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Threat Model Analysis for spinnaker/clouddriver

Threat: Cloud Provider Credential Exfiltration

  • Description: An attacker gains access to the Clouddriver instance and extracts stored cloud provider credentials. The attacker might exploit a vulnerability within Clouddriver itself, use debugging tools, memory dumps, or access to improperly secured credential storage. This directly involves Clouddriver's credential handling.
    • Impact: Complete control over the cloud resources managed by that Clouddriver instance. The attacker can create, modify, or delete any resource, exfiltrate data, launch attacks, and incur significant costs.
    • Affected Clouddriver Component:
      • CredentialsRepository (and related classes for credential storage/retrieval).
      • Caching mechanisms that might temporarily store credentials.
      • Cloud provider-specific modules (e.g., AmazonCredentials, GoogleCloudCredentials).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Use a dedicated secrets management service (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, etc.). Clouddriver should never store credentials directly.
      • Implement strict network segmentation for the Clouddriver instance.
      • Enable host-based intrusion detection (HIDS) and file integrity monitoring (FIM).
      • Regularly rotate cloud provider credentials.
      • Encrypt credentials at rest and in transit.

Threat: Unauthorized Cloud Resource Creation via API Manipulation

  • Description: An attacker, having gained some access (e.g., compromised user, separate vulnerability), crafts malicious API requests directly to Clouddriver to create unauthorized cloud resources, bypassing Spinnaker's UI. This directly exploits Clouddriver's API.
    • Impact: Creation of unauthorized resources (VMs, databases, etc.), leading to increased costs, resource exhaustion, and potential use of these resources for malicious purposes.
    • Affected Clouddriver Component:
      • API controllers handling resource creation (e.g., TaskController, provider-specific controllers like AmazonInstanceController).
      • TaskRepository (if task definitions are manipulated).
      • Cloud provider-specific modules interacting with cloud APIs (e.g., AmazonCloudProvider).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strictly enforce RBAC within Clouddriver and Spinnaker.
      • Robust input validation and sanitization for all Clouddriver API requests.
      • Use API gateways with request validation and rate limiting in front of Clouddriver.
      • Monitor Clouddriver API logs for suspicious activity.
      • Implement "dry-run" functionality where supported.

Threat: Unauthorized Cloud Resource Deletion via API Manipulation

  • Description: Similar to creation, but the attacker crafts API requests directly to Clouddriver to delete existing resources. This directly exploits Clouddriver's API and resource management capabilities.
    • Impact: Service disruption, data loss, and potential business interruption.
    • Affected Clouddriver Component:
      • API controllers handling resource deletion (e.g., TaskController, provider-specific controllers).
      • TaskRepository (if task definitions are manipulated).
      • Cloud provider-specific modules interacting with cloud APIs.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Same mitigations as for unauthorized creation (RBAC, input validation, API gateway, monitoring, dry-run).
      • Enable deletion protection for critical resources (if supported by the cloud provider).
      • Implement robust backup and recovery procedures.

Threat: Exploitation of a Vulnerability in a Cloud Provider SDK Used by Clouddriver

  • Description: Clouddriver relies on cloud provider SDKs. A vulnerability in one of these SDKs, when exploited through Clouddriver's interaction with it, could lead to compromise. This is direct because Clouddriver is the execution context.
    • Impact: Varies, but could range from information disclosure to remote code execution within the Clouddriver process.
    • Affected Clouddriver Component:
      • Cloud provider-specific modules that directly use the SDKs (e.g., AmazonCloudProvider, GoogleCloudProvider).
    • Risk Severity: High (dependent on the SDK vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Keep cloud provider SDKs up-to-date.
      • Use a Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tool.
      • Monitor security advisories from cloud providers and SDK vendors.

Threat: Cross-Account Resource Access via Misconfigured IAM Roles Used by Clouddriver

  • Description: Clouddriver, configured for multi-account management, uses IAM roles. Misconfiguration in these roles or trust policies could allow Clouddriver (and thus an attacker) to access resources in unintended accounts. This is a direct threat to Clouddriver's multi-account handling.
    • Impact: Data breaches, resource compromise, and service disruption across accounts.
    • Affected Clouddriver Component:
      • Cloud provider-specific modules handling IAM role assumption (e.g., AmazonCredentials).
      • Configuration files defining account mappings and IAM roles.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Carefully review and audit IAM roles and trust policies.
      • Use condition keys in IAM policies for further restriction.
      • Regularly audit Clouddriver's configuration and IAM role usage.
      • Use infrastructure-as-code (IaC) for IAM role management.

Threat: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Cloud Provider Metadata Accessed by Clouddriver

  • Description: An attacker crafts a request to Clouddriver that causes it to make an unintended request to a cloud provider's metadata service or another internal service, leveraging Clouddriver's interaction with cloud metadata.
    • Impact: Exposure of sensitive information (instance credentials, internal network details), potential for further attacks.
    • Affected Clouddriver Component:
      • Cloud provider-specific modules interacting with the metadata service.
      • Code handling user-provided URLs/hostnames used in requests.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strictly validate and sanitize user-provided input used in URLs/hostnames.
      • Use a whitelist of allowed URLs/hostnames for internal services.
      • Avoid unnecessary requests to the metadata service.
      • Implement network segmentation to limit Clouddriver's access.
      • Use an HTTP client with SSRF protection.