attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for nationalsecurityagency/skills-service

Objective: Compromise application using skills-service by exploiting vulnerabilities within skills-service itself.

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Application Using Skills-Service [CRITICAL NODE] └───[OR]─ Exploit Skills-Service Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

├───[AND]─ Exploit Authentication/Authorization Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[OR]─ JWT Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├─── Weak Secret Key [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Brute-force/Dictionary Attack on Secret Key [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├─── Algorithm Downgrade Attack [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Force HS256 instead of RS256 (if applicable and vulnerable) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├─── JWT Signature Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Remove Signature/Exploit "none" algorithm vulnerability (if present) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └─── JWT Replay Attack [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │       └─── Capture and Re-use Valid JWT [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├───[OR]─ RBAC Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├─── Role Manipulation in JWT [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Modify JWT claims to elevate privileges (if signature not properly verified) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├─── Insecure API Endpoint Authorization [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Access admin/privileged endpoints without proper roles (due to flawed authorization logic) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

├───[AND]─ Exploit API Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[OR]─ Injection Attacks [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├─── SQL Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├─── Parameter Manipulation in Skill Queries [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   │   └─── Inject SQL code via skill name, description, or other parameters [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Blind SQL Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │       └─── Infer database structure and data by observing application behavior [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├─── Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └─── Access/Modify Skills of Other Users/Organizations [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │       └─── Manipulate skill IDs or user identifiers in API requests to access unauthorized data [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├─── API Abuse/Rate Limiting Issues [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├─── Brute-force Attacks [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Repeatedly call API endpoints to guess credentials or IDs (less effective with JWT, but possible against login endpoints if any) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├─── Denial of Service (DoS) via API Flooding [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Overwhelm skills-service with excessive API requests [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├─── Input Validation Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └─── Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Stored Data [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │       └─── Inject malicious scripts into skill descriptions that are later rendered in the application [HIGH-RISK PATH]

├───[AND]─ Exploit Dependency Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├─── Known Vulnerabilities in Libraries [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├─── Spring Framework Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Exploit known CVEs in the Spring Boot framework used by skills-service [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├─── Jackson (JSON Processing) Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Exploit known CVEs in Jackson library for deserialization or other issues [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├─── Other Third-Party Library Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Identify and exploit vulnerabilities in any other libraries used by skills-service [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └─── Outdated Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │       └─── Skills-service uses outdated versions of libraries with known vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]

├───[AND]─ Exploit Infrastructure/Deployment Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├─── Misconfiguration [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├─── Insecure Server Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Weak TLS settings, exposed management ports, default credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├─── Database Misconfiguration [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Weak database passwords, exposed database ports, insecure database settings [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├─── Exposed Management Interfaces [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └─── Access to Admin Panels or Monitoring Tools [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │       └─── Exploit default credentials or vulnerabilities in management interfaces (e.g., Spring Boot Actuator if exposed without proper security) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   └─── Insecure Communication Channels [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       └─── Lack of HTTPS/TLS [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│           └─── Intercept communication between application and skills-service if not using HTTPS [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Skills-Service Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]:

This is the overarching goal. Attack vectors involve targeting any weakness within the skills-service application itself to compromise the application that uses it.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Authentication/Authorization Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE]:

• Attack Vectors:
  • Bypassing authentication mechanisms to gain unauthorized access.
  • Exploiting flaws in authorization logic to escalate privileges or access resources without proper permissions.

Attack Tree Path: 3. JWT Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]:

• Attack Vectors:
  • Weak Secret Key [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Brute-force/Dictionary Attack on Secret Key [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attacker attempts to guess the secret key used to sign JWTs by trying common passwords, dictionary words, or brute-forcing character combinations. If successful, they can forge valid JWTs.
  • Algorithm Downgrade Attack [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Force HS256 instead of RS256 (if applicable and vulnerable) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • If the system is misconfigured or vulnerable, attacker manipulates the JWT header to use a weaker algorithm like HS256 (symmetric) instead of a stronger one like RS256 (asymmetric). If the server mistakenly uses the public key as the secret key for HS256 verification, the attacker can forge valid JWTs using the publicly known key.
  • JWT Signature Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Remove Signature/Exploit "none" algorithm vulnerability (if present) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • In older or poorly configured systems, attacker removes the JWT signature or sets the algorithm to "none". If the server doesn't properly validate the signature or algorithm, it might accept the unsigned JWT.
  • JWT Replay Attack [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Capture and Re-use Valid JWT [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attacker intercepts a valid JWT (e.g., through network sniffing or man-in-the-middle attack) and re-uses it to gain unauthorized access within its validity period.

Attack Tree Path: 4. RBAC Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

• Attack Vectors:
  • Role Manipulation in JWT [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Modify JWT claims to elevate privileges (if signature not properly verified) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • If JWT signature verification is weak or bypassed, attacker modifies the "roles" or "permissions" claims within the JWT to grant themselves higher privileges (e.g., changing "user" role to "admin").
  • Insecure API Endpoint Authorization [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Access admin/privileged endpoints without proper roles (due to flawed authorization logic) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attacker identifies API endpoints intended for administrators or privileged users and attempts to access them without having the necessary roles or permissions. This exploits flaws in the authorization logic that might not correctly check user roles before granting access.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Exploit API Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]:

• Attack Vectors:
  • Targeting weaknesses in the API endpoints exposed by skills-service to gain unauthorized access, manipulate data, or cause disruption.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Injection Attacks [CRITICAL NODE]:

• Attack Vectors:
  • SQL Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] -> Parameter Manipulation in Skill Queries [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Inject SQL code via skill name, description, or other parameters [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attacker crafts malicious input containing SQL code and injects it into API parameters (e.g., skill name, description) that are used in database queries. If the application doesn't properly sanitize or parameterize queries, the injected SQL code is executed by the database, potentially allowing data extraction, modification, or deletion.
  • SQL Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] -> Blind SQL Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Infer database structure and data by observing application behavior [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attacker injects SQL code that doesn't directly return data but changes the application's behavior (e.g., time delays, error messages) based on database conditions. By observing these behavioral changes, the attacker can infer database structure and extract data bit by bit, even without direct error messages or data output.

Attack Tree Path: 7. Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

• Attack Vectors:
  • Access/Modify Skills of Other Users/Organizations [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Manipulate skill IDs or user identifiers in API requests to access unauthorized data [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attacker manipulates resource identifiers (e.g., skill IDs, user IDs) in API requests to access or modify resources belonging to other users or organizations without proper authorization. This exploits a lack of proper access control checks based on user identity and resource ownership.

Attack Tree Path: 8. API Abuse/Rate Limiting Issues [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

• Attack Vectors:
  • Brute-force Attacks [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Repeatedly call API endpoints to guess credentials or IDs (less effective with JWT, but possible against login endpoints if any) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attacker makes a large number of automated requests to API endpoints, attempting to guess credentials (if login endpoints exist) or resource IDs. Lack of rate limiting allows these attacks to proceed without being blocked.
  • Denial of Service (DoS) via API Flooding [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Overwhelm skills-service with excessive API requests [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attacker floods the skills-service with a massive volume of API requests, exceeding its capacity to handle them. This can lead to service degradation or complete unavailability (DoS).

Attack Tree Path: 9. Input Validation Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

• Attack Vectors:
  • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Stored Data [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Inject malicious scripts into skill descriptions that are later rendered in the application [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attacker injects malicious JavaScript code into input fields (e.g., skill descriptions) that are stored in the database. When this data is later retrieved and displayed in the application without proper output encoding, the injected JavaScript code is executed in the user's browser, potentially leading to session hijacking, defacement, or redirection to malicious sites.

Attack Tree Path: 10. Exploit Dependency Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

• Attack Vectors:
  • Known Vulnerabilities in Libraries [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] -> Spring Framework Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Exploit known CVEs in the Spring Boot framework used by skills-service [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attacker identifies known security vulnerabilities (CVEs) in the Spring Boot framework used by skills-service and exploits them. Publicly available exploits or Metasploit modules might be used to target these vulnerabilities, potentially leading to remote code execution or other severe compromises.
  • Known Vulnerabilities in Libraries [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] -> Jackson (JSON Processing) Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Exploit known CVEs in Jackson library for deserialization or other issues [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Similar to Spring Framework vulnerabilities, attacker targets known CVEs in the Jackson JSON processing library, often related to deserialization flaws. Exploiting these can lead to remote code execution.
  • Known Vulnerabilities in Libraries [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] -> Other Third-Party Library Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Identify and exploit vulnerabilities in any other libraries used by skills-service [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attacker scans the skills-service for all third-party libraries used and identifies any with known vulnerabilities. Exploits are then sought or developed to target these vulnerabilities.
  • Outdated Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Skills-service uses outdated versions of libraries with known vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attacker identifies that skills-service is using outdated versions of libraries with publicly known vulnerabilities. This is often easily detectable through vulnerability scanning. Exploits for these known vulnerabilities are then used to compromise the application.

Attack Tree Path: 11. Exploit Infrastructure/Deployment Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

• Attack Vectors:
  • Misconfiguration [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] -> Insecure Server Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Weak TLS settings, exposed management ports, default credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attacker exploits misconfigurations in the server environment, such as weak TLS/SSL settings allowing for downgrade attacks or interception, exposed management ports (e.g., SSH, RDP) accessible from the internet, or default credentials for system accounts or services.
  • Misconfiguration [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] -> Database Misconfiguration [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Weak database passwords, exposed database ports, insecure database settings [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attacker exploits misconfigurations in the database system, such as weak or default database passwords, exposed database ports accessible from the internet, or insecure database settings that allow for unauthorized access or data breaches.
  • Exposed Management Interfaces [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] -> Access to Admin Panels or Monitoring Tools [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Exploit default credentials or vulnerabilities in management interfaces (e.g., Spring Boot Actuator if exposed without proper security) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • Attacker discovers exposed management interfaces (e.g., admin panels, monitoring dashboards like Spring Boot Actuator endpoints) that are not properly secured. They attempt to access these interfaces using default credentials or by exploiting known vulnerabilities in the management interface itself.
  • Insecure Communication Channels [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Lack of HTTPS/TLS [HIGH-RISK PATH] -> Intercept communication between application and skills-service if not using HTTPS [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
    • If communication between the application and skills-service (or between clients and the application) is not encrypted using HTTPS/TLS, attacker can intercept network traffic to eavesdrop on sensitive data, steal credentials, or perform man-in-the-middle attacks.