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Attack Surface Analysis for alibaba/sentinel

Description: Attackers gain access to the Sentinel Dashboard, allowing them to view, modify, or delete rules and configurations. How Sentinel Contributes: The Dashboard is Sentinel's central management interface, providing direct control over its core functionality. Its web-based nature and the power it wields make it a prime target. Example: An attacker uses a discovered default password or exploits a vulnerability in the Dashboard's authentication mechanism to gain administrative access. They then disable all flow control rules, leading to a successful denial-of-service attack. Impact: Complete compromise of Sentinel's functionality, potential denial-of-service, data exposure (if rules reveal sensitive information), bypass of security controls. Risk Severity: Critical Mitigation Strategies: * Strong Authentication: Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all Dashboard users. * Authorization (RBAC): Implement strict Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). Grant users only the minimum necessary permissions. * Regular Updates: Keep the Sentinel Dashboard software absolutely current with the latest security patches. * Web Application Firewall (WAF): Deploy a WAF configured to protect against common web attacks targeting the Dashboard. * Network Segmentation: Isolate the Dashboard from the public internet. Use a dedicated, secure network segment. * Input Validation: Rigorously sanitize all user inputs to the Dashboard to prevent injection attacks. * Security Audits & Penetration Testing: Conduct frequent security audits and penetration tests specifically targeting the Dashboard.

Description: Attackers modify Sentinel's configuration files or environment variables to alter or disable protection rules. How Sentinel Contributes: Sentinel's behavior is directly determined by its configuration. Insecure access to this configuration provides a direct path to manipulate Sentinel's core functionality. Example: An attacker gains write access to the sentinel.properties file (perhaps through a compromised service account or a shared file system vulnerability) and modifies it to set extremely high flow control thresholds, effectively disabling protection. Impact: Weakening or disabling of Sentinel's protection, leading to denial-of-service, performance degradation, or other application-specific impacts. Direct control over Sentinel's core logic. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: * Secure Configuration Management: Use a dedicated, secure configuration management system (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault). Do not store configurations in easily accessible locations. * Strict Access Control: Enforce the principle of least privilege. Only authorized users and processes should have read/write access to configuration files and environment variables. * Integrity Checks: Implement checksums or digital signatures to verify the integrity of configuration files. Detect and prevent unauthorized modifications. * Secure Transport: Use TLS/HTTPS when loading configuration from remote sources (if applicable). * Configuration Validation: Validate configuration data before applying it. Ensure it conforms to expected formats and values, and reject invalid configurations.

Description: Attackers gain control of the dynamic rule source (e.g., Nacos, Apollo, Zookeeper) and inject malicious rules. How Sentinel Contributes: Sentinel's dynamic rule loading feature creates a direct dependency on the security of the external rule source. Compromise of the source is a compromise of Sentinel. Example: An attacker compromises the credentials for the Nacos server used by Sentinel and injects a rule that sets grade to 0 (allow all) for all resources, effectively disabling all of Sentinel's protection mechanisms. Impact: Complete control over Sentinel's rule set, enabling attackers to disable protection, cause denial-of-service, or manipulate application behavior. This is a direct attack on Sentinel's core functionality. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: * Secure the Rule Source: Implement strong authentication and authorization for the dynamic rule source. Use robust access control mechanisms. * Network Segmentation: Isolate the rule source from untrusted networks. Use a dedicated, secure network segment. * Regular Updates: Keep the rule source software (Nacos, Zookeeper, etc.) up-to-date with the latest security patches. * Monitoring: Continuously monitor the rule source for suspicious activity and unauthorized access attempts. Implement alerting. * Secure Communication: Use TLS/HTTPS for all communication between Sentinel and the rule source. * Rule Integrity Checks: Implement mechanisms to verify the integrity of rules retrieved from the dynamic source (e.g., digital signatures or checksums). Reject any rules that fail integrity checks.