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Attack Tree Analysis for spinnaker/clouddriver

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Control Over Cloud Resources

Attack Tree Visualization

                                 [*** Gain Unauthorized Control Over Cloud Resources ***]
                                                              \
                                                               \
                                                                \
                  [*** Abuse Clouddriver's Legitimate Functionality ***]
                                                                /
                                                               /
                                                              /
                                     [*** Misconfigured Accounts ***]
                                              /       |       \
                                             /        |        \
                                            /         |         \
                                   [***Cloud   [***Cloud    [***Cloud
                                    Provider  Provider  Provider
                                    API       API       API
                                    Misuse]   Misuse]   Misuse]
                                    (e.g.,   (e.g.,   (e.g.,
                                     AWS)     GCP)     Azure)

Likelihood: --> M-H --> M-H --> M-H Impact: --> VH --> VH --> VH Effort: --> L --> L --> L Skill: --> I --> I --> I Detection: --> M --> M --> M

Attack Tree Path: Abuse Clouddriver's Legitimate Functionality

  • Description: This represents the attacker leveraging Clouddriver's intended features, but in a way that violates security policies or grants unauthorized access. This is often achieved through misconfigurations or exploiting weak security practices, rather than finding bugs in the code itself.
  • Why it's Critical: This is a highly likely attack vector because it exploits common misconfigurations and weaknesses in how organizations manage cloud resources. It doesn't require advanced technical skills to find and exploit code vulnerabilities.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement the principle of least privilege rigorously.
    • Regularly audit cloud provider configurations and permissions.
    • Use Infrastructure as Code (IaC) to manage configurations consistently and securely.
    • Implement strong authentication and authorization mechanisms.

Attack Tree Path: Misconfigured Accounts

  • Description: This refers to cloud provider accounts (e.g., AWS IAM roles, GCP service accounts, Azure service principals) used by Clouddriver that have excessive permissions. If an attacker gains control of Clouddriver (through any means), they inherit these overly permissive roles, granting them broad access to cloud resources.
  • Why it's Critical: This is a very common vulnerability and a primary target for attackers. Overly permissive roles are often granted due to convenience or lack of understanding of the principle of least privilege.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant only the absolute minimum permissions required for Clouddriver to function.
    • Regular Audits: Conduct regular audits of IAM roles/policies/service accounts to identify and remediate excessive permissions.
    • Use Separate Accounts: Use different accounts for different Spinnaker pipelines or applications to limit the blast radius of a compromise.
    • Just-in-Time (JIT) Access: Consider using JIT access mechanisms to grant temporary, elevated permissions only when needed.

Attack Tree Path: Cloud Provider API Misuse (AWS, GCP, Azure, etc.)

  • Description: This represents the direct exploitation of the misconfigured accounts. Once an attacker has access to Clouddriver with overly permissive credentials, they can use the cloud provider APIs to perform unauthorized actions, such as:

    • Creating, modifying, or deleting virtual machines, databases, storage buckets, etc.
    • Exfiltrating data.
    • Deploying malicious code.
    • Disrupting services.
    • Using resources for unauthorized purposes (e.g., cryptocurrency mining).

  • Why it's Critical: This is the direct consequence of misconfigured accounts and represents the actualization of the attacker's goal.

  • Mitigation Strategies (Same as for Misconfigured Accounts, plus):

    • Cloud Provider Monitoring: Utilize cloud provider monitoring services (e.g., AWS CloudTrail, GCP Cloud Logging, Azure Monitor) to detect suspicious API activity.
    • Anomaly Detection: Implement anomaly detection systems to identify unusual patterns of API usage.
    • Security Information and Event Management (SIEM): Integrate cloud provider logs with a SIEM system for centralized monitoring and alerting.
    • Web Application Firewall (WAF): If Clouddriver's API is exposed externally, use a WAF to protect against common web attacks.

  • Specific Examples (per provider):

    • AWS: An attacker with excessive IAM permissions could create new EC2 instances, access S3 buckets, modify security groups, or even delete entire VPCs.
    • GCP: An attacker with overly permissive service account roles could create new Compute Engine instances, access Cloud Storage buckets, modify firewall rules, or delete projects.
    • Azure: An attacker with excessive service principal permissions could create new virtual machines, access storage accounts, modify network security groups, or delete resource groups.