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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for spinnaker/clouddriver

Mitigation Strategy: Enforce Principle of Least Privilege for Cloud Provider Accounts (Clouddriver Configuration)

Description:

  1. Identify Operations: Within Clouddriver's codebase and configuration, identify all cloud provider API calls and the specific actions they perform.
  2. Map to Minimal Permissions: For each identified operation, determine the absolute minimum set of cloud provider permissions required. This often involves consulting cloud provider documentation.
  3. Configure Clouddriver Accounts: In Clouddriver's configuration files (e.g., clouddriver.yml, provider-specific config), specify the precise service account/role/credentials that have only those minimal permissions. This is a direct Clouddriver configuration change. Do not configure Clouddriver to use accounts with broad or administrative access.
  4. Credential Source Configuration: Configure how Clouddriver obtains credentials. Instead of hardcoding, use environment variables, instance metadata (if running on a cloud instance), or integration with a secrets manager (configured within Clouddriver).
  5. Account/Pipeline Isolation (Clouddriver Config): If you have multiple Spinnaker applications or pipelines, configure separate cloud provider accounts within Clouddriver for each. This is done within Clouddriver's configuration to isolate their permissions.

Threats Mitigated:

  • Unauthorized Resource Access (Severity: High): If Clouddriver is configured with overly permissive credentials, an attacker gaining access to it could manipulate cloud resources beyond what's intended.
  • Privilege Escalation (Severity: High): Overly permissive credentials configured within Clouddriver could be used to gain broader access within the cloud environment.
  • Compliance Violations (Severity: Medium to High): Configuring Clouddriver with excessive permissions violates least privilege principles, potentially leading to compliance issues.

Impact:

  • Unauthorized Resource Access: Risk significantly reduced by ensuring Clouddriver itself is configured to use only minimally necessary credentials.
  • Privilege Escalation: Risk significantly reduced by limiting the permissions Clouddriver is configured to use.
  • Compliance Violations: Risk reduced by adhering to least privilege within Clouddriver's configuration.

Currently Implemented: [Example: Clouddriver is configured to use AWS IAM roles via environment variables. Roles are defined externally, but Clouddriver's config points to them.]

Missing Implementation: [Example: Clouddriver's configuration still uses a single GCP service account for all operations. Need to define separate accounts and update Clouddriver's config to use them.]

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Strict Input Validation and Sanitization (Within Clouddriver)

Description:

  1. Identify Input Points (Code Audit): Conduct a code audit of Clouddriver to identify all locations where user-provided data is received (API handlers, pipeline stage processors, etc.).
  2. Implement Validation Logic (Code Changes): Within Clouddriver's code, add validation checks before any user-provided data is used to interact with cloud providers. These checks should enforce strict whitelists.
  3. Sanitization Routines (Code Changes): Before using user-provided data in API calls or commands, add sanitization routines within Clouddriver's code to prevent injection attacks. Use appropriate escaping, encoding, or parameterized queries.
  4. "Run Job (Manifest)" Hardening (Code/Config): Specifically within Clouddriver's handling of "Run Job (Manifest)" and similar stages:
    • Implement code-level checks to restrict the types of commands or scripts that can be executed.
    • Potentially use Clouddriver's configuration to disable or restrict the use of these stages.
    • Add code to log and audit the execution of these stages.

Threats Mitigated:

  • Command Injection (Severity: High): Attackers could inject malicious commands through Clouddriver if input isn't validated and sanitized within Clouddriver.
  • Resource Injection (Severity: High): Attackers could manipulate resource names or configurations if Clouddriver doesn't properly validate input.
  • Denial of Service (DoS) (Severity: Medium): Malformed input could cause Clouddriver to crash or consume excessive resources if not handled properly within Clouddriver.

Impact:

  • Command Injection: Risk significantly reduced by adding validation and sanitization directly within Clouddriver's code.
  • Resource Injection: Risk significantly reduced by validating input before it's used in cloud provider interactions.
  • Denial of Service (DoS): Risk reduced by handling potentially problematic input gracefully within Clouddriver.

Currently Implemented: [Example: Some basic input validation exists in Clouddriver's API handlers, but it's not comprehensive.]

Missing Implementation: [Example: Comprehensive input validation and sanitization are missing in many parts of Clouddriver's codebase, especially in pipeline stage processors. "Run Job (Manifest)" handling needs significant hardening.]

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Clouddriver Configuration Management (Secrets Integration)

Description:

  1. Secrets Manager Integration (Code/Config): Modify Clouddriver's code and/or configuration to integrate with a secrets manager (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager). This involves:
    • Adding code to retrieve secrets from the secrets manager at runtime.
    • Configuring Clouddriver (e.g., in clouddriver.yml) with the necessary connection details for the secrets manager.
    • Replacing hardcoded credentials in Clouddriver's configuration with references to secrets stored in the secrets manager.
  2. Configuration File Encryption (Deployment): While not strictly within Clouddriver, how you deploy and manage the encrypted configuration files is crucial. This is often tightly coupled with how Clouddriver is deployed.

Threats Mitigated:

  • Credential Exposure (Severity: High): Storing credentials directly in Clouddriver's configuration files makes them vulnerable. Integration with a secrets manager mitigates this directly within Clouddriver's operation.
  • Unauthorized Access (Severity: High): Compromised credentials in Clouddriver's config could grant access to cloud resources.

Impact:

  • Credential Exposure: Risk significantly reduced. Clouddriver itself no longer stores credentials in plain text.
  • Unauthorized Access: Risk significantly reduced by protecting credentials through the secrets manager integration.

Currently Implemented: [Example: Clouddriver is configured to retrieve AWS credentials from environment variables, which are populated from Secrets Manager during deployment.]

Missing Implementation: [Example: Need to implement similar integration for GCP credentials, which are currently hardcoded in a configuration file.]

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Clouddriver API (Authentication/Authorization within Clouddriver)

Description:

  1. Authentication Enforcement (Code Changes): Modify Clouddriver's API handlers to require authentication. This involves adding code to:
    • Check for valid authentication tokens (e.g., API keys, JWTs) in incoming requests.
    • Reject requests that lack valid authentication.
  2. Authorization Logic (Code Changes): Implement authorization checks within Clouddriver's API handlers to enforce RBAC. This involves:
    • Mapping authenticated users to roles.
    • Checking if the user's role has the necessary permissions to perform the requested API operation.
    • Rejecting requests that are not authorized.
  3. Rate Limiting (Code/Config): Implement rate limiting within Clouddriver (either in code or through configuration) to prevent abuse.
  4. TLS Enforcement (Configuration): Configure Clouddriver to only accept HTTPS connections. This is typically done in Clouddriver's configuration.

Threats Mitigated:

  • Unauthorized API Access (Severity: High): Without authentication and authorization within Clouddriver, anyone could potentially access its API.
  • Data Breaches (Severity: High): An attacker could exploit API vulnerabilities if security isn't enforced within Clouddriver.
  • Denial of Service (DoS) (Severity: Medium): Rate limiting within Clouddriver prevents attackers from overwhelming the API.

Impact:

  • Unauthorized API Access: Risk significantly reduced by enforcing authentication and authorization within Clouddriver's code.
  • Data Breaches: Risk reduced by securing the API internally.
  • Denial of Service (DoS): Risk reduced by implementing rate limiting within Clouddriver.

Currently Implemented: [Example: Clouddriver requires API keys for authentication. TLS is enforced.]

Missing Implementation: [Example: RBAC is not implemented within Clouddriver's API handlers. Rate limiting is basic and needs improvement.]

Mitigation Strategy: Comprehensive Monitoring and Auditing (Clouddriver Logging)

Description:

  1. Detailed Logging (Code Changes): Modify Clouddriver's code to generate detailed logs for all significant actions, including:
    • Cloud provider API calls (with request and response details, where appropriate and safe).
    • Authentication and authorization events.
    • Configuration changes.
    • Errors and exceptions.
    • Include timestamps, user IDs (if applicable), IP addresses, and other relevant context.
  2. Structured Logging (Code Changes): Use a structured logging format (e.g., JSON) to make logs easier to parse and analyze.
  3. Log Level Configuration (Configuration): Configure Clouddriver's logging level (e.g., DEBUG, INFO, WARN, ERROR) appropriately. Use a more verbose level during development and testing, and a less verbose level in production (but still capture sufficient detail for security auditing).
  4. Log Rotation (Configuration/Deployment): Configure log rotation to prevent log files from growing too large. This is often handled at the deployment level but impacts Clouddriver's logging.

Threats Mitigated:

  • Undetected Security Incidents (Severity: High): Without detailed logging within Clouddriver, it's difficult to detect and investigate security incidents.
  • Insider Threats (Severity: Medium to High): Logging within Clouddriver helps track user actions and identify potential malicious activity.
  • Compliance Violations (Severity: Medium to High): Lack of sufficient logging can hinder compliance efforts.

Impact:

  • Undetected Security Incidents: Risk significantly reduced. Detailed logging within Clouddriver provides the necessary data for incident detection and response.
  • Insider Threats: Risk reduced. Logging helps monitor and audit user activity within Clouddriver.
  • Compliance Violations: Risk reduced. Comprehensive logging helps demonstrate compliance with security requirements.

Currently Implemented: [Example: Clouddriver generates basic logs, but they are not comprehensive or structured.]

Missing Implementation: [Example: Need to add more detailed logging to Clouddriver's code, especially for cloud provider interactions and authentication events. Need to implement structured logging.]

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Caching Practices (Clouddriver Configuration and Code)

Description:

  1. Cache Configuration (Configuration): Review and adjust Clouddriver's caching configuration (e.g., clouddriver.yml, provider-specific config). This includes:
    • Setting appropriate TTLs for cached data.
    • Disabling caching for sensitive data, if necessary.
    • Configuring cache sizes and eviction policies.
  2. Cache Invalidation Logic (Code Changes): In some cases, you may need to modify Clouddriver's code to implement more sophisticated cache invalidation strategies (e.g., event-based invalidation).
  3. Cache Key Management (Code Review): Review how Clouddriver generates cache keys to ensure they are unique and do not inadvertently expose sensitive information.

Threats Mitigated:

  • Stale Data (Severity: Medium): Incorrect caching configurations within Clouddriver can lead to the use of outdated data.
  • Cache Poisoning (Severity: High): If Clouddriver's caching mechanisms are vulnerable, an attacker could inject malicious data. (This is less direct, but Clouddriver's configuration and code influence the risk).
  • Information Disclosure (Severity: Medium): Improperly configured caching within Clouddriver could expose sensitive data.

Impact:

  • Stale Data: Risk reduced by configuring appropriate TTLs and invalidation strategies within Clouddriver.
  • Cache Poisoning: Risk reduced (indirectly) by ensuring Clouddriver's caching is configured securely and by implementing robust input validation.
  • Information Disclosure: Risk reduced by carefully managing sensitive data in Clouddriver's cache configuration.

Currently Implemented: [Example: Default Clouddriver caching is enabled with basic TTLs.]

Missing Implementation: [Example: Need to review and potentially adjust Clouddriver's caching configuration for specific cloud providers and data types. May need to add code for event-based cache invalidation.]