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Attack Tree Analysis for stjohnjohnson/smartthings-mqtt-bridge

Objective: [G] Gain Unauthorized Control/Exfiltrate Data

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      [G] Gain Unauthorized Control/Exfiltrate Data
                                                  /                   |
                                                 /                    |
                                                /                     |
                      [A] [CN] Compromise MQTT Broker        [B] Compromise Bridge Itself
                               /       |                               |
                              /        |                               |
         [A1] [HR] Weak MQTT   [A2] [HR] MQTT                   [B2] [HR] [CN] Dependency
         Credentials   Broker                           Vulnerabilities in Bridge
                       Misconfiguration

Attack Tree Path: [A] [CN] Compromise MQTT Broker

  • [A] [CN] Compromise MQTT Broker:
    • Description: The attacker gains full control over the MQTT broker, allowing them to intercept, modify, or inject messages between the SmartThings hub and any connected devices. This is a critical node because it's the central point of communication.
    • Impact: High - Complete control over all connected devices, potential for data exfiltration, and disruption of service.
    • Why Critical: Compromising the broker gives the attacker control over all traffic flowing through the bridge.

Attack Tree Path: [A1] [HR] Weak MQTT Credentials

  • [A1] [HR] Weak MQTT Credentials: * Description: The attacker gains access to the MQTT broker by using default, easily guessable, or weak credentials. This could be due to the bridge or the broker itself using weak default passwords, or the administrator failing to change them. * Likelihood: High - Default and weak credentials are a very common vulnerability. * Impact: High - Full control of the MQTT broker. * Effort: Low - Simple password guessing or using publicly known default credentials. * Skill Level: Low - Basic scripting or using readily available tools. * Detection Difficulty: Medium - Might be detected by intrusion detection systems if unusual login patterns are observed, or by monitoring MQTT traffic for unauthorized clients. Failed login attempts might be logged. * Mitigation: * Enforce strong, unique passwords for the MQTT broker and the bridge's connection to it. * Use a password manager. * Never use default credentials. * Consider using client certificates for authentication instead of just username/password.

Attack Tree Path: [A2] [HR] MQTT Broker Misconfiguration

  • [A2] [HR] MQTT Broker Misconfiguration: * Description: The attacker exploits misconfigurations in the MQTT broker's settings to gain unauthorized access. This could include enabling anonymous access, disabling TLS/SSL encryption, or having weak or no access control lists (ACLs). * Likelihood: Medium - Depends on the administrator's diligence, but misconfigurations are common. * Impact: High - Similar to weak credentials, can lead to full control. * Effort: Low to Medium - Scanning for open ports, checking for anonymous access, etc. * Skill Level: Low to Medium - Basic network scanning and understanding of MQTT. * Detection Difficulty: Medium to High - Depends on the specific misconfiguration. Some, like exposed management interfaces, might be easily detected. Others, like overly permissive ACLs, might be harder to spot without deep inspection of the broker configuration. * Mitigation: * Follow best practices for securing the MQTT broker. * Enable TLS/SSL with strong ciphers. * Implement strict ACLs. * Keep the broker software up-to-date. * Disable anonymous access. * Restrict access to management interfaces.

Attack Tree Path: [B] Compromise Bridge Itself

  • [B] Compromise Bridge Itself
    • Description: The attacker gains control over the bridge application itself.
    • Impact: High - Control over the translation between SmartThings and MQTT, allowing manipulation of device commands and data.
    • Why Critical: The bridge is the essential link between SmartThings and the MQTT network.

Attack Tree Path: [B2] [HR] [CN] Dependency Vulnerabilities in Bridge

  • [B2] [HR] [CN] Dependency Vulnerabilities in Bridge: * Description: The attacker exploits a known vulnerability in one of the third-party libraries (dependencies) used by the smartthings-mqtt-bridge. This could allow them to execute arbitrary code on the system running the bridge. * Likelihood: Medium to High - Very common, especially if dependencies are not regularly updated. * Impact: Medium to High - Depends on the specific vulnerability. Could range from minor information disclosure to remote code execution. * Effort: Low to Medium - Using automated tools to scan for known vulnerabilities in dependencies. * Skill Level: Low to Medium - Using vulnerability scanners and understanding vulnerability reports. * Detection Difficulty: Low to Medium - Vulnerability scanners can easily identify known vulnerable dependencies. However, exploiting the vulnerability might be more difficult to detect. * Mitigation: * Regularly update all dependencies to their latest versions. * Use tools like npm audit (for Node.js) or similar tools for other languages to identify and remediate vulnerable dependencies. * Consider using a Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tool to automate this process. * Why Critical: A vulnerable dependency can be a gateway to compromising the entire bridge, and thus the communication between SmartThings and MQTT.