attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for alibaba/druid

Attack Surface: Exposed Druid Management Endpoints

• Description: Druid provides built-in management endpoints (e.g., /druid/index.html) for monitoring and configuration. If these endpoints are accessible without proper authentication and authorization, they become a significant attack surface.
• Druid Contribution: Druid provides these endpoints as a feature, making them inherently part of its attack surface if not secured.
• Example: An attacker accesses /druid/index.html without authentication and gains access to connection pool statistics, database connection details, and potentially configuration settings. They might then use this information to launch further attacks or disrupt service.
• Impact: Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Potential Configuration Manipulation.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Disable Management Endpoints in Production: If monitoring is not required directly through these endpoints in production, disable them entirely in the Druid configuration.
  • Implement Strong Authentication and Authorization: If management endpoints are necessary, enforce strong authentication (e.g., username/password, API keys, certificate-based authentication) and role-based authorization to restrict access to authorized users only.
  • Network Segmentation: Restrict access to management endpoints to a dedicated management network or specific IP ranges. Use firewalls to block external access.

Attack Surface: Insecure Default Configuration

• Description: Druid's default configuration settings might prioritize ease of use over security, potentially enabling features or settings that are not secure for production environments.
• Druid Contribution: Druid's default settings are the source of this attack surface. Users must actively change them to secure the application.
• Example: Default logging level is set to DEBUG, which logs sensitive information like database queries with parameters. These logs are then accessible to unauthorized personnel or exposed through misconfigured logging systems.
• Impact: Information Disclosure (Sensitive data in logs).
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Review and Harden Default Configuration: Thoroughly review Druid's default configuration documentation and identify settings that need to be changed for production security.
  • Minimize Logging Verbosity in Production: Set logging levels to INFO or WARN in production to reduce the amount of potentially sensitive data logged.
  • Secure Log Storage and Access: Ensure logs are stored securely with appropriate access controls to prevent unauthorized access.

Attack Surface: Hardcoded Credentials in Configuration Files

• Description: Storing database credentials directly in Druid configuration files (e.g., druid.properties, XML) makes them easily accessible if the configuration files are compromised.
• Druid Contribution: Druid accepts credentials directly in configuration files, making this a potential vulnerability if best practices are not followed.
• Example: Database username and password are stored in plain text in druid.properties. An attacker gains access to the server's file system (e.g., through a web application vulnerability) and reads the configuration file, obtaining database credentials.
• Impact: Full Database Compromise, Data Breach, Unauthorized Access.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Externalize Configuration: Avoid storing credentials directly in configuration files. Use environment variables, system properties, or dedicated secrets management systems (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault) to manage and inject credentials.
  • Restrict File System Permissions: Limit file system permissions on configuration files to only the necessary users and processes.

Attack Surface: Denial of Service through Connection Pool Exhaustion

• Description: Attackers can attempt to exhaust the Druid connection pool by rapidly opening and holding connections, preventing legitimate application requests from accessing the database.
• Druid Contribution: Druid's connection pool mechanism, while designed for performance, can be a target for DoS if not properly configured and protected.
• Example: An attacker sends a flood of requests to the application, each attempting to acquire a database connection. The connection pool becomes exhausted, and legitimate users are unable to connect to the database, leading to application downtime.
• Impact: Denial of Service, Application Downtime.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Connection Pool Limits: Configure appropriate maximum connection pool size and idle connection timeout settings in Druid to limit resource consumption and release idle connections.
  • Request Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting at the application level to restrict the number of requests from a single source within a given time frame, preventing connection pool exhaustion attacks.

Attack Surface: Information Disclosure through Excessive Logging

• Description: Overly verbose logging configurations in Druid can inadvertently log sensitive data, such as database queries with sensitive parameters or internal application state, which can be exposed if logs are not properly secured.
• Druid Contribution: Druid's logging capabilities, if misconfigured, can contribute to information disclosure.
• Example: Druid logs SQL queries at DEBUG level, including user input parameters. These logs are stored in a shared file system accessible to unauthorized users, who can then extract sensitive data from the logged queries.
• Impact: Information Disclosure, Potential Data Breach.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Minimize Logging of Sensitive Data: Avoid logging sensitive data (e.g., passwords, API keys, personal identifiable information) in Druid logs.
  • Sanitize Logged Data: If logging sensitive data is unavoidable, sanitize or mask it before logging (e.g., redact passwords, mask credit card numbers).
  • Secure Log Storage and Access: Store logs securely with appropriate access controls.