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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for marcelbirkner/docker-ci-tool-stack

Mitigation Strategy: Regularly Update Base Images

  • Description:
    1. Identify the base images used in Dockerfiles for Jenkins, SonarQube, Nexus, and any build tools within the docker-ci-tool-stack.
    2. Establish a process to monitor for updates to these base images (e.g., using watchtower, or subscribing to security mailing lists for the base image providers).
    3. When updates are available, especially security updates, update the FROM instruction in your Dockerfiles to use the newer image tag.
    4. Rebuild the Docker images using the updated base images.
    5. Redeploy the updated images to your CI/CD environment.
    6. Automate this process using CI/CD pipelines to ensure regular updates.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Vulnerable Base OS Packages - Severity: High
    • Outdated Libraries in Base Images - Severity: Medium
  • Impact:
    • Vulnerable Base OS Packages: High reduction in risk. Significantly reduces the attack surface by patching known OS vulnerabilities.
    • Outdated Libraries in Base Images: Medium reduction in risk. Addresses vulnerabilities in libraries used by applications within the containers.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Base images are likely used, but automated regular updates might be missing.
  • Missing Implementation: Automated process for monitoring and updating base images, and rebuilding/redeploying containers.

Mitigation Strategy: Minimize Image Footprint

  • Description:
    1. Review Dockerfiles for Jenkins, SonarQube, Nexus, and build tools.
    2. Use minimal base images like Alpine Linux where feasible, instead of larger distributions like Ubuntu or CentOS.
    3. Employ multi-stage builds in Dockerfiles. In the first stage, include all build dependencies. In the final stage, copy only the necessary artifacts and runtime dependencies to a minimal base image.
    4. Remove unnecessary tools, packages, and libraries from the final Docker images.
    5. Clean up package managers caches (e.g., apt-get clean, yum clean all) within the Dockerfile to reduce image size.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Increased Attack Surface - Severity: Medium
    • Unnecessary Utilities and Tools - Severity: Low
  • Impact:
    • Increased Attack Surface: Medium reduction in risk. Reduces the number of potential entry points for attackers by removing unnecessary components.
    • Unnecessary Utilities and Tools: Low reduction in risk. Limits the tools available to an attacker if they compromise a container.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Dockerfiles might already be somewhat optimized, but further minimization is often possible.
  • Missing Implementation: Systematic review and optimization of Dockerfiles for minimal footprint, especially implementing multi-stage builds where not already used.

Mitigation Strategy: Vulnerability Scanning of Docker Images

  • Description:
    1. Integrate a Docker image scanning tool (like Trivy, Clair, Anchore) into your CI/CD pipeline.
    2. Configure the scanning tool to scan newly built Docker images before they are pushed to a registry or deployed.
    3. Define a policy for vulnerability severity levels (e.g., fail builds for critical and high vulnerabilities).
    4. Automate the scanning process to run with every image build.
    5. Establish a workflow for addressing identified vulnerabilities, including patching, rebuilding images, or applying workarounds.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Vulnerable Components in Docker Images - Severity: High
    • Supply Chain Attacks via Vulnerable Dependencies - Severity: Medium
  • Impact:
    • Vulnerable Components in Docker Images: High reduction in risk. Proactively identifies and prevents deployment of images with known vulnerabilities.
    • Supply Chain Attacks via Vulnerable Dependencies: Medium reduction in risk. Helps detect vulnerabilities introduced through dependencies included in the images.
  • Currently Implemented: Likely missing. Vulnerability scanning is often not included in basic setups but is a crucial security practice.
  • Missing Implementation: Integration of a Docker image scanning tool into the CI/CD pipeline and definition of vulnerability management policies.

Mitigation Strategy: Use Private Docker Registry

  • Description:
    1. Utilize the Nexus Repository Manager included in the docker-ci-tool-stack or another private Docker registry.
    2. Configure your CI/CD pipeline to push built Docker images to this private registry instead of relying solely on public registries like Docker Hub.
    3. Configure your deployment environment to pull Docker images from the private registry.
    4. Implement access control on the private registry to restrict who can push and pull images.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Supply Chain Attacks via Compromised Public Images - Severity: Medium
    • Unauthorized Access to Internal Images - Severity: Medium
  • Impact:
    • Supply Chain Attacks via Compromised Public Images: Medium reduction in risk. Reduces reliance on potentially compromised public registries.
    • Unauthorized Access to Internal Images: Medium reduction in risk. Protects proprietary images from unauthorized access and distribution.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Nexus is included in the tool stack, but it might not be fully configured and enforced as the primary image source.
  • Missing Implementation: Full configuration of Nexus as the private registry, CI/CD pipeline integration to push/pull from Nexus, and enforcement of private registry usage.

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Image Signing and Verification

  • Description:
    1. Enable Docker Content Trust in your Docker environment.
    2. Configure your CI/CD pipeline to sign Docker images after building them and pushing them to the private registry.
    3. Configure your Docker daemon to verify image signatures before pulling and running containers.
    4. Manage signing keys securely and restrict access to them.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Image Tampering - Severity: High
    • Malicious Image Injection - Severity: High
  • Impact:
    • Image Tampering: High reduction in risk. Ensures that images pulled are exactly as they were signed and haven't been modified.
    • Malicious Image Injection: High reduction in risk. Prevents the use of unauthorized or malicious images by verifying signatures.
  • Currently Implemented: Likely missing. Image signing and verification are advanced security measures not typically enabled by default.
  • Missing Implementation: Enabling Docker Content Trust, configuring image signing in the CI/CD pipeline, and enforcing signature verification in the Docker environment.

Mitigation Strategy: Harden Jenkins Configuration

  • Description:
    1. Access Jenkins configuration through the web interface (/configureSecurity/).
    2. Enable security realm (e.g., Jenkins' own user database, LDAP, Active Directory).
    3. Enable authorization (e.g., Role-Based Strategy, Matrix-based security).
    4. Disable anonymous access and restrict access to administrative functionalities.
    5. Disable script console access for non-administrators.
    6. Configure CSRF protection (should be enabled by default, verify it is).
    7. Regularly review and update Jenkins security settings.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Unauthorized Access to Jenkins - Severity: High
    • Privilege Escalation - Severity: High
    • CSRF Attacks - Severity: Medium
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized Access to Jenkins: High reduction in risk. Prevents unauthorized users from accessing and manipulating Jenkins.
    • Privilege Escalation: High reduction in risk. Limits the ability of compromised accounts to gain administrative privileges.
    • CSRF Attacks: Medium reduction in risk. Mitigates CSRF attacks that could lead to unintended actions in Jenkins.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Basic security realm might be enabled, but fine-grained authorization and hardening steps might be missing.
  • Missing Implementation: Detailed configuration of authorization (RBAC), disabling script console for non-admins, and regular security configuration reviews.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Jenkins Plugins

  • Description:
    1. Regularly check for plugin updates in Jenkins Plugin Manager (/pluginManager/updates).
    2. Update plugins to the latest versions promptly, especially security updates.
    3. Uninstall unnecessary plugins to reduce the attack surface.
    4. Before installing new plugins, research their security reputation and known vulnerabilities.
    5. Utilize the Jenkins Plugin Manager's security warnings and advisories to identify vulnerable plugins.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Vulnerable Jenkins Plugins - Severity: High
    • Plugin Backdoors or Malicious Plugins - Severity: High
  • Impact:
    • Vulnerable Jenkins Plugins: High reduction in risk. Patches known vulnerabilities in plugins that could be exploited.
    • Plugin Backdoors or Malicious Plugins: High reduction in risk. Reduces the risk of installing malicious plugins by minimizing the number of plugins and being cautious about new installations.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Plugin updates might be done occasionally, but a systematic approach and security-focused plugin management might be missing.
  • Missing Implementation: Establish a regular plugin update schedule, plugin security review process before installation, and monitoring of plugin security advisories.

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Strong Authentication and Authorization in Jenkins

  • Description:
    1. Enforce strong password policies for Jenkins user accounts (complexity, length, expiration).
    2. Consider enabling multi-factor authentication (MFA) for Jenkins logins using plugins like the Google Authenticator plugin or similar.
    3. Implement Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) using the Role-Based Strategy plugin or similar.
    4. Define roles based on job responsibilities (e.g., developer, operator, administrator).
    5. Assign users to roles and grant permissions based on the principle of least privilege.
    6. Regularly review user accounts and permissions.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Unauthorized Access due to Weak Passwords - Severity: High
    • Account Compromise - Severity: High
    • Privilege Escalation - Severity: High
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized Access due to Weak Passwords: High reduction in risk. Makes it harder for attackers to guess or crack passwords.
    • Account Compromise: High reduction in risk (with MFA). Significantly reduces the risk of account compromise even if passwords are leaked.
    • Privilege Escalation: High reduction in risk (with RBAC). Limits the impact of compromised accounts by restricting their permissions.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Basic authentication might be in place, but strong password policies, MFA, and fine-grained RBAC are likely missing.
  • Missing Implementation: Enforcing strong password policies, implementing MFA, configuring RBAC, and establishing user/permission review processes.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Credentials Management in Jenkins

  • Description:
    1. Utilize the Jenkins Credentials Plugin to store credentials securely.
    2. Avoid storing credentials directly in Jenkins job configurations, scripts, or environment variables.
    3. Use credential IDs to reference credentials in jobs instead of embedding the actual secrets.
    4. Restrict access to credential management to authorized users only.
    5. Consider integrating with external secret management solutions like HashiCorp Vault for enhanced security and centralized secret management.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Exposure of Sensitive Credentials in Jenkins Configuration - Severity: High
    • Hardcoded Credentials in Jobs - Severity: High
    • Credential Leakage - Severity: High
  • Impact:
    • Exposure of Sensitive Credentials in Jenkins Configuration: High reduction in risk. Prevents accidental exposure of credentials in Jenkins UI or configuration files.
    • Hardcoded Credentials in Jobs: High reduction in risk. Eliminates hardcoded credentials in jobs, making them more secure and maintainable.
    • Credential Leakage: High reduction in risk. Reduces the risk of credential leakage by centralizing and securing credential storage.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Credentials plugin might be used for some credentials, but best practices might not be consistently applied.
  • Missing Implementation: Systematic use of Jenkins Credentials Plugin for all secrets, avoiding hardcoding, and potentially integrating with external secret management.

Mitigation Strategy: Restrict Access to Jenkins Agents

  • Description:
    1. Use secure communication protocols (e.g., SSH) for communication between Jenkins master and agents.
    2. Implement agent authorization to control which agents can connect to the Jenkins master and execute jobs.
    3. Harden Jenkins agent operating systems and configurations.
    4. Isolate Jenkins agents in separate networks or security zones if possible.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Agent Compromise Leading to Master Compromise - Severity: High
    • Unauthorized Agent Connection - Severity: Medium
    • Data Exfiltration via Agents - Severity: Medium
  • Impact:
    • Agent Compromise Leading to Master Compromise: Medium reduction in risk. Limits the impact of agent compromise on the Jenkins master.
    • Unauthorized Agent Connection: Medium reduction in risk. Prevents unauthorized agents from connecting and potentially executing malicious jobs.
    • Data Exfiltration via Agents: Medium reduction in risk. Reduces the risk of data exfiltration through compromised agents by isolating them.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Secure communication (SSH) might be used, but agent authorization and agent hardening might be missing.
  • Missing Implementation: Implementing agent authorization, hardening agent OS and configurations, and network isolation of agents.

Mitigation Strategy: Harden SonarQube Configuration

  • Description:
    1. Access SonarQube configuration through the web interface (usually /admin/settings).
    2. Configure secure authentication and authorization mechanisms (e.g., local users, LDAP, SAML).
    3. Restrict access to administrative functionalities to authorized users only.
    4. Disable anonymous access if not required.
    5. Review and adjust default security settings according to security best practices.
    6. Regularly review and update SonarQube security settings.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Unauthorized Access to SonarQube - Severity: High
    • Data Breach via SonarQube - Severity: High
    • Manipulation of Code Analysis Rules - Severity: Medium
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized Access to SonarQube: High reduction in risk. Prevents unauthorized users from accessing sensitive code analysis data and configurations.
    • Data Breach via SonarQube: High reduction in risk. Protects code and analysis results from unauthorized access and potential data breaches.
    • Manipulation of Code Analysis Rules: Medium reduction in risk. Prevents attackers from altering analysis rules to hide vulnerabilities.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Basic authentication might be enabled, but fine-grained authorization and hardening steps might be missing.
  • Missing Implementation: Detailed configuration of authorization, disabling anonymous access if not needed, and regular security configuration reviews.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure SonarQube Plugins

  • Description:
    1. Regularly check for plugin updates in SonarQube Marketplace (within the SonarQube UI).
    2. Update plugins to the latest versions promptly, especially security updates.
    3. Uninstall unnecessary plugins to reduce the attack surface.
    4. Before installing new plugins, research their security reputation and known vulnerabilities.
    5. Monitor SonarQube community forums and security advisories for plugin-related security issues.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Vulnerable SonarQube Plugins - Severity: High
    • Plugin Backdoors or Malicious Plugins - Severity: High
  • Impact:
    • Vulnerable SonarQube Plugins: High reduction in risk. Patches known vulnerabilities in plugins that could be exploited.
    • Plugin Backdoors or Malicious Plugins: High reduction in risk. Reduces the risk of installing malicious plugins by minimizing the number of plugins and being cautious about new installations.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Plugin updates might be done occasionally, but a systematic approach and security-focused plugin management might be missing.
  • Missing Implementation: Establish a regular plugin update schedule, plugin security review process before installation, and monitoring of plugin security advisories.

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Strong Authentication and Authorization in SonarQube

  • Description:
    1. Enforce strong password policies for SonarQube user accounts (complexity, length, expiration).
    2. Consider enabling multi-factor authentication (MFA) if supported by your authentication provider (e.g., SAML, external authentication).
    3. Utilize SonarQube's permission system to control access to projects, quality profiles, and other functionalities.
    4. Define roles based on user responsibilities (e.g., developer, security reviewer, administrator).
    5. Assign users to roles and grant permissions based on the principle of least privilege.
    6. Regularly review user accounts and permissions.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Unauthorized Access due to Weak Passwords - Severity: High
    • Account Compromise - Severity: High
    • Data Breach - Severity: High
    • Unauthorized Modification of Analysis Settings - Severity: Medium
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized Access due to Weak Passwords: High reduction in risk. Makes it harder for attackers to guess or crack passwords.
    • Account Compromise: High reduction in risk (with MFA). Significantly reduces the risk of account compromise even if passwords are leaked.
    • Data Breach: High reduction in risk (with RBAC). Limits access to sensitive code analysis data.
    • Unauthorized Modification of Analysis Settings: Medium reduction in risk (with RBAC). Prevents unauthorized changes to analysis configurations.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Basic authentication might be in place, but strong password policies, MFA, and fine-grained RBAC are likely missing.
  • Missing Implementation: Enforcing strong password policies, implementing MFA (if feasible), configuring RBAC, and establishing user/permission review processes.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Communication to SonarQube

  • Description:
    1. Enable HTTPS for all communication to the SonarQube web interface.
    2. Configure SonarQube to enforce HTTPS and redirect HTTP traffic to HTTPS.
    3. Ensure that TLS certificates are properly configured and valid.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks - Severity: High
    • Data Interception - Severity: High
    • Credential Sniffing - Severity: High
  • Impact:
    • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: High reduction in risk. Encrypts communication, making it significantly harder for attackers to intercept and manipulate traffic.
    • Data Interception: High reduction in risk. Protects sensitive code analysis data and credentials from being intercepted in transit.
    • Credential Sniffing: High reduction in risk. Prevents attackers from sniffing user credentials transmitted over the network.
  • Currently Implemented: Might be partially implemented. HTTPS might be enabled, but proper enforcement and redirection might be missing.
  • Missing Implementation: Enforcing HTTPS for all SonarQube web traffic and ensuring proper TLS certificate configuration.

Mitigation Strategy: Regularly Review SonarQube Security Reports

  • Description:
    1. Regularly access and review SonarQube security reports and dashboards.
    2. Pay attention to identified vulnerabilities, security hotspots, and code smells with security implications.
    3. Prioritize and address security issues based on their severity and potential impact.
    4. Integrate SonarQube security analysis into your development workflow and track remediation efforts.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Unidentified Security Vulnerabilities in Code - Severity: High
    • Delayed Remediation of Security Issues - Severity: Medium
  • Impact:
    • Unidentified Security Vulnerabilities in Code: High reduction in risk. Proactively identifies security vulnerabilities in the codebase through static analysis.
    • Delayed Remediation of Security Issues: Medium reduction in risk. Promotes timely remediation of identified security issues by providing reports and dashboards.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. SonarQube analysis might be running, but regular review of security reports and proactive remediation might be missing.
  • Missing Implementation: Establishing a process for regular review of SonarQube security reports and integrating remediation into the development workflow.

Mitigation Strategy: Harden Nexus Configuration

  • Description:
    1. Access Nexus Repository Manager configuration through the web interface (usually /settings).
    2. Configure secure authentication and authorization mechanisms (e.g., local users, LDAP, Active Directory, SAML).
    3. Restrict access to administrative functionalities to authorized users only.
    4. Disable anonymous access if not required.
    5. Review and adjust default security settings according to security best practices.
    6. Regularly review and update Nexus security settings.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Unauthorized Access to Nexus - Severity: High
    • Data Breach via Nexus - Severity: High
    • Manipulation of Repositories - Severity: High
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized Access to Nexus: High reduction in risk. Prevents unauthorized users from accessing and manipulating repositories and configurations.
    • Data Breach via Nexus: High reduction in risk. Protects artifacts and repository metadata from unauthorized access and potential data breaches.
    • Manipulation of Repositories: High reduction in risk. Prevents attackers from tampering with repositories, uploading malicious artifacts, or deleting critical components.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Basic authentication might be enabled, but fine-grained authorization and hardening steps might be missing.
  • Missing Implementation: Detailed configuration of authorization, disabling anonymous access if not needed, and regular security configuration reviews.

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Strong Authentication and Authorization in Nexus

  • Description:
    1. Enforce strong password policies for Nexus user accounts (complexity, length, expiration).
    2. Consider enabling multi-factor authentication (MFA) if supported by your authentication provider (e.g., LDAP, Active Directory, SAML).
    3. Utilize Nexus's role-based access control (RBAC) to manage user permissions and control access to repositories and functionalities.
    4. Define roles based on user responsibilities (e.g., developer, release manager, administrator).
    5. Assign users to roles and grant permissions based on the principle of least privilege.
    6. Regularly review user accounts and permissions.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Unauthorized Access due to Weak Passwords - Severity: High
    • Account Compromise - Severity: High
    • Data Breach - Severity: High
    • Unauthorized Repository Manipulation - Severity: High
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized Access due to Weak Passwords: High reduction in risk. Makes it harder for attackers to guess or crack passwords.
    • Account Compromise: High reduction in risk (with MFA). Significantly reduces the risk of account compromise even if passwords are leaked.
    • Data Breach: High reduction in risk (with RBAC). Limits access to sensitive artifacts and repository metadata.
    • Unauthorized Repository Manipulation: High reduction in risk (with RBAC). Prevents unauthorized users from modifying or deleting repositories.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Basic authentication might be in place, but strong password policies, MFA, and fine-grained RBAC are likely missing.
  • Missing Implementation: Enforcing strong password policies, implementing MFA (if feasible), configuring RBAC, and establishing user/permission review processes.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Nexus Repositories

  • Description:
    1. Configure appropriate repository formats (e.g., Docker, Maven, npm) and security policies for each repository based on the type of artifacts stored.
    2. Implement access control lists (ACLs) to restrict access to specific repositories based on user roles and responsibilities.
    3. Regularly review and update repository security settings and ACLs.
    4. Consider using repository content validation and scanning features if available in Nexus (depending on license and plugins).
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Unauthorized Access to Specific Repositories - Severity: Medium
    • Accidental or Malicious Modification of Repositories - Severity: Medium
    • Supply Chain Attacks via Compromised Repositories - Severity: Medium
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized Access to Specific Repositories: Medium reduction in risk. Limits access to sensitive repositories to authorized users.
    • Accidental or Malicious Modification of Repositories: Medium reduction in risk. Prevents unintended or malicious changes to repository content.
    • Supply Chain Attacks via Compromised Repositories: Medium reduction in risk. Reduces the risk of supply chain attacks by controlling access and potentially validating repository content.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Basic repository formats might be configured, but fine-grained ACLs and repository-specific security policies might be missing.
  • Missing Implementation: Configuring ACLs for repositories, defining repository-specific security policies, and regular review of repository security settings.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Communication to Nexus

  • Description:
    1. Enable HTTPS for all communication to the Nexus web interface and API.
    2. Configure Nexus to enforce HTTPS and redirect HTTP traffic to HTTPS.
    3. Ensure that TLS certificates are properly configured and valid.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks - Severity: High
    • Data Interception - Severity: High
    • Credential Sniffing - Severity: High
  • Impact:
    • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: High reduction in risk. Encrypts communication, making it significantly harder for attackers to intercept and manipulate traffic.
    • Data Interception: High reduction in risk. Protects sensitive artifact data and credentials from being intercepted in transit.
    • Credential Sniffing: High reduction in risk. Prevents attackers from sniffing user credentials transmitted over the network.
  • Currently Implemented: Might be partially implemented. HTTPS might be enabled, but proper enforcement and redirection might be missing.
  • Missing Implementation: Enforcing HTTPS for all Nexus web and API traffic and ensuring proper TLS certificate configuration.

Mitigation Strategy: Regularly Backup Nexus Data

  • Description:
    1. Configure regular backups of Nexus data, including repository content and configuration.
    2. Store backups in a secure and separate location from the Nexus instance.
    3. Test backup restoration procedures regularly to ensure data recovery capabilities.
    4. Automate the backup process to ensure consistent and reliable backups.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Data Loss due to System Failure - Severity: High
    • Data Loss due to Security Incident (e.g., Ransomware) - Severity: High
    • Data Corruption - Severity: Medium
  • Impact:
    • Data Loss due to System Failure: High reduction in risk. Enables recovery of Nexus data in case of hardware failures or system crashes.
    • Data Loss due to Security Incident: High reduction in risk. Allows restoration of Nexus data after security incidents like ransomware attacks or data breaches.
    • Data Corruption: Medium reduction in risk. Provides a point-in-time recovery option in case of data corruption.
  • Currently Implemented: Likely missing. Backups are often not configured in basic setups but are crucial for data resilience.
  • Missing Implementation: Configuring automated backups, defining backup retention policies, and testing backup restoration procedures.

Mitigation Strategy: Harden Docker Daemon Configuration

  • Description:
    1. Enable TLS authentication for Docker daemon to secure communication with Docker clients.
    2. Restrict access to the Docker socket (/var/run/docker.sock) using file system permissions or socket activation.
    3. Configure resource limits (CPU, memory, disk I/O) for containers to prevent resource exhaustion.
    4. Enable Docker Content Trust to ensure image integrity.
    5. Consider using rootless Docker to reduce the attack surface of the Docker daemon.
    6. Regularly review and update Docker daemon configuration.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Unauthorized Access to Docker Daemon - Severity: High
    • Container Escape - Severity: High
    • Resource Exhaustion - Severity: Medium
    • Image Tampering - Severity: High
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized Access to Docker Daemon: High reduction in risk. Prevents unauthorized users from controlling the Docker daemon and potentially the host system.
    • Container Escape: High reduction in risk (with rootless Docker and resource limits). Reduces the risk of container escape vulnerabilities and limits the impact if escape occurs.
    • Resource Exhaustion: Medium reduction in risk. Prevents denial-of-service attacks caused by resource-hungry containers.
    • Image Tampering: High reduction in risk (with Docker Content Trust). Ensures image integrity and prevents the use of tampered images.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Basic Docker daemon setup might be in place, but hardening measures like TLS authentication, socket access restriction, and rootless Docker are likely missing.
  • Missing Implementation: Enabling TLS authentication, restricting Docker socket access, configuring resource limits, enabling Docker Content Trust, and considering rootless Docker.

Mitigation Strategy: Restrict Access to Docker Socket

  • Description:
    1. Change the ownership and permissions of the Docker socket (/var/run/docker.sock) to restrict access to only authorized users or groups.
    2. Avoid exposing the Docker socket over the network.
    3. If network access is required, use secure alternatives like Docker API over TLS or Docker context with SSH.
    4. Consider using socket activation to further limit the lifetime of the Docker socket.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Unauthorized Container Management - Severity: High
    • Host System Compromise via Docker Socket - Severity: High
    • Privilege Escalation - Severity: High
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized Container Management: High reduction in risk. Prevents unauthorized users from creating, starting, stopping, or deleting containers.
    • Host System Compromise via Docker Socket: High reduction in risk. Protects the host system from being compromised through the Docker socket.
    • Privilege Escalation: High reduction in risk. Limits the ability of attackers to escalate privileges by exploiting the Docker socket.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Default file system permissions might provide some level of restriction, but more robust access control measures are likely missing.
  • Missing Implementation: Implementing stricter file system permissions for the Docker socket, avoiding network exposure, and considering socket activation.

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Resource Limits for Containers

  • Description:
    1. Define resource limits (CPU, memory, disk I/O) in Docker Compose files or container runtime configurations for Jenkins, SonarQube, Nexus, and build tool containers.
    2. Use Docker resource management features like cpu_limit, mem_limit, blkio_weight to enforce these limits.
    3. Monitor container resource usage to identify and adjust limits as needed.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Resource Exhaustion - Severity: Medium
    • Denial of Service (DoS) - Severity: Medium
    • Noisy Neighbor Effect - Severity: Medium
  • Impact:
    • Resource Exhaustion: Medium reduction in risk. Prevents individual containers from consuming excessive resources and impacting other containers or the host system.
    • Denial of Service (DoS): Medium reduction in risk. Mitigates DoS attacks caused by resource-hungry containers.
    • Noisy Neighbor Effect: Medium reduction in risk. Improves the stability and performance of the CI/CD environment by preventing resource contention between containers.
  • Currently Implemented: Likely missing. Resource limits are often not configured by default but are important for resource management and stability.
  • Missing Implementation: Defining and enforcing resource limits for all containers in the docker-ci-tool-stack using Docker resource management features.

Mitigation Strategy: Enable Docker Content Trust

  • Description:
    1. Enable Docker Content Trust in your Docker environment by setting the DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=1 environment variable.
    2. Ensure that Docker images are signed by trusted publishers or your organization's signing keys.
    3. Configure your Docker daemon to verify image signatures before pulling and running containers.
    4. Manage signing keys securely and restrict access to them.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Image Tampering - Severity: High
    • Malicious Image Injection - Severity: High
    • Supply Chain Attacks via Compromised Images - Severity: High
  • Impact:
    • Image Tampering: High reduction in risk. Ensures that images pulled are exactly as they were signed and haven't been modified.
    • Malicious Image Injection: High reduction in risk. Prevents the use of unauthorized or malicious images by verifying signatures.
    • Supply Chain Attacks via Compromised Images: High reduction in risk. Reduces the risk of supply chain attacks by verifying the authenticity and integrity of images.
  • Currently Implemented: Likely missing. Docker Content Trust is an advanced security feature not typically enabled by default.
  • Missing Implementation: Enabling Docker Content Trust in the Docker environment, configuring image signing processes, and enforcing signature verification.

Mitigation Strategy: Enforce HTTPS for Web Interfaces

  • Description:
    1. Enable HTTPS for the web interfaces of Jenkins, SonarQube, and Nexus.
    2. Configure each application to enforce HTTPS and redirect HTTP traffic to HTTPS.
    3. Ensure that TLS certificates are properly configured and valid for each application.
    4. For Jenkins, configure the Jenkins URL to use HTTPS in system settings.
    5. For SonarQube and Nexus, configure HTTPS settings within their respective administration interfaces.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks - Severity: High
    • Data Interception - Severity: High
    • Credential Sniffing - Severity: High
  • Impact:
    • Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: High reduction in risk. Encrypts communication, making it significantly harder for attackers to intercept and manipulate traffic.
    • Data Interception: High reduction in risk. Protects sensitive data and credentials from being intercepted in transit to and from web interfaces.
    • Credential Sniffing: High reduction in risk. Prevents attackers from sniffing user credentials transmitted over the network to web interfaces.
  • Currently Implemented: Might be partially implemented. HTTPS might be enabled, but proper enforcement and redirection might be missing for all web interfaces.
  • Missing Implementation: Enforcing HTTPS for all web interfaces of Jenkins, SonarQube, and Nexus, and ensuring proper TLS certificate configuration for each.