Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
63 lines (51 loc) · 5.23 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

63 lines (51 loc) · 5.23 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for apache/commons-codec

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code, Leak Sensitive Data, or Cause DoS via Apache Commons Codec

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      Attacker's Goal:
                                      Execute Arbitrary Code, Leak Sensitive Data, or Cause DoS
                                      via Apache Commons Codec
                                                  |
                                                  |
                                          Vulnerable Codec Usage
                                                  |
                                          ---------------------
                                                  |
                                          Insecure Deserialization (if applicable) [CRITICAL]
                                                  |
                                          ---------------------
                                          |                     |
                                    Gadget Chain Injection      Object Confusion
                                    [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: Vulnerable Codec Usage

  • Description: This is the overarching category where the application uses a Commons Codec component in a way that creates a vulnerability, even if the codec itself is not flawed. The critical vulnerability here stems from how the output of the codec is subsequently handled.
  • Focus: The primary concern is the interaction between Commons Codec's decoding functions (e.g., Base64 decoding) and the application's deserialization process.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Deserialization (if applicable) [CRITICAL]

  • Description: This is the critical node. It represents the scenario where data decoded by Commons Codec is then passed to an unsafe deserialization mechanism. This is not a vulnerability within Commons Codec itself, but rather a vulnerability in how the application uses the decoded output.
  • Likelihood: Medium to High (dependent on whether the application performs deserialization after decoding). If deserialization is used, the likelihood is high.
  • Impact: Very High (Potential for Arbitrary Code Execution).
  • Effort: Medium to High (finding a suitable gadget chain can be complex, but readily available tools and exploits exist).
  • Skill Level: Advanced to Expert (requires understanding of deserialization vulnerabilities and exploit development).
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (requires careful code review and potentially dynamic analysis to identify vulnerable deserialization patterns).
  • Mitigation:
    • Avoid native Java serialization if at all possible.
    • If deserialization is necessary, use a secure deserialization library (e.g., Jackson or Gson) with strict whitelisting of allowed classes. Never deserialize untrusted data without strong safeguards.
    • Implement robust input validation before deserialization to ensure the data conforms to expected types and structures.
    • Consider using a Content Security Policy (CSP) to limit the potential impact of code execution vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Gadget Chain Injection [CRITICAL]

  • Description: This is the most direct and dangerous attack vector within insecure deserialization. The attacker crafts a malicious payload that, when decoded by Commons Codec and then deserialized, triggers a "gadget chain." A gadget chain is a sequence of carefully chosen class instantiations and method calls that ultimately lead to arbitrary code execution.
  • Likelihood: High (if insecure deserialization is present).
  • Impact: Very High (Arbitrary Code Execution).
  • Effort: Medium to High (requires finding or crafting a suitable gadget chain; many publicly available gadget chains exist for common libraries).
  • Skill Level: Advanced to Expert.
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard (requires deep understanding of the application's classpath and potential gadget chains).
    • Mitigation: Same as for Insecure Deserialization. The best defense is to prevent insecure deserialization in the first place.

Attack Tree Path: Object Confusion

  • Description: The attacker manipulates the encoded data to cause the deserialization process to create unexpected objects. While not directly leading to RCE like a gadget chain, this can still lead to unexpected application behavior, potential logic flaws, or be a stepping stone to other vulnerabilities.
  • Likelihood: Medium (if insecure deserialization is present, and the application logic is susceptible to unexpected object types).
  • Impact: Medium to High (depends on how the application handles the unexpected objects; could range from minor misbehavior to more serious logic flaws).
  • Effort: Medium.
  • Skill Level: Advanced.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard.
  • Mitigation: Same as for Insecure Deserialization, with a particular emphasis on strict type checking and validation after decoding and before deserialization.