Threat: Rogue Agent Registration
- Threat: Rogue Agent Registration (Spoofing)
- Description: An attacker registers a malicious
glu
agent with theglu
console, impersonating a legitimate target host. The attacker crafts a fake agent that mimics the expected communication protocol of a genuine agent.glu
's agent registration process is the direct vulnerability. - Impact: The attacker can receive deployment instructions intended for legitimate hosts, potentially leading to the execution of arbitrary code on the attacker's machine. This could also allow the attacker to intercept sensitive data.
- Affected Component:
glu
Console (agent registration and management logic), Agent-Console communication protocol. - Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Strong Agent Authentication: Implement robust, unique credentials (e.g., cryptographic keys, strong API tokens) for each agent. Rotate these credentials regularly.
- Manual Agent Approval: Require manual approval of new agent registrations by an administrator.
- Out-of-Band Verification: Use an out-of-band channel to verify the identity of new agents.
- Network Segmentation: Restrict network access to the
glu
console.
Threat: Console Impersonation
- Threat: Console Impersonation (Spoofing)
- Description: An attacker sets up a fake
glu
console and tricksglu
agents into connecting to it. This relies onglu
agent's vulnerability to accept connections from untrusted consoles. - Impact: The attacker can intercept agent communications, steal agent credentials, modify deployment instructions, and potentially gain control of all target hosts.
- Affected Component:
glu
Agent (console connection logic), Agent-Console communication protocol. - Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- TLS Certificate Pinning: The
glu
agent should pin the TLS certificate of theglu
console. - Console Public Key Verification: Pre-configure the agent with the console's public key and verify the console's identity.
- Secure Network Configuration: Ensure DNS and network routing are secure.
- TLS Certificate Pinning: The
Threat: Deployment Script Tampering
- Threat: Deployment Script Tampering (Tampering)
- Description: An attacker intercepts and modifies deployment scripts as they are transmitted from the
glu
console to theglu
agent. This is a direct threat to theglu
communication channel. - Impact: The attacker can execute arbitrary code on the target host.
- Affected Component: Agent-Console communication, specifically the mechanism for transmitting deployment scripts.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- End-to-End Encryption: Use TLS for all communication between the console and agents.
- Digital Signatures: The
glu
console should digitally sign deployment scripts, and the agent should verify the signature. - Hashing: Calculate a cryptographic hash of the script on the console and verify it on the agent.
Threat: ZooKeeper Data Manipulation
- Threat: ZooKeeper Data Manipulation (Tampering)
- Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to ZooKeeper and modifies
glu
's configuration data. This directly impactsglu
because of its reliance on ZooKeeper. - Impact: Misconfigured deployments, denial of service, redirection of deployments, and potential system failure.
- Affected Component: ZooKeeper,
glu
Console (reliance on ZooKeeper),glu
Agent (reliance on ZooKeeper). - Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Secure ZooKeeper Access: Implement strong authentication and authorization for ZooKeeper.
- Network Segmentation: Restrict network access to ZooKeeper.
- ZooKeeper Auditing: Enable and monitor ZooKeeper audit logs.
- Input Validation:
glu
components should validate data from ZooKeeper. - Regular Backups: Regularly back up ZooKeeper data.
- Threat:
glu
Console Credential Compromise (Information Disclosure) - Description: An attacker obtains valid credentials for the
glu
console. This directly targets theglu
console's authentication. - Impact: The attacker gains full control over the
glu
deployment system. - Affected Component:
glu
Console (authentication and authorization logic). - Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Strong Passwords: Enforce strong password policies.
- Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Require MFA for all console access.
- Regular Password Rotation: Enforce regular password changes.
- Account Lockout: Implement account lockout policies.
- Web Application Security Best Practices: Follow general web application security best practices.
Threat: Agent Privilege Escalation
- Threat: Agent Privilege Escalation (Elevation of Privilege)
- Description: The
glu
agent runs with excessive privileges, and a vulnerability in the agent itself is exploited. This focuses on vulnerabilities within theglu
agent code, not just the Fabric scripts. - Impact: Complete compromise of the target host.
- Affected Component:
glu
Agent. - Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Principle of Least Privilege: Run the
glu
agent with the minimum necessary privileges. Use a dedicated user account. - Sandboxing: Use sandboxing techniques to isolate the agent's execution environment.
- Regular security audits: Regularly audit the system.
- Principle of Least Privilege: Run the
Threat: Agent Binary Tampering
- Threat: Agent Binary Tampering (Tampering)
- Description: An attacker replaces or modifies the
glu
agent binary. This is a direct attack on theglu
agent itself. - Impact: The attacker gains complete control over the agent's functionality.
- Affected Component:
glu
Agent binary on the target host. - Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Code Signing: Digitally sign the
glu
agent binary and verify the signature before execution. - File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): Use a FIM system to detect unauthorized changes.
- Secure Boot: Use secure boot to prevent the execution of unauthorized code.
- Regular Updates: Keep the
glu
agent updated. - Limited Access: Restrict access to the target host.
- Code Signing: Digitally sign the