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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for pongasoft/glu

Attack Surface: Compromised Glu Console Credentials

  • Description: An attacker gains access to the glu console using stolen or guessed credentials.
  • How glu contributes: The glu console is the central control point provided by glu, making it a high-value target. Glu's authentication mechanisms are a direct attack surface.
  • Example: An attacker phishes a glu administrator's credentials or uses a default/weak password and logs in to the glu console.
  • Impact: Full control over deployments managed by glu, access to sensitive data within glu (configurations, potentially secrets), ability to deploy malicious code via glu to all managed hosts.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Password Policies: Enforce strong, unique passwords for all glu users.
    • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Require MFA for all console logins.
    • Regular Credential Rotation: Implement a policy for regularly rotating credentials, especially for administrative accounts.
    • Secure Authentication Provider Configuration: Ensure that any integrated authentication providers used by glu (JIRA, GitHub, LDAP) are securely configured and regularly patched. This is glu-specific because glu chooses to integrate with these.
    • Monitor Login Attempts: Implement monitoring and alerting for failed login attempts and suspicious login activity within glu.

Attack Surface: Privilege Escalation within the Glu Console

  • Description: An attacker with limited access to the glu console exploits a vulnerability in glu's code to gain higher privileges.
  • How glu contributes: Glu's own role-based access control (RBAC) system and authorization logic are the direct attack surface.
  • Example: A user with "read-only" access to a project discovers a vulnerability in a glu API endpoint that allows them to modify deployment scripts, bypassing glu's intended permissions.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to projects, environments, or actions within glu; potential for malicious deployments through glu.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Thorough Authorization Checks: Implement robust authorization checks within glu's code at every level, especially for API endpoints. Ensure that glu's permissions are enforced consistently.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant users only the minimum necessary permissions within glu.
    • Regular Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits of glu's authorization logic and RBAC configuration.
    • Input Validation: Validate all user input within glu to prevent attackers from manipulating authorization parameters.

Attack Surface: Malicious Deployment Script Injection

  • Description: An attacker modifies deployment scripts (fabric files) managed by glu to include malicious code.
  • How glu contributes: Glu executes these scripts on target hosts, providing a direct path for code execution. Glu's central storage and management of scripts are the core vulnerability.
  • Example: An attacker compromises the glu console and modifies a fabric file stored within glu to include a command that downloads and executes a backdoor.
  • Impact: Complete compromise of all target hosts via glu; data theft, system destruction, lateral movement.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Script Storage: Store deployment scripts in a secure location with strict access controls, ensuring that glu's access to these scripts is also secured.
    • Script Integrity Checks: Implement mechanisms within glu to verify the integrity of scripts before execution (e.g., checksums, digital signatures).
    • Code Review: Require code review for all changes to deployment scripts that glu will use.
    • Input sanitization: Sanitize all variables used in scripts that glu will use.
    • Limit execution permissions: Run scripts with limited user configured in glu.

Attack Surface: Glu Agent Code Execution Vulnerabilities

  • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the glu agent itself to execute arbitrary code. This is distinct from compromising the host the agent runs on.
  • How glu contributes: The glu agent is code provided by glu, and any vulnerabilities in its handling of commands, scripts, or communication are direct attack surfaces.
  • Example: An attacker sends a specially crafted message to the glu agent that exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in the agent's code, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary commands.
  • Impact: Compromise of the agent host and potentially other hosts managed by glu; data theft, system disruption.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Agent Communication: Ensure that communication between the glu console and agents is encrypted and mutually authenticated as implemented by glu.
    • Monitor Agent Activity: Implement monitoring and alerting for suspicious agent activity as reported by glu.
    • Regular Agent Updates: Keep glu agents up to date to patch vulnerabilities in the agent code.
    • Least Privilege for Agents: Run glu agents with the least privilege necessary as configured within glu.

Attack Surface: ZooKeeper Compromise (Impacting Glu)

  • Description: An attacker gains control of the ZooKeeper cluster used by glu.
  • How glu contributes: Glu relies on ZooKeeper for coordination. While ZooKeeper itself isn't part of glu, glu's dependence on it creates this attack surface.
  • Example: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in ZooKeeper or gains access through weak credentials and modifies the ZooKeeper data used by glu to redirect deployments.
  • Impact: Complete disruption of deployments managed by glu, potential for data corruption or loss, ability to inject malicious configurations into glu.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure ZooKeeper Configuration: Follow best practices for securing ZooKeeper, ensuring that glu's connection to ZooKeeper is secure:
      • Strong Authentication: Use strong authentication for glu's access to ZooKeeper.
      • Network Access Control: Restrict network access to the ZooKeeper cluster to only authorized hosts, including the glu console and agents.
      • Encryption: Use TLS/SSL for communication between glu and ZooKeeper.
      • Regular Updates: Keep ZooKeeper up-to-date.
      • Dedicated Cluster: Use a dedicated ZooKeeper cluster for glu.

Attack Surface: API Vulnerabilities (Unauthenticated Access/Injection within Glu)

  • Description: An attacker exploits vulnerabilities in the glu REST API itself to gain unauthorized access or inject malicious data.
  • How glu contributes: The glu API is a core component provided by glu.
  • Example: An attacker discovers a glu API endpoint that does not require authentication and allows them to list all deployed projects. Or, an attacker uses a SQL injection vulnerability in a glu API parameter to extract data from glu's database.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to data within glu, ability to modify deployments through glu, potential for denial-of-service attacks against glu.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure API Authentication: Require authentication for all glu API endpoints.
    • Input Validation and Sanitization: Thoroughly validate and sanitize all input to glu API endpoints.
    • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting within glu to prevent brute-force attacks.
    • Regular API Security Testing: Conduct regular security testing of glu's API.

Attack Surface: Insecure Storage of Secrets within Glu

  • Description: Glu stores or handles sensitive information (API keys, database credentials, etc.) in an insecure manner within its own configuration or database.
  • How glu contributes: Glu requires access to various systems and services, often necessitating the storage and management of credentials within the glu system itself.
  • Example: Glu stores database credentials in plain text within its configuration files, which are accessible to anyone with read access to the glu console.
  • Impact: Exposure of sensitive information, leading to unauthorized access to connected systems and services that glu uses.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secrets Management System: Integrate glu with a dedicated secrets management system. Ensure glu is configured to use it correctly.
    • Avoid Hardcoding Secrets: Never hardcode secrets in glu configuration files or scripts used by glu.
    • Encryption at Rest: Encrypt sensitive data stored in the glu database.
    • Least Privilege: Grant glu only the minimum necessary permissions to access secrets.
    • Regular Audits: Regularly audit glu's configuration and usage of secrets.