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Attack Tree Analysis for apache/commons-io

Objective: Compromise Application via Exploitation of Apache Commons IO Weaknesses

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Compromise Application via Exploitation of Apache Commons IO Weaknesses [HIGH RISK PATH START]
      1. Exploit Path Traversal Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 1.1. Bypass Path Sanitization using FilenameUtils.normalize/cleanPath
        • 1.1.1. Craft Malicious Paths [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • 1.2. Direct File Access with Unvalidated Paths using FileUtils [HIGH RISK PATH START]
        • 1.2.1. Supply User-Controlled Paths to FileUtils Methods [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      1. Exploit File Upload/Processing Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH START]
      • 2.1. Malicious File Upload via FileUploadUtils (or similar) [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 2.1.1. Upload Web Shell/Executable [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
        • 2.1.2. Upload Malicious Data File [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • 2.2. Vulnerabilities in File Processing Logic using Commons IO
        • 2.2.3. Deserialization Vulnerabilities (Indirect) [CRITICAL NODE]
      1. Exploit Information Disclosure Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH START]
      • 4.1. Path Traversal leading to Sensitive File Access [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 4.1.1. Read Configuration Files [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1. Craft Malicious Paths [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vector: Input manipulation to craft file paths containing ".." sequences or other path manipulation characters that FilenameUtils.normalize or cleanPath might not fully sanitize, especially if used incorrectly or with insufficient validation before calling these functions.

  • Risk Assessment:
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High - Access to sensitive files, potential code execution if combined with other vulnerabilities.
    • Effort: Low - Easily crafted payloads, readily available tools.
    • Skill Level: Low - Basic understanding of path traversal.
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium - Depends on logging and input validation, can be obfuscated.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigation:
    • FilenameUtils.normalize and cleanPath are not foolproof for sanitization.
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement a strict whitelist of allowed base directories and file extensions.
      • Validate user-supplied paths against the whitelist before using Commons IO functions.
      • Canonicalize the path after sanitization (e.g., using File.getCanonicalPath()) and compare it to the expected base directory.
      • Implement robust input validation to reject suspicious paths before Commons IO processing.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1. Supply User-Controlled Paths to FileUtils Methods [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vector: Passing user-supplied input directly to FileUtils methods like readFileToString, copyFile, listFiles, openInputStream, etc., without proper validation or sanitization.

  • Risk Assessment:
    • Likelihood: High - Common developer mistake, especially in quick implementations.
    • Impact: Critical - Full file system access depending on application permissions, data breach, code execution.
    • Effort: Very Low - Simple parameter manipulation in requests.
    • Skill Level: Low - Basic web request knowledge.
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy - Should be detected by basic input validation and access control checks (if implemented). If not, very hard to detect passively.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigation:
    • Directly using user-controlled paths in FileUtils is extremely dangerous.
    • Mitigation:
      • Never directly use user input as file paths for FileUtils methods without rigorous validation.
      • Implement strict input validation and sanitization.
      • Use a whitelist approach for allowed file paths or operations.
      • Enforce the principle of least privilege for application file system access.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1. Upload Web Shell/Executable [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vector: Uploading a malicious file (e.g., JSP, PHP, executable) disguised as a legitimate file type, hoping to execute it on the server if the application saves it to a web-accessible directory or processes it insecurely.

  • Risk Assessment:
    • Likelihood: Medium - Common attack vector, depends on upload validation and server configuration.
    • Impact: Critical - Remote code execution, full system compromise.
    • Effort: Low - Readily available web shells and upload tools.
    • Skill Level: Low - Basic understanding of web requests and server-side scripting.
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium - File type validation, web application firewalls (WAFs) can help, but bypasses are possible.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigation:
    • Web shell uploads are a primary method for gaining remote code execution.
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement strict file type validation based on file content (magic numbers), not just extensions.
      • Sanitize uploaded file names.
      • Store uploaded files in a non-web-accessible directory with restricted execution permissions.
      • Implement Content Security Policy (CSP).
      • Use antivirus/malware scanning on uploaded files.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.2. Upload Malicious Data File [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vector: Uploading a file containing malicious data (e.g., XML with XXE, CSV with formula injection, image with embedded exploits) that could be processed by the application using Commons IO and trigger vulnerabilities in the processing logic.

  • Risk Assessment:
    • Likelihood: Medium - Depends on application's file processing logic (XML, CSV, images, etc.).
    • Impact: High - Data corruption, information disclosure, DoS, potentially code execution (e.g., XXE, formula injection).
    • Effort: Medium - Requires crafting malicious data files specific to processing logic.
    • Skill Level: Medium - Need to understand file formats and related vulnerabilities.
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium - Input validation on file content, secure parsing libraries are needed.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigation:
    • Malicious data within files can exploit vulnerabilities in file processing.
    • Mitigation:
      • Validate file content against expected schemas or formats.
      • Use secure parsing libraries that are resistant to known vulnerabilities (e.g., for XML, CSV).
      • Sanitize or neutralize potentially harmful data within uploaded files before processing.
      • Apply input validation to the content of the uploaded file, not just metadata.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.3. Deserialization Vulnerabilities (Indirect) [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vector: If the application uses Commons IO to read files that are then deserialized (e.g., Java serialized objects), and the application doesn't properly validate the content, it could be vulnerable to deserialization attacks. (While not directly Commons IO's fault, it's part of the attack chain).

  • Risk Assessment:
    • Likelihood: Low - Requires application to deserialize data read by Commons IO, and vulnerable deserialization library.
    • Impact: Critical - Remote code execution, full system compromise.
    • Effort: Medium - Requires crafting malicious serialized data, understanding deserialization vulnerabilities.
    • Skill Level: High - Need expertise in deserialization attacks and Java (if Java serialization).
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard - Deserialization attacks can be difficult to detect, especially if not logging deserialization attempts.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigation:
    • Deserialization of untrusted data is inherently risky and can lead to RCE.
    • Mitigation:
      • Avoid deserializing data from untrusted sources if possible.
      • If deserialization is necessary, use secure alternatives to native serialization (e.g., JSON, Protocol Buffers).
      • If native serialization is unavoidable, implement robust input validation and consider using deserialization filters or sandboxing.
      • Regularly audit dependencies for known deserialization vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 4.1.1. Read Configuration Files [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vector: Using path traversal to read application configuration files (e.g., .properties, .xml, .yml) containing sensitive information like database credentials, API keys, etc., using FileUtils.readFileToString.

  • Risk Assessment:
    • Likelihood: Medium - Configuration files often stored in predictable locations, path traversal is common.
    • Impact: High - Disclosure of sensitive credentials, API keys, application secrets.
    • Effort: Low - Simple path traversal attempts.
    • Skill Level: Low - Basic understanding of path traversal.
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium - Depends on logging and access control, can be obfuscated.
  • Actionable Insights & Mitigation:
    • Configuration files often contain sensitive secrets and are prime targets for information disclosure.
    • Mitigation:
      • Store configuration files outside of the web root and in locations not easily guessable.
      • Restrict file system permissions on configuration files to only necessary processes.
      • Implement robust path traversal prevention measures as described in section 1.
      • Encrypt sensitive data within configuration files if possible (e.g., database passwords).
      • Regularly audit access to configuration files.