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Threat Model Analysis for alibaba/sentinel

Threat: Rogue Sentinel Dashboard

  • Threat: Rogue Sentinel Dashboard

    • Description: An attacker sets up a fake Sentinel dashboard or compromises an existing one to inject malicious rules, modify existing rules, or observe traffic patterns for reconnaissance. The attacker could use social engineering, exploit vulnerabilities in the dashboard's web server, or leverage stolen credentials.
    • Impact:
      • Disabling of legitimate protection mechanisms (flow control, circuit breaking).
      • Introduction of rules that cause denial-of-service.
      • Exposure of sensitive application data or traffic patterns.
      • Potential for further attacks based on gathered information.
    • Affected Sentinel Component: Sentinel Dashboard (web interface and backend).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strong Authentication: Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all dashboard users.
      • Authorization: Use role-based access control (RBAC) to limit user permissions to the minimum necessary.
      • Network Segmentation: Isolate the dashboard on a separate network segment with restricted access.
      • Input Validation: Sanitize all user inputs to prevent injection attacks (e.g., XSS, SQL injection).
      • Regular Security Audits: Conduct penetration testing and vulnerability scanning of the dashboard.
      • Web Application Firewall (WAF): Deploy a WAF in front of the dashboard to filter malicious traffic.
      • HTTPS Only: Enforce HTTPS with strong ciphers and certificate pinning.
      • Monitor Access Logs: Regularly review access logs for suspicious activity.

Threat: Rule Tampering via API

  • Threat: Rule Tampering via API

    • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the Sentinel API (e.g., through compromised credentials, network sniffing, or exploiting a vulnerability in the API client) and modifies flow control rules, circuit breaking rules, or system protection rules.
    • Impact:
      • Disabling of protection, leading to overload and potential service outage.
      • Creation of denial-of-service conditions by setting overly restrictive rules.
      • Bypassing of security controls, allowing malicious traffic to reach the application.
    • Affected Sentinel Component: Sentinel Core API (rule management functions), Sentinel Client Library (if API keys are exposed).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • API Authentication: Use strong API keys or tokens with limited scope.
      • Authorization: Implement RBAC for API access, restricting rule modification to authorized users/services.
      • Input Validation: Validate and sanitize all API requests to prevent injection attacks.
      • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on the API to prevent brute-force attacks.
      • Audit Logging: Log all API calls, including successful and failed attempts, with detailed information about the requestor and changes made.
      • Mutual TLS (mTLS): Use mTLS to authenticate both the client and the server.
      • Configuration Versioning: Implement version control for rules and configurations, allowing for rollback to previous versions.

Threat: Metric Data Manipulation

  • Threat: Metric Data Manipulation

    • Description: An attacker compromises the data store used by Sentinel (e.g., InfluxDB, Prometheus, or a custom implementation) and modifies or deletes metrics data. This could be done through direct access to the data store or by exploiting vulnerabilities in the data ingestion pipeline.
    • Impact:
      • Masking of malicious activity, making it difficult to detect attacks.
      • Incorrect triggering or disabling of adaptive protection rules.
      • Loss of historical data for analysis and troubleshooting.
      • Compromised decision-making by Sentinel based on false data.
    • Affected Sentinel Component: Sentinel DataSource (integration with external data stores), Sentinel Core (metrics processing).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure Data Store: Protect the data store with strong authentication, authorization, and encryption.
      • Network Segmentation: Isolate the data store on a separate network segment.
      • Data Integrity Checks: Implement checksums or other mechanisms to detect data tampering.
      • Regular Backups: Create regular backups of the metrics data.
      • Monitoring: Monitor the data store for unauthorized access or modifications.
      • Input Validation (Data Ingestion): If data is ingested from external sources, validate and sanitize the input.

Threat: Sentinel Cluster Resource Exhaustion

  • Threat: Sentinel Cluster Resource Exhaustion

    • Description: An attacker floods the Sentinel cluster with a large number of requests or rules, exceeding its capacity and causing it to become unresponsive. This could be a direct attack on the cluster or an indirect consequence of a large-scale attack on the protected application.
    • Impact:
      • Loss of flow control, circuit breaking, and system protection capabilities.
      • Denial-of-service for the protected application.
      • Potential cascading failures if other services depend on Sentinel.
    • Affected Sentinel Component: Sentinel Cluster (all nodes), Sentinel Client Library (if it overwhelms the cluster).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Horizontal Scaling: Deploy the Sentinel cluster with multiple nodes and auto-scaling capabilities.
      • Resource Limits: Configure resource limits (CPU, memory, network) for the Sentinel cluster.
      • Rate Limiting (Client-Side): Implement rate limiting on the client-side to prevent overwhelming the cluster.
      • Monitoring: Monitor the cluster's resource utilization and performance.
      • Load Testing: Regularly conduct load testing to determine the cluster's capacity.
      • Circuit Breaker (Client-Side): Implement a circuit breaker in the client application to handle cases where the Sentinel cluster is unavailable.

Threat: Client Library Vulnerability Exploitation

  • Threat: Client Library Vulnerability Exploitation

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the Sentinel client library (e.g., a buffer overflow, code injection, or dependency vulnerability) to gain control of the application or bypass Sentinel's protection mechanisms. This directly impacts Sentinel because the vulnerability exists within the Sentinel library itself.
    • Impact:
      • Arbitrary code execution on the application server.
      • Bypassing of flow control and circuit breaking.
      • Data exfiltration.
      • Potential for lateral movement within the network.
    • Affected Sentinel Component: Sentinel Client Library (various modules depending on the vulnerability).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regular Updates: Keep the Sentinel client library up-to-date with the latest security patches.
      • Dependency Management: Use a dependency management tool to track and update dependencies, including Sentinel.
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Regularly scan the application and its dependencies for known vulnerabilities.
      • Code Review: Conduct security code reviews of the application's integration with Sentinel.
      • Least Privilege: Run the application with the least privilege necessary.