** **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
    │   │   │   ├─── **Secrets Stored in Plain Text in Jenkins Configuration** **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
    │   │   │   ├─── **Secrets Exposed in Pipeline Logs** **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
    ├───[OR]─ Compromise Nexus Repository Manager Instance
    │   ├───[AND]─ **Exploit Unsecured Nexus Access** **(CRITICAL NODE)**
    └───[OR]─ **Supply Chain Attack via Tool-Stack Images**
        ├───[AND]─ **Use Maliciously Modified Base Images (if not from trusted sources)** **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**
        └───[AND]─ **Malicious Libraries injected into Tool-Stack containers during build process (if custom build)** **(HIGH-RISK PATH)**

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: Compromise CI/CD Pipeline

1. Critical Node: Compromise CI/CD Pipeline

  • Description: This is the root of the high-risk paths. Compromising the CI/CD pipeline, especially Jenkins, grants attackers significant control over the application deployment process and infrastructure.
  • Attack Vectors (Leading to this node):
    • Exploiting Jenkins Instance
    • Exploiting Insecure Pipeline Secrets Management

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: Compromise Jenkins Instance

2. Critical Node: Compromise Jenkins Instance

  • Description: Jenkins is the central orchestration tool in the docker-ci-tool-stack. Gaining control over Jenkins allows attackers to manipulate builds, deployments, and potentially access sensitive credentials.
  • Attack Vectors (Leading to this node):
    • Exploiting Unsecured Jenkins Access

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: Exploit Unsecured Jenkins Access

3. Critical Node: Exploit Unsecured Jenkins Access

  • Description: This is the most direct and easily exploitable vulnerability in a Jenkins instance. It arises from misconfigurations or negligence in securing Jenkins access.
  • High-Risk Paths (Under this node):
    • Default Credentials (admin:admin)
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High (Full Jenkins control)
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Low
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • No Authentication Enabled
      • Likelihood: Low
      • Impact: High (Full Jenkins control)
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Low
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • Publicly Accessible Jenkins UI without Authentication
      • Likelihood: Low
      • Impact: High (Full Jenkins control)
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Low
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path: Exploit Insecure Pipeline Secrets Management

4. High-Risk Path: Exploit Insecure Pipeline Secrets Management

  • Description: Improper handling of secrets within the CI/CD pipeline can directly expose sensitive credentials, leading to broader system compromise.
  • High-Risk Paths (Under this node):
    • Secrets Stored in Plain Text in Jenkins Configuration
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High (Exposure of sensitive credentials)
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Low
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • Secrets Exposed in Pipeline Logs
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High (Exposure of sensitive credentials)
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Low
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: Critical Node: Exploit Unsecured Nexus Access

5. Critical Node: Exploit Unsecured Nexus Access

  • Description: Similar to Jenkins and SonarQube, unsecured access to Nexus Repository Manager allows attackers to manipulate artifacts, potentially injecting malicious code into the application build process (supply chain attack).
  • Attack Vectors (Leading to this node):
    • Default Credentials (admin:admin)
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High (Nexus control, artifact manipulation)
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Low
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • No Authentication Enabled
      • Likelihood: Low
      • Impact: High (Nexus control, artifact manipulation)
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Low
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • Publicly Accessible Nexus UI without Authentication
      • Likelihood: Low
      • Impact: High (Nexus control, artifact manipulation)
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Low
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy

Attack Tree Path: High-Risk Path: Supply Chain Attack via Tool-Stack Images

6. High-Risk Path: Supply Chain Attack via Tool-Stack Images

  • Description: Compromising the tool-stack images themselves, either through malicious base images or injected dependencies, can lead to widespread and difficult-to-detect compromises.
  • High-Risk Paths (Under this node):
    • Use Maliciously Modified Base Images (if not from trusted sources)
      • Likelihood: Low
      • Impact: High (Backdoored tool-stack components, full compromise)
      • Effort: Medium to High
      • Skill Level: Medium to High
      • Detection Difficulty: Difficult
    • Malicious Libraries injected into Tool-Stack containers during build process (if custom build)
      • Likelihood: Low
      • Impact: High (Backdoored tool-stack components, full compromise)
      • Effort: Medium to High
      • Skill Level: Medium to High
      • Detection Difficulty: Difficult