Attack Surface: 1. Base Image Vulnerabilities
Description: Exploitation of known vulnerabilities in the base Docker images used by the project (e.g., maven:3-jdk-11, node:12).
docker-ci-tool-stack Contribution: The project specifies base images by tag, not digest, making it vulnerable to image updates that introduce new vulnerabilities or malicious code (supply-chain attack). It doesn't inherently enforce image scanning.
Example: A vulnerability is discovered in the node:12 base image that allows remote code execution. An attacker exploits this vulnerability in a container built using docker-ci-tool-stack.
Impact: Remote code execution within the container, potential container escape, data breaches, denial of service.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
* Image Scanning: Integrate container image scanning (e.g., Trivy, Clair, Anchore) into the CI/CD pipeline before building with docker-ci-tool-stack. Fail the build if vulnerabilities above a defined threshold are found.
* Digest Pinning: Modify the docker-compose.yml and Dockerfiles to use image digests instead of tags (e.g., node:12@sha256:...). This guarantees the image is immutable. Automate the process of updating digests.
* Minimal Base Images: Explore using distroless or other minimal base images.
* Regular Updates: Establish a process for regularly reviewing and updating base images.
Attack Surface: 2. Docker Socket Mounting
Description: Granting a container access to the host's Docker socket (/var/run/docker.sock) gives it full control over the Docker daemon.
docker-ci-tool-stack Contribution: The project's flexibility could lead users to mount the Docker socket for tasks like building other images within a container. This is a common, but dangerous, pattern facilitated by the tool's general-purpose nature.
Example: A user mounts the Docker socket to allow a container to build and push images. A vulnerability in the containerized application allows an attacker to execute docker commands on the host.
Impact: Complete host compromise.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
* Avoid Socket Mounting: This is the primary mitigation. Restructure the CI/CD process to eliminate the need for Docker socket access.
* Docker-in-Docker (dind) (with extreme caution): If building images within a container is absolutely necessary, consider dind, but run it as non-root, use TLS, and isolate the container.
* Read-Only Mount (if unavoidable): If the socket must be mounted, mount it read-only (:ro).
* Strict Security Context: If mounted, use strong seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux profiles.
* Alternative Tools: Explore tools like kaniko, buildah, or img.
Attack Surface: 3. Added Software Vulnerabilities
Description: Vulnerabilities in the tools and dependencies added on top of the base images within the Dockerfiles.
docker-ci-tool-stack Contribution: The project's Dockerfiles add various tools (e.g., wait-for-it.sh) and project-specific dependencies (via npm, mvn, etc.). These additions, facilitated by the tool's build process, are potential attack vectors.
Example: A vulnerability is found in a Node.js package installed via npm within a docker-ci-tool-stack container.
Impact: Code execution within the container, data breaches, denial of service, potential container escape.
Risk Severity: High to Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
* Dependency Scanning: Integrate dependency vulnerability scanning into the CI/CD pipeline (e.g., npm audit, mvn dependency:check, OWASP Dependency-Check, Snyk).
* Regular Updates: Keep all added software and dependencies up-to-date.
* Software Bill of Materials (SBOM): Generate an SBOM for each image.
* Minimize Dependencies: Only include necessary tools and dependencies.
Attack Surface: 4. Container Escape
Description: An attacker who gains control of a running container attempts to break out of the container's isolation and gain access to the host system.
docker-ci-tool-stack Contribution: The project doesn't inherently configure strong security contexts to prevent container escapes. It relies on default Docker settings, which may not be sufficient, and its use facilitates running potentially vulnerable code within containers.
Example: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in a web application running within a docker-ci-tool-stack container and escapes to the host.
Impact: Host compromise.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
* Non-Root User: Modify the Dockerfiles to create and use a non-root user.
* Seccomp Profiles: Implement seccomp profiles.
* AppArmor/SELinux: Use AppArmor or SELinux.
* Capability Dropping: Use Docker's --cap-drop option.
* Read-Only Root Filesystem: Use the --read-only flag.
* Resource Limits: Limit the container's CPU, memory, etc.