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Attack Tree Analysis for rundeck/rundeck

Objective: To gain unauthorized access and control over systems managed by Rundeck, potentially leading to data breaches, service disruption, or lateral movement within the infrastructure.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Rundeck ├───[OR]─ Exploit Rundeck Software Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └───[OR]─ Known Vulnerabilities (CVEs) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └───[AND]─ Identify vulnerable Rundeck version [CRITICAL NODE] │ └─── Exploit public CVEs for identified version [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[OR]─ Abuse Rundeck Features and Functionality [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ Job Definition Manipulation [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[OR]─ Insecure Job Definition Storage/Access │ │ │ └───[AND]─ Access job definition storage (e.g., filesystem, database) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └─── Modify job definitions to execute malicious commands [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[OR]─ Insufficient Access Control on Job Creation/Modification [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ Gain unauthorized access to create/modify jobs (e.g., weak ACLs, compromised user) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └─── Create/modify jobs to execute malicious commands [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └───[OR]─ Input Parameter Injection in Jobs [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───[AND]─ Identify jobs with injectable parameters [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Inject malicious commands/code via job parameters [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ Plugin Abuse for Malicious Purposes [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───[AND]─ Identify plugins with functionalities that can be misused (e.g., script plugins, notification plugins) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Abuse plugin features to execute malicious actions or exfiltrate data [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ API Abuse [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───[OR]─ Weak API Authentication/Authorization [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───[AND]─ Identify weak or default API credentials/tokens [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Use compromised credentials to access API and perform malicious actions [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[OR]─ Compromise Rundeck Configuration [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ Insecure Credentials Storage [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───[AND]─ Locate Rundeck configuration files [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Extract stored credentials (e.g., database passwords, API keys, node credentials) [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ Weak Authentication and Authorization Configuration [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[OR]─ Default Credentials [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ Attempt default Rundeck credentials [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └─── Gain initial access with default credentials [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[OR]─ Weak Passwords [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[AND]─ Attempt brute-force or dictionary attacks on Rundeck user accounts [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └─── Gain access with cracked passwords [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └───[OR]─ Overly Permissive Access Control Lists (ACLs) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───[AND]─ Analyze Rundeck ACL configuration [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Identify overly permissive ACLs granting excessive privileges to users/roles [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Exploit excessive privileges to perform unauthorized actions [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR]─ Misconfigured Node Execution Settings [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───[AND]─ Analyze node execution configuration (e.g., SSH keys, WinRM credentials) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Identify misconfigurations (e.g., weak keys, shared credentials, overly broad access) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Exploit misconfigurations to gain unauthorized access to managed nodes [CRITICAL NODE] └───[OR]─ Social Engineering/Insider Threat (Rundeck Context) [HIGH RISK PATH] └───[OR]─ Phishing for Rundeck Credentials [HIGH RISK PATH] └───[AND]─ Target Rundeck users with phishing attacks [CRITICAL NODE] └─── Obtain Rundeck credentials through phishing [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Rundeck Software Vulnerabilities - Known Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities (CVEs) in the Rundeck software.
  • Critical Nodes:
    • Identify vulnerable Rundeck version: Attackers first need to determine the exact version of Rundeck being used to target version-specific vulnerabilities.
    • Exploit public CVEs for identified version: Once a vulnerable version is identified, attackers leverage publicly available exploit code or techniques to exploit the CVE, potentially leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) and system compromise.
  • Breakdown:
    • Outdated Rundeck installations are common targets.
    • Publicly available exploit code significantly lowers the barrier to entry for attackers.
    • Successful exploitation can grant complete control over the Rundeck server.

Attack Tree Path: Abuse Rundeck Features and Functionality

  • 2.1. Job Definition Manipulation [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Modifying Rundeck job definitions to inject and execute malicious commands on managed nodes.
    • Critical Nodes:
      • Access job definition storage (e.g., filesystem, database): Attackers need to gain access to where job definitions are stored, which could be the filesystem or a database backend.
      • Modify job definitions to execute malicious commands: Once access is gained, attackers alter job definitions to include malicious commands that will be executed by Rundeck on target systems.
    • Breakdown:
      • Relies on insecure storage or access control to job definitions.
      • Allows for persistent and automated execution of malicious actions through Rundeck's job scheduling.

  • 2.2. Insufficient Access Control on Job Creation/Modification [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Exploiting weak or misconfigured Access Control Lists (ACLs) to gain unauthorized privileges to create or modify Rundeck jobs.
    • Critical Nodes:
      • Gain unauthorized access to create/modify jobs (e.g., weak ACLs, compromised user): Attackers either exploit overly permissive ACLs or compromise a user account with job management permissions.
      • Create/modify jobs to execute malicious commands: With unauthorized job management access, attackers create or modify jobs to execute malicious commands.
    • Breakdown:
      • Highlights the importance of proper ACL configuration in Rundeck.
      • Compromised user accounts with excessive permissions can lead to this attack path.

  • 2.3. Input Parameter Injection in Jobs [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious commands or code into job parameters that are not properly sanitized, leading to command or script injection vulnerabilities.
    • Critical Nodes:
      • Identify jobs with injectable parameters: Attackers need to find jobs that accept user-controlled parameters and are vulnerable to injection.
      • Inject malicious commands/code via job parameters: Attackers craft malicious input parameters to execute arbitrary commands or scripts on managed nodes when the job is executed.
    • Breakdown:
      • A common web application vulnerability that applies to Rundeck job parameters.
      • Lack of input validation in job definitions is the root cause.

  • 2.4. Plugin Abuse for Malicious Purposes [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Misusing the intended functionality of Rundeck plugins to perform malicious actions or exfiltrate data.
    • Critical Nodes:
      • Identify plugins with functionalities that can be misused (e.g., script plugins, notification plugins): Attackers analyze installed plugins to find those with features that can be abused, such as script execution plugins or notification plugins that can send data externally.
      • Abuse plugin features to execute malicious actions or exfiltrate data: Attackers leverage the identified plugin functionalities to execute malicious scripts, exfiltrate sensitive information through notification channels, or perform other unauthorized actions.
    • Breakdown:
      • Plugins, while extending functionality, can also introduce new attack vectors if their features are misused.
      • Requires understanding of plugin functionalities and how they can be abused.

  • 2.5. API Abuse - Weak API Authentication/Authorization [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Exploiting weak or default API authentication mechanisms to gain unauthorized access to the Rundeck API and perform malicious actions.
    • Critical Nodes:
      • Identify weak or default API credentials/tokens: Attackers attempt to find default API credentials or exploit weak authentication configurations, such as easily guessable API tokens.
      • Use compromised credentials to access API and perform malicious actions: With compromised API credentials, attackers can use the Rundeck API to perform a wide range of malicious actions, including job execution, configuration changes, and data exfiltration.
    • Breakdown:
      • APIs are critical interfaces and require strong authentication.
      • Default credentials or weak API key management are common vulnerabilities.
      • API access grants significant control over Rundeck.

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Rundeck Configuration

  • 3.1. Insecure Credentials Storage [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Accessing Rundeck configuration files to extract stored credentials, such as database passwords, API keys, and node credentials.
    • Critical Nodes:
      • Locate Rundeck configuration files: Attackers need to find the location of Rundeck configuration files on the server.
      • Extract stored credentials (e.g., database passwords, API keys, node credentials): Once configuration files are located, attackers parse them to extract sensitive credentials that may be stored in plaintext or easily reversible formats.
    • Breakdown:
      • Storing credentials in configuration files is a common security mistake.
      • Compromised credentials can grant access to critical systems managed by Rundeck.

  • 3.2. Weak Authentication and Authorization Configuration - Default Credentials [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Attempting to log in to Rundeck using default credentials that have not been changed after installation.
    • Critical Nodes:
      • Attempt default Rundeck credentials: Attackers try commonly known default usernames and passwords for Rundeck.
      • Gain initial access with default credentials: If default credentials are still in use, attackers gain initial access to the Rundeck application.
    • Breakdown:
      • A very basic but surprisingly effective attack if default credentials are not changed.
      • Provides initial foothold for further attacks.

  • 3.3. Weak Authentication and Authorization Configuration - Weak Passwords [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Using brute-force or dictionary attacks to crack weak passwords of Rundeck user accounts.
    • Critical Nodes:
      • Attempt brute-force or dictionary attacks on Rundeck user accounts: Attackers use automated tools to try a large number of password combinations against Rundeck login forms or API endpoints.
      • Gain access with cracked passwords: If user accounts have weak passwords, attackers can successfully crack them and gain access to Rundeck with user privileges.
    • Breakdown:
      • Relies on users choosing weak passwords.
      • Password cracking tools are readily available and effective against weak passwords.

  • 3.4. Weak Authentication and Authorization Configuration - Overly Permissive Access Control Lists (ACLs) [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Exploiting overly permissive ACL configurations to gain unauthorized privileges and perform actions beyond intended access.
    • Critical Nodes:
      • Analyze Rundeck ACL configuration: Attackers examine the Rundeck ACL configuration to understand access permissions.
      • Identify overly permissive ACLs granting excessive privileges to users/roles: Attackers look for misconfigurations in ACLs that grant users or roles more permissions than they should have, potentially leading to privilege escalation.
      • Exploit excessive privileges to perform unauthorized actions: Once overly permissive ACLs are identified, attackers leverage these excessive privileges to perform unauthorized actions within Rundeck.
    • Breakdown:
      • Complex ACL configurations are prone to misconfiguration.
      • Overly permissive ACLs can lead to significant privilege escalation.

  • 3.5. Misconfigured Node Execution Settings [HIGH RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Exploiting misconfigurations in how Rundeck connects to and executes commands on managed nodes, such as weak SSH keys, shared credentials, or overly broad access permissions.
    • Critical Nodes:
      • Analyze node execution configuration (e.g., SSH keys, WinRM credentials): Attackers examine the configuration settings for node execution, focusing on credentials and access methods.
      • Identify misconfigurations (e.g., weak keys, shared credentials, overly broad access): Attackers look for weaknesses like weak SSH keys, shared credentials across multiple nodes, or overly broad access permissions granted to Rundeck for node management.
      • Exploit misconfigurations to gain unauthorized access to managed nodes: Attackers leverage identified misconfigurations to directly access managed nodes outside of Rundeck's intended control, potentially bypassing Rundeck's access controls altogether.
    • Breakdown:
      • Node configuration is crucial for secure management.
      • Misconfigurations can lead to direct access to managed infrastructure, bypassing Rundeck's intended security boundaries.

Attack Tree Path: Social Engineering/Insider Threat (Rundeck Context) - Phishing for Rundeck Credentials

  • Attack Vector: Using phishing techniques to trick Rundeck users into revealing their login credentials.
  • Critical Nodes:
    • Target Rundeck users with phishing attacks: Attackers identify and target individuals who use Rundeck, such as administrators or operators.
    • Obtain Rundeck credentials through phishing: Attackers craft phishing emails or websites designed to mimic Rundeck login pages to steal user credentials when users enter them.
  • Breakdown:
    • Social engineering is a persistent and effective attack vector.
    • Compromised Rundeck credentials provide access to the application and potentially managed systems.
    • User awareness training and MFA are important mitigations, but phishing remains a high risk.