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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for apache/httpcomponents-client

Attack Surface: HTTP Request Smuggling

Description: Exploiting discrepancies in HTTP request parsing between front-end and back-end servers, leading to request injection. httpcomponents-client's behavior in handling ambiguous or malformed requests can contribute to this if not carefully managed by the application. How httpcomponents-client contributes: The library's handling of Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers, and its request construction mechanisms, can be exploited if the application doesn't enforce strict header validation or if vulnerabilities exist in the library's parsing logic itself. Example: An application using httpcomponents-client sends a crafted request with conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers. Due to differences in interpretation between proxies and backend servers, part of the request is misinterpreted as belonging to a subsequent request, leading to smuggling. Impact: Bypassing security controls, unauthorized access, cache poisoning, session hijacking. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies:

  • Strict Header Validation (Application): The application should validate and sanitize request headers before they are processed by httpcomponents-client, especially Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding.
  • httpcomponents-client Configuration Review: Review httpcomponents-client's configuration and usage to ensure it minimizes ambiguity in request parsing. Consider using request interceptors to enforce header consistency if needed.
  • Server-Side Hardening: Harden backend servers to be resilient against request smuggling, regardless of client behavior.

Attack Surface: Insecure TLS/SSL Configuration

Description: Misconfiguration of TLS/SSL settings within httpcomponents-client, leading to weakened encryption and vulnerability to Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks. This is a direct configuration issue within the library's usage. How httpcomponents-client contributes: httpcomponents-client provides extensive options for configuring TLS/SSL through SSLContext and SSLConnectionSocketFactory. Incorrectly configuring these components directly weakens the security of connections made by the library. Example: An application using httpcomponents-client disables certificate validation or allows weak cipher suites in its SSLContext configuration. This allows an attacker to intercept and decrypt communication between the application and the server. Impact: Data confidentiality breach, data integrity compromise, MITM attacks, credential theft. Risk Severity: Critical Mitigation Strategies:

  • Strong TLS Configuration in httpcomponents-client: Configure SSLContext and SSLConnectionSocketFactory within httpcomponents-client to enforce strong TLS protocols (TLS 1.2+), secure cipher suites, and strict certificate validation.
  • Avoid Disabling Certificate Validation: Never disable certificate validation in production environments. Only disable for controlled testing if absolutely necessary and re-enable for production.
  • Regular Configuration Audits: Periodically review the TLS/SSL configuration of httpcomponents-client to ensure it aligns with security best practices and industry standards.

Attack Surface: Connection Pool Exhaustion/DoS

Description: An attacker exhausts the application's connection pool managed by httpcomponents-client, leading to denial of service for legitimate users. Misconfiguration or lack of proper limits in httpcomponents-client's connection pooling facilitates this. How httpcomponents-client contributes: httpcomponents-client's connection pooling mechanism, if not properly configured with appropriate limits and timeouts, can be abused to exhaust resources. Example: An attacker floods the application with requests, rapidly consuming all connections in the httpcomponents-client connection pool. Legitimate requests are then unable to obtain connections and are denied service. Impact: Denial of Service (DoS), application unavailability. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies:

  • Configure Connection Pool Limits in httpcomponents-client: Properly configure httpcomponents-client's PoolingHttpClientConnectionManager with appropriate maxTotal connections, defaultMaxPerRoute, and connection timeouts.
  • Implement Request Rate Limiting (Application/WAF): Implement rate limiting to control the number of incoming requests, preventing attackers from overwhelming the connection pool.
  • Monitor Connection Pool Usage: Monitor connection pool metrics to detect and respond to potential exhaustion attacks.

Attack Surface: Decompression Bombs (Zip/Gzip/Deflate)

Description: Exploiting automatic decompression features of httpcomponents-client by sending highly compressed data that expands to a massive size upon decompression, causing resource exhaustion and denial of service. This is relevant if the application relies on httpcomponents-client to handle compressed responses. How httpcomponents-client contributes: If httpcomponents-client is configured to automatically decompress responses (e.g., via Accept-Encoding header and handling Content-Encoding), and the application doesn't impose limits, it becomes vulnerable to decompression bombs. Example: An attacker sends a server response with Content-Encoding: gzip containing a highly compressed payload. httpcomponents-client automatically decompresses this, leading to excessive memory and CPU usage, potentially causing a DoS. Impact: Denial of Service (DoS), resource exhaustion, application instability. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies:

  • Implement Decompression Size Limits (Application): The application should implement limits on the maximum size of decompressed data, regardless of httpcomponents-client's automatic decompression. This might involve custom response interceptors or content handling logic.
  • Resource Monitoring during Decompression: Monitor resource usage during content decompression to detect potential decompression bomb attacks.
  • Careful Handling of Compressed Content: If automatic decompression by httpcomponents-client is not strictly necessary, consider disabling it and handling decompression in a more controlled manner at the application level with explicit size checks.