attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for apache/commons-io

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access/Control via Commons IO

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      [*** Gain Unauthorized Access/Control via Commons IO ***]
                                                    /                                 
                                                   /                                   
                      [1. Exploit Deserialization Vulnerabilities]       [2. Leverage File System Interactions]
                               /                                                                    \
                              /                                                                      \
(HIGH-RISK) -->[***1.1 Use crafted input***]                                         [2.3 Abuse FileUtils.deleteQuietly]
  to trigger unsafe                                                                                    
(HIGH-RISK) -->[***deserialization***]                                                                \
  in IOUtils.readObject                                                                                 \
  or similar methods.                                                                      [2.3.3 Trigger]
                                                                                                   DoS by deleting
                                                                                                   critical system
                                                                                                   files.
(HIGH-RISK) -->                                                                                    /
                                                                                                   /
                                                                                    [***2.3.3 Trigger DoS***]
                                                                                    by deleting critical
                                                                                    system files.

Attack Tree Path: Gain Unauthorized Access/Control via Commons IO (Critical Node)

• Description: This is the overarching attacker goal. The attacker aims to leverage vulnerabilities within or related to the Apache Commons IO library to gain unauthorized access to the application, its data, or the underlying system. This could involve reading, modifying, or deleting data, executing arbitrary code, or causing a denial of service.
• Why Critical: This node represents the ultimate objective and the success condition for the attacker. All other attack steps are aimed at achieving this goal.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Use crafted input to trigger unsafe deserialization in IOUtils.readObject or similar methods (Critical Node, High-Risk Path)

• Description: The attacker crafts a malicious serialized object and provides it as input to the application. The application, using IOUtils.readObject (or a similar method that reads and deserializes data from a stream provided by Commons IO), attempts to deserialize the malicious object. If the application doesn't have proper security measures in place (like whitelisting allowed classes), the deserialization process can trigger the execution of arbitrary code embedded within the malicious object.
• Why Critical: This is a critical node because successful exploitation often leads to Remote Code Execution (RCE), granting the attacker complete control over the application and potentially the underlying system.
• Why High-Risk:
  • Likelihood: Medium (Highly dependent on application input handling. High if untrusted data is directly passed to a deserialization method).
  • Impact: Very High (RCE leads to complete compromise).
  • Effort: Medium (Finding a working gadget chain can be time-consuming, but tools and pre-built payloads exist).
  • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced (Requires understanding of Java serialization and gadget chains).
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (Requires monitoring for unusual process behavior or network traffic. Standard input validation might not catch serialized payloads).

Attack Tree Path: deserialization

• Description: This highlights the critical action within 1.1. The core vulnerability is the unsafe deserialization.
• Why Critical: This is the point of no return.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3.3 Trigger DoS by deleting critical system files (Critical Node, High-Risk Path)

• Description: The attacker manipulates input to the application in a way that controls the file path passed to FileUtils.deleteQuietly. The attacker provides a path to a critical system file or directory. deleteQuietly, as its name suggests, attempts to delete the file without throwing an exception if it fails. If the application runs with sufficient privileges (e.g., as root or a highly privileged user), the deletion can succeed, causing a denial-of-service (DoS) condition by rendering the system or application unusable.
  • Why Critical: This node is critical because it directly leads to a significant disruption of service. The loss of critical system files can have severe consequences, ranging from application failure to complete system compromise.
  • Why High-Risk:
    • Likelihood: Low to Medium (Requires the ability to control the path passed to deleteQuietly and the application running with sufficient privileges).
    • Impact: High (Can cause system instability or complete failure).
    • Effort: Low (If the attacker can control the path, the attack is trivial).
    • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate.
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires monitoring for deletion of critical files. The "quiet" nature of the deletion makes it harder to detect proactively, but the effects of the DoS will be obvious).