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Threat Model Analysis for marcelbirkner/docker-ci-tool-stack

Threat: Malicious Image Pull

  • Threat: Malicious Image Pull

    • Description: An attacker publishes a malicious image to a public registry (e.g., Docker Hub) with a name similar to a legitimate image, or compromises a legitimate image's tag. The DCTS pipeline, configured to pull images based on name/tag, unknowingly pulls and executes the malicious image. This leverages the DCTS's core reliance on Docker images.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of the build environment, potential exfiltration of source code, credentials, and other sensitive data. Deployment of malicious software to production environments. This is a direct attack on the DCTS's image handling.
    • Affected Component: Docker Engine (within Jenkins agents or other build nodes), Docker Registry (interaction point), Jenkinsfile (or equivalent pipeline configuration within DCTS).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Image Digest Pinning: Use specific image digests (e.g., myimage@sha256:abcdef...) in the Dockerfile and DCTS pipeline configuration.
      • Image Scanning: Integrate vulnerability scanning (e.g., Trivy, Clair) into the DCTS pipeline before using any image. Fail the build if vulnerabilities are found.
      • Trusted Registry: Use a private, trusted Docker registry with strict access controls, managed as part of the DCTS.
      • Content Trust: Enable Docker Content Trust (Notary) to verify image signatures within the DCTS environment.
      • Regular Base Image Audits: Review and update base images used in Dockerfiles, managed within the DCTS's version control.

Threat: Compromised Build Artifact in Repository (Nexus)

  • Threat: Compromised Build Artifact in Repository (Nexus)

    • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the Nexus Repository Manager within the DCTS and replaces a legitimate build artifact with a malicious version. Subsequent deployments orchestrated by the DCTS use the compromised artifact.
    • Impact: Deployment of malicious software to production environments, potential data breaches, system compromise. This directly impacts the DCTS's artifact management.
    • Affected Component: Nexus Repository Manager (specifically, the hosted repositories as part of the DCTS).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Access Control: Implement strong authentication and authorization for the DCTS's Nexus instance, limiting access.
      • Checksum Verification: Configure the DCTS pipeline to verify checksums of artifacts downloaded from the DCTS's Nexus.
      • Artifact Signing: Sign build artifacts and verify signatures before deployment, integrated into the DCTS workflow.
      • Regular Audits: Periodically audit the contents of the DCTS's Nexus repositories.
      • Immutable Artifacts: Configure the DCTS's Nexus to prevent overwriting of existing artifacts.

Threat: Docker Socket Exposure

  • Threat: Docker Socket Exposure

    • Description: The Docker socket (/var/run/docker.sock) is exposed to a container running within the DCTS environment (e.g., a Jenkins agent container). An attacker exploiting a vulnerability within that container can use the Docker socket to gain root access to the host machine running the DCTS components.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of the host machine running the DCTS, allowing the attacker to access all containers, data, and potentially other systems on the network. This is a direct threat to the DCTS's infrastructure.
    • Affected Component: Docker Engine (host configuration within the DCTS), Jenkins agent container (configuration within the DCTS), potentially other containers running on the same DCTS host.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Avoid Mounting the Socket: Do not mount the Docker socket into containers within the DCTS unless absolutely necessary.
      • Docker-in-Docker (DinD) Alternatives: Use DinD alternatives like Kaniko, Buildah, or img within the DCTS, which do not require access to the Docker socket.
      • Least Privilege: Run containers within the DCTS with the least privileged user possible (non-root).
      • Security Profiles: Use AppArmor or SELinux to restrict container capabilities within the DCTS and prevent access to the Docker socket.
      • User Namespaces: Enable user namespaces in Docker within the DCTS to map container root to a non-root host user.

Threat: CI/CD Pipeline Configuration Tampering (DCTS-Specific)

  • Threat: CI/CD Pipeline Configuration Tampering (DCTS-Specific)

    • Description: An attacker gains access to the version control system hosting the DCTS configuration (e.g., GitLab) and modifies the CI/CD pipeline configuration files (e.g., Jenkinsfile, .gitlab-ci.yml) that define the DCTS itself. This is distinct from tampering with application pipelines; it's tampering with the DCTS's own pipeline.
    • Impact: Execution of arbitrary code within the DCTS's build environment, potential compromise of the entire DCTS infrastructure, data exfiltration, disruption of all CI/CD processes managed by the DCTS.
    • Affected Component: GitLab (repository hosting DCTS config), Jenkins (pipeline execution within DCTS), Version Control System (Git, specifically for the DCTS configuration).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Access Control: Implement strong authentication and authorization for the version control system hosting the DCTS configuration.
      • Code Review: Require code reviews for all changes to the DCTS's pipeline configuration files.
      • Protected Branches: Use protected branches for the DCTS configuration repository to prevent direct commits.
      • Audit Trails: Enable detailed audit logging in the version control system to track changes to the DCTS's pipeline configuration.

Threat: Unauthorized Access to Jenkins/GitLab (within DCTS)

  • Threat: Unauthorized Access to Jenkins/GitLab (within DCTS)

    • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the Jenkins or GitLab web interface that are part of the DCTS, through weak passwords, compromised credentials, or exploiting vulnerabilities. This is about compromising the DCTS's own Jenkins/GitLab instances.
    • Impact: Ability to trigger builds, modify configurations, access source code, and potentially compromise the entire DCTS pipeline and any projects it manages.
    • Affected Component: Jenkins (web interface within DCTS), GitLab (web interface within DCTS).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strong Passwords: Enforce strong, unique passwords for all user accounts on the DCTS's Jenkins and GitLab.
      • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Enable MFA for all user accounts on the DCTS's Jenkins and GitLab.
      • Regular Updates: Keep the DCTS's Jenkins, GitLab, and all plugins up to date.
      • Access Control: Implement role-based access control (RBAC) within the DCTS's Jenkins and GitLab.
      • Network Segmentation: Isolate the DCTS's Jenkins and GitLab servers from the public internet.

Threat: Unpatched Vulnerabilities in DCTS Components

  • Threat: Unpatched Vulnerabilities in DCTS Components

    • Description: The DCTS itself relies on various components (Jenkins, GitLab, Nexus, Docker, SonarQube, etc.). Unpatched vulnerabilities in any of these specific DCTS components can be exploited by an attacker. This focuses on the security of the DCTS itself, not the applications it builds.
    • Impact: Varies depending on the vulnerability, but could range from information disclosure to complete compromise of the DCTS and all projects it manages.
    • Affected Component: Any of the DCTS's core components (Jenkins, GitLab, Nexus, Docker, SonarQube, etc.).
    • Risk Severity: High (potentially Critical, depending on the vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regular Updates: Implement a process for regularly updating all DCTS components to the latest stable versions. This is a core maintenance task for the DCTS.
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Use vulnerability scanning tools to identify known vulnerabilities in the DCTS components themselves.
      • Dependency Management: Use dependency management tools to track and update third-party libraries used by the DCTS components.
      • Security Advisories: Monitor security advisories and mailing lists for the DCTS components.