attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for jgm/pandoc

Objective: Compromise application using Pandoc by exploiting vulnerabilities within Pandoc's processing of user-supplied content.

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Application via Pandoc Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]

• [AND] Exploit Pandoc Input Processing Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
  • [OR] Malicious Input File [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • [OR] Injection Attacks within Document Formats [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • [OR] HTML Injection (in Markdown, reStructuredText, etc. converted to HTML) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • [LEAF] Embed malicious HTML tags and scripts within input document [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • [OR] JavaScript Injection (in formats allowing JavaScript, or via HTML injection) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • [LEAF] Inject malicious JavaScript code that executes in the browser when output is rendered [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • [OR] Format-Specific Vulnerabilities
      • [OR] XML External Entity (XXE) Injection (e.g., in DOCX, ODT, EPUB) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • [LEAF] Embed malicious external entity definitions in input documents [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • [OR] Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via External Resources (e.g., in Markdown, HTML) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • [LEAF] Include links or image references to internal/sensitive resources in input [HIGH-RISK PATH]
• [AND] Exploit Pandoc Output Generation Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
  • [OR] Output Injection/Escaping Issues [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • [OR] Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Generated HTML [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • [LEAF] Input content is not properly escaped when generating HTML output, leading to XSS vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
• [AND] Exploit Pandoc Configuration or Environment Vulnerabilities (Less Pandoc-Specific, but relevant in context)
  • [OR] Vulnerable Dependencies of Pandoc (Libraries used by Pandoc) [CRITICAL NODE]
    • [LEAF] Exploit known vulnerabilities in libraries that Pandoc depends on (e.g., parsing libraries, PDF generation libraries)

Attack Tree Path: 1. Attack Goal: Compromise Application via Pandoc Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]

• Description: The attacker's ultimate objective is to successfully compromise the application that utilizes Pandoc. This could involve gaining unauthorized access, executing arbitrary code, or causing disruption.
• Impact: If successful, the impact can range from data breaches and service disruption to complete application takeover, depending on the specific vulnerability exploited and the application's architecture.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Pandoc Input Processing Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH START]

• Description: This is a primary attack vector focusing on vulnerabilities that arise during the processing of user-supplied input by Pandoc. Attackers aim to craft malicious input documents that trigger vulnerabilities within Pandoc's parsing or conversion logic.
• Attack Vectors within this Node:
  • Malicious Input File [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]: The attacker delivers a specially crafted document to the application for processing by Pandoc. This file is designed to exploit weaknesses in how Pandoc handles different document formats.
    • Injection Attacks within Document Formats [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Attackers embed malicious payloads within the content of a valid document format, leveraging features of the format itself to inject code or trigger unintended actions.
      • HTML Injection (in Markdown, reStructuredText, etc. converted to HTML) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via HTML Injection.
        • Exploitation: Attackers embed malicious HTML tags and JavaScript code within input formats like Markdown or reStructuredText. When Pandoc converts this input to HTML, it may not properly sanitize these tags. If the resulting HTML is displayed in a user's browser, the injected JavaScript code can execute, leading to XSS.
        • Impact: Account takeover, data theft, website defacement, redirection to malicious sites.
        • Mitigation: Strictly sanitize HTML output generated by Pandoc, especially when processing user-provided content. Use a robust HTML sanitization library. Consider using Pandoc's options to disable features that increase HTML attack surface (e.g., --no-highlight, --no-mathml). Implement Content Security Policy (CSP) in the web application.
      • JavaScript Injection (in formats allowing JavaScript, or via HTML injection) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via JavaScript Injection.
        • Exploitation: Similar to HTML injection, attackers aim to inject JavaScript code. This can be directly in formats that allow JavaScript or indirectly by injecting HTML that contains JavaScript.
        • Impact: Account takeover, data theft, website defacement, redirection to malicious sites.
        • Mitigation: Same as HTML Injection: Strict HTML sanitization, CSP, and potentially disabling JavaScript-related features if not necessary.
    • Format-Specific Vulnerabilities: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities inherent in the parsers Pandoc uses for different input formats.
      • XML External Entity (XXE) Injection (e.g., in DOCX, ODT, EPUB) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Vulnerability Type: XML External Entity (XXE) Injection.
        • Exploitation: Attackers craft malicious documents in XML-based formats (like DOCX, ODT, EPUB) containing external entity definitions. If Pandoc's XML parser is not configured to prevent XXE, it may attempt to resolve these external entities, potentially leading to:
          • Information Disclosure: Reading local files on the server.
          • Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Making requests to internal or external resources from the server.
        • Impact: Information disclosure, Server-Side Request Forgery, Denial of Service.
        • Mitigation: Configure XML parsers used by Pandoc to disable external entity processing. Specifically, disallow DOCTYPE declarations and external entities. Ensure dependencies are updated to patched versions.
      • Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via External Resources (e.g., in Markdown, HTML) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Vulnerability Type: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
        • Exploitation: Attackers include links or image references to external resources within input formats like Markdown or HTML. If Pandoc attempts to fetch these resources without proper validation, attackers can cause Pandoc to make requests to internal or sensitive resources, potentially bypassing firewalls or accessing internal services.
        • Impact: Access to internal resources, potential further exploitation of internal services, information disclosure.
        • Mitigation: Disable or strictly control the fetching of external resources by Pandoc. If necessary, implement strict whitelisting of allowed domains and protocols. Sanitize URLs to prevent manipulation.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Pandoc Output Generation Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH START]

• Description: This attack vector focuses on vulnerabilities that occur during the process of Pandoc generating output in a specific format. Even if input parsing is secure, issues in output generation can introduce vulnerabilities.
• Attack Vectors within this Node:
  • Output Injection/Escaping Issues [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]: Pandoc might fail to properly escape or encode user-provided content when generating output, leading to injection vulnerabilities in the output format.
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Generated HTML [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) due to output escaping issues.
      • Exploitation: When generating HTML output, Pandoc might not correctly escape user-provided content that should be treated as text, not HTML code. This can lead to XSS if the generated HTML is displayed in a browser.
      • Impact: Account takeover, data theft, website defacement, redirection to malicious sites.
      • Mitigation: Ensure Pandoc and the application correctly encode output, especially for HTML. Use output encoding functions appropriate for the target format. Re-emphasize HTML sanitization as a crucial defense.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit Pandoc Configuration or Environment Vulnerabilities - Vulnerable Dependencies of Pandoc (Libraries used by Pandoc) [CRITICAL NODE]

• Description: Pandoc relies on numerous external libraries for parsing, conversion, and output generation. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies can indirectly affect Pandoc and the application using it.
• Attack Vectors within this Node:
  • Exploit known vulnerabilities in libraries that Pandoc depends on (e.g., parsing libraries, PDF generation libraries):
    • Vulnerability Type: Vulnerabilities in third-party libraries.
    • Exploitation: Attackers target known vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows, remote code execution bugs) in libraries used by Pandoc. If Pandoc uses a vulnerable version of a library, exploiting the library vulnerability can compromise Pandoc and the application.
    • Impact: Varies greatly depending on the library vulnerability - Denial of Service, Information Disclosure, Code Execution, System Compromise.
    • Mitigation: Maintain a comprehensive inventory of Pandoc's dependencies. Regularly scan dependencies for known vulnerabilities using vulnerability scanning tools. Implement a robust patch management process to promptly update vulnerable dependencies to patched versions. Use dependency management tools to track and manage dependencies effectively.