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Attack Tree Analysis for apache/commons-lang

Objective: Compromise application using Apache Commons Lang by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within the library itself.

Attack Tree Visualization

0. Compromise Application Using Apache Commons Lang [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
    ├── 1. Exploit Deserialization Vulnerability in SerializationUtils [CRITICAL NODE]
    │   ├── 1.1. Application uses SerializationUtils.deserialize() on untrusted input [CRITICAL NODE]
    │   │   └── 1.1.3. Craft malicious serialized object (e.g., using ysoserial or similar tools) [CRITICAL NODE]
    │   │       └── 1.1.4. Send malicious serialized object to vulnerable endpoint/code path [CRITICAL NODE]
    │   │           └── 1.1.4.2. Achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on server [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH IMPACT] [HIGH-RISK PATH END]

Attack Tree Path: 0. Compromise Application Using Apache Commons Lang [HIGH-RISK PATH START]

  • Attack Vector: Root goal of the attacker. Represents the overall objective of exploiting Commons Lang to compromise the application.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Critical
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure coding practices throughout the application.
    • Regular security assessments and penetration testing.
    • Defense-in-depth security architecture.

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Deserialization Vulnerability in SerializationUtils [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Targeting the SerializationUtils component for deserialization vulnerabilities. This is the primary high-risk attack vector related to Commons Lang.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Critical
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Eliminate or minimize the use of SerializationUtils.deserialize() on untrusted input.
    • If deserialization is unavoidable, implement strict input validation (though extremely difficult for serialized objects).
    • Consider using secure deserialization libraries or alternative data formats (JSON, Protobuf).
    • Apply principle of least privilege to application processes.
    • Regularly update Commons Lang library.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Application uses SerializationUtils.deserialize() on untrusted input [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Identifying and exploiting code locations where the application uses SerializationUtils.deserialize() to process data from external, potentially malicious sources.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Critical
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Code review to identify all usages of SerializationUtils.deserialize().
    • Trace data flow to determine if input to deserialize() originates from untrusted sources (user input, external APIs, network data).
    • Implement input validation and sanitization (if deserialization is absolutely necessary, but highly complex and error-prone for serialized objects).
    • Consider architectural changes to avoid deserialization of untrusted data.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3. Craft malicious serialized object (e.g., using ysoserial or similar tools) [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Creating a specially crafted serialized Java object that, when deserialized by the vulnerable application, will execute attacker-controlled code. Tools like ysoserial simplify this process by providing pre-built payloads and gadget chains.
  • Likelihood: High (if previous steps are successful)
  • Impact: Critical (Payload Delivery)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Medium (Tool Usage, Gadget Chain Understanding)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Signature-based detection possible, evasion possible)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Address the root cause: avoid deserialization of untrusted data (mitigation for 1.1).
    • Implement network intrusion detection systems (IDS) or intrusion prevention systems (IPS) to detect known malicious serialized payloads (signature-based detection).
    • Employ anomaly detection to identify unusual deserialization patterns.
    • Keep Java runtime and dependencies updated to patch known gadget chains (though new ones are constantly discovered).

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.4. Send malicious serialized object to vulnerable endpoint/code path [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Transmitting the crafted malicious serialized object to the identified vulnerable endpoint or code path in the application, triggering the deserialization process.
  • Likelihood: High (if previous steps are successful)
  • Impact: Critical (Exploitation Trigger)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Network Monitoring, Anomaly Detection)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Address the root cause: avoid deserialization of untrusted data (mitigation for 1.1).
    • Implement Web Application Firewall (WAF) rules to detect and block suspicious serialized data in requests.
    • Monitor network traffic for unusual patterns or large serialized data payloads.
    • Rate limiting and input validation at the application entry points.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.4.2. Achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on server [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH IMPACT] [HIGH-RISK PATH END]

  • Attack Vector: Successful deserialization of the malicious object leads to the execution of attacker-controlled code on the application server. This is the ultimate goal of this high-risk path, resulting in full system compromise.
  • Likelihood: Very High (if previous steps are successful)
  • Impact: Critical
  • Effort: N/A (Outcome)
  • Skill Level: N/A (Outcome)
  • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard (Post-Exploitation activity)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Prevent reaching this stage by effectively mitigating earlier steps, especially 1.1.
    • Implement robust post-exploitation detection and response mechanisms (e.g., endpoint detection and response - EDR).
    • Regular security monitoring and incident response planning.
    • System hardening and least privilege configurations to limit the impact of RCE.