Threat: Malicious Image Injection
Description: Attackers replace legitimate Docker images provided or used by the docker-ci-tool-stack
with malicious ones. This could happen by compromising the source repository, build pipeline, or image registry. These malicious images can contain backdoors or malware that compromises the CI/CD environment upon deployment.
Impact: Full compromise of the CI/CD environment managed by the tool stack, supply chain attacks by injecting malicious code into build artifacts, exfiltration of sensitive data from the CI/CD system.
Affected Component: Docker Images provided by docker-ci-tool-stack
, Image Pull Process
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
- Thoroughly vet the source and maintainer of the
docker-ci-tool-stack
and its provided images. - Implement image signing and verification mechanisms to ensure image integrity before deployment.
- Use a private and secure image registry with strict access controls.
- Regularly audit the image build and deployment pipeline for any signs of compromise.
- Implement monitoring for unexpected changes in image digests or sources.
Description: Developers or users might inadvertently hardcode secrets (passwords, API keys, tokens) within the configuration files (e.g., Docker Compose files, environment variables) used to deploy the docker-ci-tool-stack
. Attackers who gain access to these configuration files can extract these secrets.
Impact: Unauthorized access to services managed by the tool stack (Jenkins, SonarQube, Nexus), compromise of external systems that these services interact with, data breaches due to exposed credentials.
Affected Component: Configuration Files (Docker Compose, Environment Variables) used with docker-ci-tool-stack
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
- Never hardcode secrets in configuration files or code.
- Utilize dedicated secrets management solutions (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, Kubernetes Secrets) to securely store and manage secrets.
- Inject secrets into containers at runtime using environment variables or volume mounts from secure secret stores.
- Implement regular security audits of configuration files to identify and remove any accidentally exposed secrets.
- Educate developers and users on secure secrets management practices.
Description: The default configurations of services like Jenkins, SonarQube, and Nexus, as deployed by the docker-ci-tool-stack
, might contain insecure settings (e.g., default credentials, weak authentication, exposed management interfaces). Attackers can exploit these misconfigurations to gain unauthorized access to these services.
Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive CI/CD data, code repositories, build artifacts, and the ability to manipulate CI/CD pipelines managed by the tool stack. Potential for remote code execution if vulnerabilities are present in misconfigured services.
Affected Component: Service Configurations (Jenkins, SonarQube, Nexus) within docker-ci-tool-stack
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
- Thoroughly review and harden the default configurations of all services deployed by the
docker-ci-tool-stack
. - Change all default passwords immediately upon deployment and enforce strong password policies.
- Implement strong authentication and authorization mechanisms for all services.
- Disable or restrict access to unnecessary management interfaces or features.
- Regularly review and update service configurations to align with security best practices.
Description: Services like Jenkins and SonarQube within the docker-ci-tool-stack
rely on plugins or extensions. These plugins can contain vulnerabilities. If the tool stack uses vulnerable or outdated plugins, attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities to compromise the service instances.
Impact: Compromise of Jenkins or SonarQube instances within the tool stack, potential for remote code execution on the CI/CD server, data breaches by accessing sensitive information managed by these services.
Affected Component: Service Plugins/Extensions (Jenkins Plugins, SonarQube Plugins) used in docker-ci-tool-stack
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
- Maintain a detailed inventory of all plugins and extensions used by services within the
docker-ci-tool-stack
. - Regularly update all plugins and extensions to the latest secure versions.
- Implement a plugin vetting process to assess the security of plugins before installation.
- Utilize automated tools to scan for known vulnerabilities in installed plugins and extensions.
- Minimize the number of plugins and extensions installed to reduce the attack surface.
Description: The Docker images provided by the docker-ci-tool-stack
might be built upon vulnerable base images or contain outdated software packages with known vulnerabilities. Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access to the containers running the CI/CD components.
Impact: Compromise of CI/CD components (Jenkins, SonarQube, Nexus) deployed by the tool stack, potential for lateral movement within the CI/CD infrastructure, disruption of CI/CD pipelines due to exploited vulnerabilities.
Affected Component: Docker Images (Base Images) used in docker-ci-tool-stack
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
- Regularly update the base images used to build Docker images for the
docker-ci-tool-stack
. - Implement automated vulnerability scanning of the Docker images provided and used by the tool stack during build and runtime.
- Use minimal and hardened base images whenever possible to reduce the attack surface.
- Establish a process to monitor for security updates for base images and rebuild images promptly when updates are available.