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Threat Model Analysis for pongasoft/glu

  • Threat: Rogue Agent Registration (Spoofing)
  • Description: An attacker registers a malicious glu agent with the glu console, impersonating a legitimate target host. The attacker crafts a fake agent that mimics the expected communication protocol of a genuine agent. glu's agent registration process is the direct vulnerability.
  • Impact: The attacker can receive deployment instructions intended for legitimate hosts, potentially leading to the execution of arbitrary code on the attacker's machine. This could also allow the attacker to intercept sensitive data.
  • Affected Component: glu Console (agent registration and management logic), Agent-Console communication protocol.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Agent Authentication: Implement robust, unique credentials (e.g., cryptographic keys, strong API tokens) for each agent. Rotate these credentials regularly.
    • Manual Agent Approval: Require manual approval of new agent registrations by an administrator.
    • Out-of-Band Verification: Use an out-of-band channel to verify the identity of new agents.
    • Network Segmentation: Restrict network access to the glu console.
  • Threat: Console Impersonation (Spoofing)
  • Description: An attacker sets up a fake glu console and tricks glu agents into connecting to it. This relies on glu agent's vulnerability to accept connections from untrusted consoles.
  • Impact: The attacker can intercept agent communications, steal agent credentials, modify deployment instructions, and potentially gain control of all target hosts.
  • Affected Component: glu Agent (console connection logic), Agent-Console communication protocol.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • TLS Certificate Pinning: The glu agent should pin the TLS certificate of the glu console.
    • Console Public Key Verification: Pre-configure the agent with the console's public key and verify the console's identity.
    • Secure Network Configuration: Ensure DNS and network routing are secure.
  • Threat: Deployment Script Tampering (Tampering)
  • Description: An attacker intercepts and modifies deployment scripts as they are transmitted from the glu console to the glu agent. This is a direct threat to the glu communication channel.
  • Impact: The attacker can execute arbitrary code on the target host.
  • Affected Component: Agent-Console communication, specifically the mechanism for transmitting deployment scripts.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • End-to-End Encryption: Use TLS for all communication between the console and agents.
    • Digital Signatures: The glu console should digitally sign deployment scripts, and the agent should verify the signature.
    • Hashing: Calculate a cryptographic hash of the script on the console and verify it on the agent.
  • Threat: ZooKeeper Data Manipulation (Tampering)
  • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to ZooKeeper and modifies glu's configuration data. This directly impacts glu because of its reliance on ZooKeeper.
  • Impact: Misconfigured deployments, denial of service, redirection of deployments, and potential system failure.
  • Affected Component: ZooKeeper, glu Console (reliance on ZooKeeper), glu Agent (reliance on ZooKeeper).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure ZooKeeper Access: Implement strong authentication and authorization for ZooKeeper.
    • Network Segmentation: Restrict network access to ZooKeeper.
    • ZooKeeper Auditing: Enable and monitor ZooKeeper audit logs.
    • Input Validation: glu components should validate data from ZooKeeper.
    • Regular Backups: Regularly back up ZooKeeper data.
  • Threat: glu Console Credential Compromise (Information Disclosure)
  • Description: An attacker obtains valid credentials for the glu console. This directly targets the glu console's authentication.
  • Impact: The attacker gains full control over the glu deployment system.
  • Affected Component: glu Console (authentication and authorization logic).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Passwords: Enforce strong password policies.
    • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Require MFA for all console access.
    • Regular Password Rotation: Enforce regular password changes.
    • Account Lockout: Implement account lockout policies.
    • Web Application Security Best Practices: Follow general web application security best practices.
  • Threat: Agent Privilege Escalation (Elevation of Privilege)
  • Description: The glu agent runs with excessive privileges, and a vulnerability in the agent itself is exploited. This focuses on vulnerabilities within the glu agent code, not just the Fabric scripts.
  • Impact: Complete compromise of the target host.
  • Affected Component: glu Agent.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Run the glu agent with the minimum necessary privileges. Use a dedicated user account.
    • Sandboxing: Use sandboxing techniques to isolate the agent's execution environment.
    • Regular security audits: Regularly audit the system.
  • Threat: Agent Binary Tampering (Tampering)
  • Description: An attacker replaces or modifies the glu agent binary. This is a direct attack on the glu agent itself.
  • Impact: The attacker gains complete control over the agent's functionality.
  • Affected Component: glu Agent binary on the target host.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Code Signing: Digitally sign the glu agent binary and verify the signature before execution.
    • File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): Use a FIM system to detect unauthorized changes.
    • Secure Boot: Use secure boot to prevent the execution of unauthorized code.
    • Regular Updates: Keep the glu agent updated.
    • Limited Access: Restrict access to the target host.