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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for alibaba/druid

Threat: JMX Configuration Manipulation

  • Threat: JMX Configuration Manipulation

    • Description: An attacker connects to Druid's JMX (Java Management Extensions) interface remotely (if enabled and not secured) and modifies Druid's configuration. They could change connection pool settings (e.g., maxActive, minIdle), disable security features (e.g., the SQL firewall), or alter logging configurations. The most severe scenario involves exploiting a vulnerability in a JMX-exposed method to achieve remote code execution.
    • Impact: Denial of service (by exhausting the connection pool), information disclosure (by disabling security features or altering logging), or potentially even code execution (if a vulnerability exists in a JMX-exposed method).
    • Affected Component: JMX interface and various Druid configuration parameters accessible via JMX.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (if code execution is possible) or High (for DoS and information disclosure).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Disable remote JMX access if not absolutely necessary.
      • If remote JMX is required, enforce strong authentication and authorization (username/password, certificate-based authentication).
      • Use SSL/TLS to encrypt JMX communication.
      • Configure JMX access control lists (ACLs) to restrict access to specific users and operations.

Threat: SQL Injection via WallFilter Bypass

  • Threat: SQL Injection via WallFilter Bypass

    • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious SQL query that bypasses Druid's SQL firewall (WallFilter). This could happen if the WallFilter is misconfigured (e.g., with overly permissive rules), disabled, or if the attacker finds a vulnerability in the WallFilter itself. The attacker then executes arbitrary SQL commands against the database. This threat directly involves a core Druid component designed for security.
    • Impact: Data breaches (reading, modifying, or deleting data), database compromise, potentially even operating system compromise (depending on database privileges).
    • Affected Component: WallFilter (SQL firewall component).
    • Risk Severity: Critical.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Primary: Always use parameterized queries and proper input validation in the application code. Never rely solely on the WallFilter.
      • Configure the WallFilter with a strict, whitelist-based policy. Only allow known-good SQL patterns.
      • Regularly review and update the WallFilter configuration.
      • Keep Druid up to date to receive security patches for the WallFilter.
      • Consider using a Web Application Firewall (WAF) in front of the application.

Threat: Connection Pool Exhaustion (DoS)

  • Threat: Connection Pool Exhaustion (DoS)

    • Description: An attacker opens a large number of database connections through Druid, exceeding the configured maximum number of active connections (maxActive). This prevents legitimate users from accessing the database. This directly targets Druid's connection pooling mechanism.
    • Impact: Denial of service (DoS) – legitimate users cannot access the database.
    • Affected Component: Connection pool management (controlled by parameters like maxActive, minIdle, maxWait).
    • Risk Severity: High.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Configure maxActive to a reasonable value based on expected load and database server capacity.
      • Set appropriate values for minIdle, maxWait, and other connection pool parameters.
      • Implement connection pooling monitoring to detect and alert on potential exhaustion.
      • Use a circuit breaker pattern to prevent cascading failures.

Threat: Unauthorized Access to StatViewServlet

  • Threat: Unauthorized Access to StatViewServlet

    • Description: An attacker gains access to the Druid StatViewServlet web interface. The attacker can then view sensitive information about the database connection pool, executed SQL queries, database schema details.
    • Impact: Information disclosure of database schema, query patterns, connection parameters, and potentially sensitive data exposed in queries. This can aid further attacks.
    • Affected Component: StatViewServlet (web UI component).
    • Risk Severity: High.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Disable StatViewServlet in production if not strictly required.
      • If required, enforce strong authentication and authorization.
      • Change the default URL path of StatViewServlet.
      • Implement IP whitelisting.

Threat: Sensitive Information Leakage in Logs

  • Threat: Sensitive Information Leakage in Logs

    • Description: Druid logs database connection details (including usernames and potentially passwords) or raw SQL queries containing sensitive data due to misconfiguration.
    • Impact: Information disclosure – sensitive data is exposed in log files, potentially accessible to unauthorized individuals.
    • Affected Component: Druid's logging configuration and any components that interact with the logging system.
    • Risk Severity: High (if passwords are leaked).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Configure Druid's logging to redact or mask sensitive information.
      • Use a logging framework that supports data masking or redaction.
      • Review error handling code to ensure sensitive information is not inadvertently logged.
      • Implement strict access controls on log files.

Threat: Druid Configuration File Tampering

  • Threat: Druid Configuration File Tampering

    • Description: An attacker gains access to the server's filesystem and modifies Druid's configuration files. They could change connection parameters, disable security features, or alter logging settings.
    • Impact: Varies depending on the modification. Could lead to denial of service, information disclosure, or even database compromise.
    • Affected Component: Druid configuration files.
    • Risk Severity: High.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement strict file system permissions.
      • Use file integrity monitoring.
      • Store sensitive configuration values in a secure vault or secrets management system.

Threat: Exploitation of Druid Vulnerabilities

  • Threat: Exploitation of Druid Vulnerabilities

    • Description: An attacker exploits a known or unknown vulnerability in Druid itself. This directly impacts the security of the Druid installation.
    • Impact: Varies depending on the vulnerability. Could range from information disclosure to denial of service to remote code execution.
    • Affected Component: Potentially any Druid component, depending on the vulnerability.
    • Risk Severity: Variable (High to Critical, depending on the vulnerability).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Keep Druid up to date with the latest security patches.
      • Monitor for security advisories related to Druid.
      • Perform regular vulnerability scanning and penetration testing.