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Attack Tree Analysis for nextflow-io/nextflow

Objective: Gain RCE or Exfiltrate Data via Nextflow Exploit

Attack Tree Visualization

                                 +-------------------------------------------------+
                                 |  **Gain RCE or Exfiltrate Data via Nextflow Exploit** |
                                 +-------------------------------------------------+
                                                    |
      +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
      |                                                                                                                |

+-------------------------+ +-------------------------+ | Exploit Nextflow Core | | (Not Included) | +-------------------------+ +-------------------------+ | +---------------------+---------------------+---------------------+---------------------+ | Process Injection | Config Injection | Script Injection | Dependency Hijack | +---------------------+---------------------+---------------------+---------------------+ | | | | +-------+-------+ +-------+-------+ +-------+-------+ +-------+-------+ | 1a| 1b| | | 2b | | 3a| 3b| | 4a| | +-------+-------+ +-------+-------+ +-------+-------+ +-------+-------+ [HIGH] [HIGH] [HIGH] [HIGH] [HIGH] [HIGH]

Attack Tree Path: 1a. Unsafe Deserialization [HIGH] (Critical Node)

  • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in how Nextflow (or a library used within a process) handles the deserialization of data. If untrusted data is deserialized without proper validation, it can lead to the execution of arbitrary code.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Very High (RCE)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation:
    • Avoid using Java's default serialization if possible.
    • Use a secure deserialization library and follow best practices.
    • Implement strict input validation before deserialization.
    • Consider using a whitelist-based approach to allowed classes during deserialization.

Attack Tree Path: 1b. Command Injection via process [HIGH] (Critical Node)

  • Description: An attacker injects malicious shell commands into the command string executed within a Nextflow process block. This occurs when user-provided input is directly incorporated into the command without proper sanitization or escaping.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Very High (RCE)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation:
    • Never directly embed user-provided input into command strings.
    • Use parameterized commands or Nextflow's built-in input handling mechanisms (channels, params).
    • Implement robust input validation and sanitization.
    • Use a whitelist-based approach to allowed characters in input.

Attack Tree Path: 2b. Environment Variable Manipulation [HIGH]

  • Description: An attacker modifies environment variables used by Nextflow to inject malicious configurations. This can alter Nextflow's behavior, potentially leading to code execution or other undesirable outcomes.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation:
    • Minimize the use of environment variables for critical configurations.
    • Tightly control and monitor the environment where Nextflow runs.
    • Use configuration files with integrity checks instead of relying solely on environment variables.
    • Implement least privilege principles for the Nextflow execution environment.

Attack Tree Path: 3a. Malicious Workflow Script [HIGH] (Critical Node)

  • Description: An attacker gains write access to the Nextflow workflow script (main.nf or included files) and inserts malicious code. This gives the attacker full control over the workflow's execution.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Very High (Full Control)
  • Effort: Low (once access is gained)
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy
  • Mitigation:
    • Implement strict access controls on the workflow script repository.
    • Use version control (e.g., Git) and enforce code review processes.
    • Monitor for unauthorized changes to the workflow script.
    • Use code signing to verify the integrity of the script.

Attack Tree Path: 3b. Dynamic Script Generation [HIGH] (Critical Node)

  • Description: The workflow script dynamically generates parts of itself based on user input. If this input is not properly sanitized, an attacker can inject malicious Nextflow code, similar to command injection but at the DSL level.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Very High (Full Control)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation:
    • Avoid dynamic script generation whenever possible.
    • If unavoidable, use a templating engine with strict escaping and sanitization.
    • Implement a whitelist-based approach to allowed code constructs.
    • Thoroughly review and test any dynamic code generation logic.

Attack Tree Path: 4a. Compromised Container Image [HIGH] (Critical Node)

  • Description: An attacker compromises a container image used by the Nextflow workflow. This could be a base image or an image built specifically for the workflow. The compromised image contains malicious code that executes when the container is run.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Very High (RCE within the container)
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation:
    • Use trusted base images from reputable sources.
    • Scan container images for vulnerabilities regularly.
    • Use image signing and verification.
    • Pin image versions to specific tags (not latest).
    • Use a private container registry with strict access controls.