attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for alibaba/druid

Objective: Compromise Application using Alibaba Druid Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Druid [CRITICAL NODE] ├── Exploit Druid Configuration Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── Insecure Default Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── Default Credentials for Monitoring/Management Features [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └── Access Druid Monitor Panel with Default Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └── Gain Insight into Database Credentials and Application Behavior [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └── Potential for Data Exfiltration or Further Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├── File Inclusion Vulnerabilities in Configuration Loading (if applicable) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └── Include Malicious Configuration File [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └── Execute Arbitrary Code or Modify Application Behavior [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── Exposed Configuration Files [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── Access Configuration Files (e.g., through misconfigured web server, directory traversal) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └── Read Sensitive Configuration Data (Database Credentials, etc.) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── Use Credentials to Access and Compromise Database [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├── Exploit Druid Monitoring and Management Features [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── Unauthorized Access to Druid Monitor Panel [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── Lack of Authentication on Monitor Panel [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └── Directly Access Monitor Panel [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └── Information Disclosure (SQL Queries, Connection Details, Performance Metrics) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise Application via Druid [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: This is the ultimate goal of the attacker, encompassing all potential vulnerabilities within Druid that can be exploited to compromise the application.
• Threat: Successful compromise can lead to data breaches, data manipulation, denial of service, and complete control over the application and potentially underlying systems.
• Actionable Insight: Implement comprehensive security measures across all aspects of Druid configuration, deployment, and usage, as detailed in the subsequent points.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Druid Configuration Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Targeting weaknesses in how Druid is configured, including default settings, insecure storage of sensitive data, and vulnerabilities in configuration management processes.
• Threat: Configuration flaws can directly expose sensitive information, bypass security controls, and even allow for arbitrary code execution.
• Actionable Insight: Prioritize secure configuration practices, including changing default credentials, strong encryption, disabling unnecessary features, and securing configuration files and endpoints.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Insecure Default Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Exploiting default settings that are convenient for initial setup but insecure for production environments.
• Threat: Default credentials, weak encryption, and unnecessary enabled features can be easily exploited by attackers with minimal effort.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Change Default Credentials: Immediately change all default usernames and passwords for Druid monitoring and management interfaces.
  • Disable Unnecessary Features: Disable any Druid features that are not essential for the application's functionality, especially if they expose management or monitoring interfaces.
  • Implement Strong Password Encryption: Ensure Druid configuration properly encrypts sensitive information like database passwords using recommended practices.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Default Credentials for Monitoring/Management Features [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Attempting to access Druid's monitoring panel or management interfaces using commonly known default usernames and passwords (e.g., admin/admin).
• Threat: Successful access grants attackers immediate insight into sensitive information like database connection strings, SQL queries, and application behavior.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Change Default Credentials (Critical): This is the most crucial step. Replace default credentials with strong, unique passwords immediately upon deployment.
  • Regularly Audit Accounts: Periodically review user accounts and access rights to ensure no unauthorized accounts exist.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Access Druid Monitor Panel with Default Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Directly accessing the Druid monitor panel URL and attempting to log in using default credentials.
• Threat: Successful login provides access to the monitor panel and the information it exposes.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Secure Monitor Panel Access: Ensure strong authentication is enabled and default credentials are changed.
  • Network Segmentation: Consider placing the monitor panel on a restricted network segment, limiting public internet access.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Gain Insight into Database Credentials and Application Behavior [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Analyzing the information exposed through the Druid monitor panel (when accessed with default credentials or due to lack of authentication) to extract sensitive details.
• Threat: Disclosed information can include database connection strings, usernames, potentially passwords, and insights into application logic and vulnerabilities, enabling further attacks.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Secure Monitor Panel (Critical): Preventing unauthorized access to the monitor panel is paramount to avoid information disclosure.
  • Minimize Information Exposure: Review the information displayed on the monitor panel and consider if any sensitive data can be masked or removed without impacting monitoring functionality.

Attack Tree Path: 7. Potential for Data Exfiltration or Further Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Utilizing the obtained database credentials or application insights to launch further attacks, such as direct database access, SQL injection attempts, or exploitation of application logic flaws.
• Threat: This can lead to data breaches, data manipulation, denial of service, or complete application compromise.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Database Security Hardening: Implement strong database security measures, including strong passwords, access controls, and network segmentation.
  • Application Security Best Practices: Follow secure coding practices to prevent SQL injection and other vulnerabilities that could be exploited with the gained insights.
  • Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS): Deploy IDPS to detect and block malicious activity originating from the compromised application or attacker's network.

Attack Tree Path: 8. File Inclusion Vulnerabilities in Configuration Loading (if applicable) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in how Druid loads configuration files, potentially allowing an attacker to include and load a malicious configuration file.
• Threat: Successful file inclusion can lead to arbitrary code execution on the server, granting the attacker complete control over the system.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Secure Configuration Loading Mechanisms: Ensure that configuration loading processes are robust and not susceptible to file inclusion attacks. Validate file paths and inputs used in configuration loading.
  • Principle of Least Privilege (File System): Run the application with minimal necessary file system permissions to limit the impact of potential file inclusion vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 9. Include Malicious Configuration File [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Injecting a malicious configuration file into the configuration loading process, leveraging a file inclusion vulnerability.
• Threat: Loading a malicious configuration file can allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code or modify application behavior as defined in the malicious configuration.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Input Validation (Configuration Loading): Thoroughly validate any input used in configuration file paths to prevent injection of malicious paths.
  • Regular Security Audits: Conduct security audits to identify and remediate any potential file inclusion vulnerabilities in configuration loading mechanisms.

Attack Tree Path: 10. Execute Arbitrary Code or Modify Application Behavior [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Achieving code execution or modifying application behavior as a result of successfully loading a malicious configuration file via file inclusion.
• Threat: Arbitrary code execution represents the highest level of compromise, allowing the attacker to perform any action on the server, including data theft, system manipulation, and establishing persistent access.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Prevent File Inclusion (Critical): Focus on preventing file inclusion vulnerabilities in the first place, as this is the root cause of this critical risk.
  • Runtime Application Self-Protection (RASP): Consider using RASP solutions to detect and prevent code execution attempts at runtime.

Attack Tree Path: 11. Exposed Configuration Files [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Accidental or intentional exposure of Druid configuration files due to misconfigured web servers, directory traversal vulnerabilities, or insecure deployment practices.
• Threat: Exposed configuration files often contain sensitive information, including database credentials, API keys, and other secrets, which can be directly used to compromise the application and related systems.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Secure Configuration File Storage (Critical): Store configuration files outside the web server's document root and restrict file system permissions to only the application user.
  • Regular Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits to identify and remediate any potential vulnerabilities that could lead to configuration file exposure, such as directory traversal or misconfigurations.
  • Principle of Least Privilege (File System): Ensure web server processes and users have minimal necessary permissions to access configuration files.

Attack Tree Path: 12. Access Configuration Files (e.g., through misconfigured web server, directory traversal) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Exploiting web server misconfigurations or directory traversal vulnerabilities to access and retrieve Druid configuration files.
• Threat: Successful access allows the attacker to read the contents of configuration files and extract sensitive information.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Web Server Hardening: Properly configure and harden the web server to prevent directory traversal and other access control bypasses.
  • Regular Vulnerability Scanning: Use vulnerability scanners to identify and remediate web server misconfigurations and vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 13. Read Sensitive Configuration Data (Database Credentials, etc.) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Analyzing the content of exposed configuration files to extract sensitive data, particularly database credentials.
• Threat: Obtaining database credentials provides a direct path to database compromise, potentially leading to data breaches, data manipulation, and denial of service.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Secure Configuration File Storage (Critical): Preventing configuration file exposure is the primary defense against this attack.
  • Credential Management: Consider using secure credential management solutions to avoid storing sensitive credentials directly in configuration files, if possible.

Attack Tree Path: 14. Use Credentials to Access and Compromise Database [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Utilizing the extracted database credentials to directly connect to and compromise the database server.
• Threat: Database compromise is a critical security incident, potentially leading to data breaches, data manipulation, denial of service, and reputational damage.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Database Security Hardening (Critical): Implement strong database security measures, including strong passwords, access controls, network segmentation, and regular security audits.
  • Database Activity Monitoring: Implement database activity monitoring to detect and respond to suspicious database access attempts.

Attack Tree Path: 15. Exploit Druid Monitoring and Management Features [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Targeting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in Druid's monitoring and management features, such as the monitor panel, JMX interface, or HTTP APIs.
• Threat: Exploitation can lead to information disclosure, unauthorized access, and potentially control over Druid and the application.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Secure Monitoring Features (Critical): Implement strong authentication and authorization for all Druid monitoring and management features.
  • Regular Security Audits: Include Druid's monitoring features in regular security audits and penetration testing to identify and address any vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 16. Unauthorized Access to Druid Monitor Panel [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Gaining unauthorized access to the Druid monitor panel due to lack of authentication or weak authentication.
• Threat: Unauthorized access leads to information disclosure, potentially revealing sensitive data about the application, database, and system configuration.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Implement Strong Authentication (Monitor Panel - Critical): Always enable and enforce strong authentication for the Druid monitor panel.
  • Authorization Controls (Monitor Panel): Implement authorization to restrict access to the monitor panel to only authorized users or roles.

Attack Tree Path: 17. Lack of Authentication on Monitor Panel [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: The Druid monitor panel is deployed without any authentication mechanism, allowing anyone with network access to access it.
• Threat: Complete information disclosure to any network attacker.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Enable Authentication (Monitor Panel - Critical): Immediately enable authentication for the monitor panel.
  • Default Deny Access: Ensure that access to the monitor panel is denied by default and explicitly granted only to authorized users.

Attack Tree Path: 18. Directly Access Monitor Panel [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Directly accessing the URL of the Druid monitor panel when authentication is lacking.
• Threat: Immediate access to the monitor panel and its exposed information.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Secure Monitor Panel Access (Critical): Prevent direct, unauthenticated access to the monitor panel by implementing authentication and authorization.

Attack Tree Path: 19. Information Disclosure (SQL Queries, Connection Details, Performance Metrics) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Retrieving sensitive information displayed on the Druid monitor panel, such as SQL queries, database connection details, and performance metrics.
• Threat: Disclosed information can be used to plan further attacks, such as SQL injection, database compromise, or exploitation of application logic flaws.
• Actionable Insight:
  • Secure Monitor Panel (Critical): Prevent unauthorized access to the monitor panel to avoid information disclosure.
  • Minimize Information Exposure (Monitor Panel): Review and minimize the amount of sensitive information displayed on the monitor panel.